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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three papers that, together, analyze the impacts
of education and/or workplace policies on student/worker outcomes, with an
emphasis on gender and non-traditional higher education paths. In chap-
ter 1, I study the effects of statewide credit transfer policies on community
college enrollment, degree attainment, and transfers into public four-year in-
stitutions. Community colleges provide entry points to higher education for
42 percent of undergraduates. To facilitate and encourage transfers, states
have enacted statewide articulation laws, which mandate the development of
formal transfer agreements between community colleges and public, four-year
institutions. In this paper I estimate the direct effects of statewide articula-
tion, namely whether they increase transfers from community colleges, and
the indirect effects, whether they change student enrollment and attainment
choices. I show evidence that statewide articulation laws did not increase
transfers, but increased community college enrollment, and non-vocational
associate’s degree attainment. To investigate the effects of articulation agree-
ments on transfers into four-year public universities, I collect community
college transfer data from the state of California. My findings show that
California’s STAR act did not significantly increase transfers from California
Community Colleges to California State University campuses. I further ex-
ploit a quasi-experiment wherein states implement articulation policies over
multiple years, and find a statistically significant long-run 20 percent increase
in enrollment at community colleges. This effect is driven by students’ sub-
stituting away from less competitive four-year institutions. I also find a 17.4
percent increase in non-vocational associate’s degrees awarded.
In chapter 2, co-authored with Avery Calkins, Ariel Binder, and Brenden
Timpe, we study the impacts of gendered peer environments on women’s
college major choices. We leverage variation in the timing of women’s col-
leges’ transition to coeducation throughout the 1960s-2000s to study how
ii
exposure to a gendered social environment affects women’s human capital
investments. Applying event study and synthetic control analyses to newly
collected historical data, we find that the share of women majoring in STEM
at newly coeducational colleges declined by 2.0 percentage points (24%) after
ten years of coeducation. Coeducation induced a large increase in the male
share of the student body, but did not measurably influence the male share of
faculty, capacity constraints, or the ability composition of female students. A
simple extrapolation of our main estimate suggests that gendered peer effects
can account for 34% of the gender gap in STEM majoring. These findings
support the hypothesis that non-pecuniary factors, related to social norms
and gender roles, shape gender gaps in major choice that in turn perpetuate
the gender wage gap.
In chapter 3, co-authored with Russell Weinstein, we study the effects of
outside options on worker’s wages. In particular, we examine the probability
that a worker’s wage increases, which we proxy with a worker appearing as
one of the five highest paid employees in their firm, after experiencing an
outside opening. We focus on the orchestra setting where vacancies are rare,
making it possible to identify meaningful changes in outside options. Fur-
thermore, the nature of the classical musician industry makes it so that we
can identify the relevant set of outside options for each musicians in the or-
chestra. Using data from orchestra rosters and wage data from orchestra tax
forms (Form 990), we estimate an event-study model and find evidence that
musicians are 1.1 percentage points more likely to appear as one of the five
highest paid employees in their orchestra within two years after they experi-
ence an opening for their instrument-position in another orchestra, relative
to the year before the opening. However, this result is not statistically sig-
nificant. Workers who have been in the orchestra for 10-19 years experience
a statistically significant 3.69 percentage point increase, which is also sta-
tistically significantly larger than the effect for musicians with 0-9 years of
tenure.
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CHAPTER 1




Educational attainment is an important determinant of long-run labor-market
outcomes. An average student with a college degree will earn twice as much as
one with only a high school diploma (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Hershbein
and Kearney, 2014; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Rising costs present a
barrier to enrollment for many students. To address increasing costs, partic-
ularly of four-year institutions, community colleges were designed to provide
a low-cost, easy-to-access pathway to the benefits associated with a college
degree.1 Since 1960, community colleges have educated nearly half of all first-
time freshmen in the United States, of which 80 percent aspire to transfer to
four-year institutions. Only a quarter of these students are able to transfer,
however, and those who do lose an average of 26 percent of their completed
credits in the process (Horn and Skomsvold, 2011; Government Accountabil-
ity, 2017; Baker, 2016; Schudde et al., 2020). Research highlights innate abil-
ity and socioeconomic background as potential explanations for low transfer
rates. Much less work has discussed the role of institutional challenges that
students face, in particular the difficulties they face with credit transfer.
In this paper I examine how transfer policies - statewide articulation agree-
ments (SAAs) - affect students’ transfer, enrollment, and degree-attainment
decisions. SAAs are contracts between state community colleges and public
universities that allow more credits to transfer across institutions more ef-
ficiently. This will encourage more students to transfer and will also alter
the costs and benefits of attending community college, increasing its option
value. Specifically, in states with an SAA, students can enroll in up to two
1Kane and Rouse (1999) provide a summary of community colleges, their history and
impacts
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years of coursework required for a bachelor’s degree at a community college,
which offers them at reduced tuition rates, without hindering their academic
progress. Without an SAA, there is no guarantee that credits will trans-
fer, which increases time-to-degree for students who choose the community
college route. For this reason, the presence of an SAA can induce more first-
time freshmen to enroll in the two-year sector. Finally, most SAAs require
an associate’s degree to guarantee transfer of credits, therefore making it
more likely that a student desiring to transfer will obtain a credential from
a community college along the way.
I begin by estimating the direct effects of SAAs, namely whether transfers
from community colleges into four-year institutions increase. To conduct this
analysis I utilize hand collected data from the state of California. Existing
data do not distinguish whether students transferred from another four-year
institution or from a community college. Therefore, I collect detailed data on
transfer-in enrollment by sending institutions from both the California State
University (CSU) and the University of California (UC) systems. I focus
my analysis on the 2010 California Students Transfer Achievement Reform
Act (STAR), which developed an agreement between California Community
Colleges (CCCs) and the CSU system. In principle, this act affected transfers
into the CSU system but not the UC system. By comparing transfer-in rates
into the CSU system with those into and UC system using a difference-in-
differences, I show that the STAR act led to a statistically significant one-
percentage-point increase in CCC transfer-in enrollment at CSU campuses
relative to UC campuses. This estimate equates to an additional 191 students
per CSU campus per year, relative to UC campuses. Considering that there
are 112 community colleges in the state of California, this increase yields, on
average, only two additional students transferring out of each CCC per year.
The results of the triple difference design, where I include first-time freshmen
as an additional control group, show no effect of the STAR act on transfers
from the CCCs to the CSU campuses. This implies that the results of the
difference-in-differences analysis is mainly driven by overall transfer patters
in the state of California, as well as enrollment patters at the CSU campuses.
This is to be expected given that this policy was passed right after the great
recession, when many students decided to enroll in community colleges.
I then examine the indirect effects of SAAs using temporal variations in
states’ adoption of articulation policies. I use a difference-in-differences ap-
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proach to estimate the effects on first-time freshman enrollment and degree
attainment at community colleges. I show that SAAs lead to an increase
in first-time freshman enrollment at community colleges. Insofar as commu-
nity colleges disproportionately serve nontraditional students, I test whether
SAA policies have a stronger effects on this population. Using full and
part-time enrollment as proxies-for traditional and non-traditional students,
respectively-I find that SAAs are more effective in increasing non-traditional
enrollment in the long run. I further explore a possible mechanism through
which enrollment could increase, specifically, whether students substitute
away from four-year institutions. Initially, when pooling all four-year insti-
tutions together, I find no drop in first-time freshmen enrollment, indicating
that students are not substituting away from four-year institutions. How-
ever, when I disaggregate by the selectivity of four-year institutions, I find
evidence that students are substituting away from less selective four-year in-
stitutions into community colleges. Next I estimate the effects on associate’s
degrees awarded, and although I do not find any effect on overall associate’s
degrees awarded, I show that SAA policies increase non-vocational associate’s
degree attainment while decreasing vocational associate’s degree attainment
at community colleges in states that enact SAA policies. Finally, I supple-
ment all my main findings with several additional heterogeneity exercises and
robustness checks to ensure the accuracy of my analysis.
Three key insights emerge from this analysis. First, the STAR act’s goal
was first and foremost to increase the number of associate’s degrees awarded.
The second goal of interest was increasing transfers into the CSU system.
Baker (2016) suggests that the reform was able to achieve its primary goal,
but my estimates indicate that this did not translate into an increase in
transfers. Second, SAA policies have spillover effects in the form of increasing
part-time student enrollment. This increase is entirely offset by a decrease in
enrollment at less selective four-year institutions. Additionally, SAA policies
increase non-vocational associate’s degree attainment, which indicates that
some of the students who are substituting away from four-year institutions
are obtaining a degree from the community college.Third, degree completion
is an important metric that affects community college funding (Blankstein
and Wolff-Eisenberg, 2020; St. Amour, 2020), and therefore one of the main
goals of SAAs is to increase associate’s-degree attainment. To that end, al-
most all SAAs mandate that students must obtain an associate’s degree to
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guarantee credit transfer, and this has proven to be successful, although the
magnitude of the increase in degree attainment is much smaller (approxi-
mately 30 additional students) than the size of the increase in enrollment
(approximately 113 additional students).
My findings build on the literature on the effectiveness of statewide artic-
ulation efforts by providing new estimates of their causal effects on transfer
rates from community colleges to four-year public institutions. Earlier stud-
ies on SAAs are mostly descriptive and to their credit have provided a wealth
of information on patterns and types of agreements implemented across the
United States (Kintzer and Wattenbarger, 1985; Bender, 1990; Townsend
and Ignash, 2000). Related research that quantifies the effects of SAA is
limited. Anderson et al. (2006) explore the impact of SAAs on the proba-
bility of transfer, for all states, using a logistic regression analysis and find
no significant effects. Worsham et al. (2020) focus on North Carolina SAA
efforts, and examine metrics of success after transfer. A study that is close
to my research is Baker (2016), who focuses on California, but utilizes a
different identification strategy, finding similarly modest effects on transfers
from CCC to CSU campuses. In this current study, I include the UC system
in my analysis, enabling me to implement a new identification strategy and
paint a broader picture of how an entire state university system responds to
changes in state legislation. I show that, when comparing transfers across
the CSU and UC systems, the magnitude of the effect is larger than when
the UC system is excluded from the analysis.
This paper also provides new evidence pertaining to the determinants of
community college attendance and degree attainment. This issue is partic-
ularly salient in light of the rising costs of four-year institutions and the
emergence of the COVID-19 virus, both of which are forcing many students
to stay closer to home and/or reconsider their enrollment decisions (Denning,
2017). Unlike most studies in this space, I focus on state policies that target
community college students to further illuminate factors that contribute to
their enrollment and educational-attainment decisions. Much of the existing
literature examines only student and/or community college characteristics.
Carrell and Kurlaender (2016), for example, examine whether observable
characteristics of CCCs are significantly correlated with transfer productiv-
ity. Similarly, several other studies provide evidence of the effects of innate
student ability, academic intensity, and family background on transfers and
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how well students perform after transferring (Grubb, 1991; Dougherty and
Reid, 2006; Dougherty, 1992; Stange, 2012a; Doyle, 2009; Leigh and Gill,
1997). Other studies that do examine state and federal policies are con-
cerned primarily with financial aid, e.g. Marx and Turner (2019). I provide
new evidence that state transfer policies can inadvertently increase enroll-
ment and degree attainment at community colleges, a result which has not
been documented in any prior work. 2
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In section 1.2, I provide de-
tailed background information on statewide articulation in the United States
as a whole as well as in-depth information on California in particular. In
section 1.3, I describe the data. In section 1.4, I present a conceptual frame-
work to provide a basis for my empirical analysis, and in section 1.5 I detail
the sample construction, describe the identification strategy, and present the
econometric models I use to estimate the effects of statewide articulation
on transfers, enrollment, and degree attainment. In section 1.6, I discuss
the main findings and heterogeneity, and present robustness analyses, and in
section 1.7 I conclude.
1.2 Articulation Agreements: History and Background
1.2.1 Articulation in the United States
Articulation agreements were initially developed informally between individ-
ual institutions. State agencies and commissions later became involved via
legislation or education code action (Kintzer and Wattenbarger, 1985). The
Florida Formal Agreement Plan of 1971 was the first statewide agreements
to be developed and approved. Since then, a total of 41 states have enacted
mandatory SAAs through legislation and/or state education board policies.
SAAs vary across states. According to the Education Commission of the
States, there are three main transfer metrics to consider. A state can man-
date the development of a common course numbering (CCN) scheme, which
2This work also adds to the broader literature on educational attainment and human
capital accumulation (Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Averett and Burton, 1996; Good-
man et al., 2017, 2020), notably building on the Becker (1993) model of human capital
accumulation in a novel way.
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is a uniform numbering convention used at all public postsecondary institu-
tions for lower-division courses. States can also institute a transferable core of
lower-division courses (TC), wherein an agreed-upon set of general-education
courses must be fully transferable at public institutions.3 The final metric is
the guaranteed transfer of an associate’s degree (GAA). This guarantees that
students who are awarded associate’s degrees before transferring to four-year
institutions can transfer all of their credits to those institutions and enter
at the junior-standing level. The GAA does not guarantee admission to a
four-year institution, but rather ensures that credits will be accepted con-
ditional on being admitted.4 Figure 1.2 shows the frequency of each policy,
and figure 1.3 shows that the most states combine a GAA with a TC. 5
1.2.2 Articulation in California
Articulation efforts in California date back to the 1970s when articulation
agreements were voluntarily developed between institutions. In an effort to
streamline the credit transfer process, however, as well as to increase as-
sociate’s degree attainment among transfer-oriented students, in 2010 the
California State Legislature enacted the Student Transfer Achievement Re-
form Act (STAR) through California senate bill 1440 (SB 1440). This act
was designed to “increase the number of students who successfully transfer
from California Community Colleges (CCC) to the California State Uni-
versity (CSU) system by establishing transfer degrees.” Although bilateral
agreements existed prior to this act, STAR differs in three key ways: (1) it
3Some agreements allow a state’s transferable core to be transferable across all public
institutions, while others will specify the institutions and/or university system that accepts
the transfers. For example, in Alabama, the transferable core is fully transferable across all
public institutions, whereas in Alaska it’s only transferable across community colleges and
the University of Alaska campuses. Institutions may have alternative naming conventions;
however, if that is the case, there is a crosswalk for institutions to use in the transfer
process.
4It is important to note that since a GAA requires that a student obtain an associate’s
degree, it would not operate through changing transfer-out rates, where transfer-out is
defined as a transfer prior to completing degree requirements. Junior standing is achieved
when a student successfully completes 60 credit hours. According to Government Account-
ability (2017), students transferring from 2-year schools to 4-year schools lose around 26
percent of completed credits, on average, in the transfer process. Therefore, to transfer
with junior status, a student would have to have completed 81 credit hours at the com-
munity college. Most policies state that students are not required to complete any further
general-education courses unless they are required for a specific major.
5See figure 1.1 for a graphical history and progression of statewide articulation
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guarantees that students who earn transfer degrees (Associate’s Degrees for
Transfer, ADTs) are admitted to the CSU system, (2) it further guarantees
that they are admitted with upper-division junior status, and (3) it precludes
CCCs from requiring additional courses for this degree (SB 1440, 2010). This
intervention became operational in the fall of 2011, and was widely publicized
by local media, CCCs, and the CSU system.6
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Statewide Articulation Policy Dates
I collect data on state policy dates from three sources: Townsend and Ignash
(2000) (TI), the Education Commission of the States (ECS), and the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislature (NCSL). Townsend and Ignash (2000)
was published in 2000, and several states have since developed statewide ar-
ticulation agreements. I therefore update their data to include states that
passed laws more recently using the Education Commission of the States’
(ECS) transfer and articulation policies database7. The ECS includes de-
scriptions of each state’s policies in addition to references to the relevant
state code/board policy. For more recent policies I cross-reference the ECS
sources with transfer and articulation laws collected by the National Confer-
ence of State Legislature (NCSL) to collect more details on the policy dates
and history.8
In their study, TI sent out a survey to executive directors of state boards
of higher education and community college agencies, including two relevant
questions: “Does your state have a statewide articulation agreement?”, and
“When was the agreement developed?” They then published a list of states
and their corresponding SAA years. Their study does not, however, provide
sufficient details for me to determine what type of “treatment” actually oc-
curred in the year they report as the first year a SAA was developed.9 For
6See section A.1 for a history of articulation in California
7https://www.ecs.org/transfer-and-articulation-policies-db/
8The National Conference of State Legislatures provides data on laws passed beginning
in 2008.
9They list only the year reported by state executives, so I do not know, for instance,
if the year listed is the date on which the policy was developed or the date on which it
7
this reason I use the ECS to locate the source documents/laws for each state.
In some states, the statewide articulation clause is embedded within a larger
education code. For example, the state of Alabama’s clause on statewide ar-
ticulation is included in a subsection of the Code of Alabama Section 16-5-8.
In that case, I examine all archived versions of the law to determine the year
in which the code was amended to include SAA sections. In other states,
SAA laws are a standalone section, and I find the date in which that law was
passed. I do this for all 50 states.
I distinguish between two types of dates: enactment dates and operational
dates. The date of policy enactment is the year in which a policy/law is
passed. For example, if a state reports passing a law in 2000 indicating that
an SAA is to be developed, but does not mention anything else in regards to
the timeline within which the SAA should be ready to use, I use the year 2000
as the enactment date (the first “treated” year). The date of operation is
the date by which an SAA is to become operational and used by students and
institutions. For instance, if a state passes a policy/law in 2000 indicating
that an SAA is to be developed and ready for use by the 2002-2003 academic
year, I then define 2002 as the operational date (the first “treated” year).
On average, the difference between when a policy is enacted and when it
becomes operational is 2.3 years.
Following the data-collection process, I create five categories in which each
state fits based on my findings. The first category comprises states for which
I can verify the TI dates, find the original policy documents, and find the
actual operational dates (vs. the date a policy was enacted). The second
comprises states for which I am able to find policy documents but am not
able to find operational dates (only enactment dates). The third comprises
cases where I am able to verify the date of agreement through secondary
sources (such as reports and archived websites) but for which the original
details and policy documents are not available. In these cases I am not able
to distinguish between the dates of policy enactment and operation, nor can
I determine what exactly is included in the policy. The fourth comprises
states for which the policy documents I find list different dates from those
reported in TI. Finally, the fifth comprises states where I am not able to
verify the dates reported in TI or find any policy documents existing before
became operational in a state.
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2000. See figure A.1 for a graphical summary of the data-collection process.
The year I use as the first “treatment” year (or “event time”) is defined
as the operational date for states that report one and the enactment date
for states that do not. Finally, I flag each state in my data according to
the above mentioned category into which it falls to conduct the robustness
analyses discussed in section 1.6.4.
1.3.2 Enrollment, Degrees Awarded, and Transfers
Data on higher education outcomes come from the Integrated Post-secondary
Education Data System (IPEDS) and its predecessor, the Higher Education
General Information Survey (HEGIS). The IPEDS and the HEGIS provide
institution-level data on all facets of higher education including, but not
limited to, enrollment, graduations, financial aid, institutional finance, and
faculty data. In this study I use the enrollment (1968-2018) and comple-
tions (1966-2018) surveys. Because the HEGIS is no longer available through
the National Center for Education Statistics, I obtained data for the years
1966/68 - 1984 by downloading the HEGIS from the Inter-university Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). In this study, I use data on
first-time freshmen enrollment, by full-time and part-time status, as well as
enrollment by race and sex. From the completions survey, I use information
on degrees awarded, which is consistently reported throughout the years that
the data is available. I also use data on degrees awarded by major, which
are not consistently reported across the years. I classify community college
majors into two categories: vocational and non-vocational. Vocational ma-
jors include engineering technologies and services, education administration,
family and consumer sciences, law enforcement and public services, busi-
ness operations and secretarial majors, agriculture and architecture related
services. Non-vocational majors include languages, literature, philosophy,
liberal arts and sciences, STEM, psychology, the social sciences and history.
The completions survey includes data on degrees awarded by degree level
(associate’s, bachelor’s, certificate) and major. The enrollment survey pro-
vides information on enrollment by student level (first-time freshmen, sopho-
mores, etc.), race, and full/part-time status. Additionally, the IPEDS reports
data on transfer-in enrollment starting in 2007. Their data, however, do
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not provide enough detail to distinguish between community college trans-
fers or transfers from other sectors. Therefore, I supplement IPEDS data
on transfer-in enrollment by collecting data on transfers from community
colleges to four-year institutions from the CSU and UC systems, from 2000-
2019. For both the CSU and UC systems, data are provided through their
respective institutional research offices’ websites. Finally, I obtain unemploy-
ment rates at the state-by-year level from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
commuting zone data from the United States Department of Agriculture.
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In table 1.1 I report raw enrollment means from 2007 for the CSU and UC
institutions that are included in the case study analysis, the first year in which
the IPEDS reports transfer data. In this table I show that UC campuses
enroll more first-time freshmen than CSU campuses, likely because they are
more selective. The difference in number of transfer student enrollment is
very small, only about 500 students. Similarly, non-CCC transfers make up
only around 1-2 percent of total enrollment in both the CSU and UC systems.
Apart from the greater selectivity of UC schools, the systems appear to be
similar to one another.
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for community colleges and four-year
institutions in the IPEDS/HEGIS data at the baseline, i.e. the first year a
college is observed in the data. In column (1) I report means at community
colleges in states that ultimately pass articulation agreements while in col-
umn (2) I report averages for community colleges in states that do not have
statewide articulation laws. In column (3) I report means for all four-year
institutions. Four-year institutions enroll more total undergraduates and
first-time freshman than community colleges, but all three groups of institu-
tions exhibit a similar distribution of full-time, male, and white students. On
average, each community college has three public four-year institutions in its
commuting zone, and each four-year institution has five community colleges
in its commuting zone.
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1.4 Conceptual Framework
This paper examines how SAAs impact student decisions to enroll at a com-
munity college or a four-year institution, obtain an associate’s degree, and
to transfer. In this section, I describe the hypothesized effects of SAAs on
choosing to enroll at a community college as a first-time freshman and to
obtain an associate’s degree, while focusing on the marginal student who
will, at some degree of probability, start her higher education at a two-year
institution.10, 11
Despite the large price tag, the lifetime income value of enrolling at a
four-year institution and obtaining a bachelor’s degree vastly outweighs the
costs and early career earnings losses associated with completing four years
of higher education (Zimmerman, 2014). Also, the payoff for obtaining a
bachelor’s degree is higher than that for obtaining an associate’s degree and
of not acquiring any higher education (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Hersh-
bein and Kearney, 2014). Yet, not all students choose to enroll at four-year
institutions.12 This means that some students either incur very high idiosyn-
cratic costs associated with attending a four-year institution or they have
incorrect beliefs in regards to expected lifetime income. SAAs will operate
in this framework by altering either expected lifetime earnings or costs.
A student graduating from high school has three main options-to enroll at
a four-year institution, a two-year institution, or to enter the labor force.13
Her decision will depend on the expected lifetime income associated with
each option, weighed against the cost. The price of each option will consist
of direct costs such as tuition, fees, and housing as well as indirect costs in
the form of the opportunity cost. Students form beliefs on the returns on
each college enrollment option prior to enrolling. After college, student i will
enter the labor market and work for T years. The present discounted value




where β is the discount factor and u(Yisjt) is the value of earnings for indi-
10I provide additional details on the inequalities and comparative statics in sectio A.2.
11As opposed to students who will always choose to start their higher educations at
four-year schools. I use the terms “two-year institution” and “community college” inter-
changeably. Throughout this section I am referring to public four-year institutions.
12In 2017, only 53% of undergraduates were enrolled at four-year institutions (Ginder
et al., 2019).
13For simplicity, I abstract away from considering other options such as for-profit insti-
tutions, certificate programs, etc.
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vidual i, in state s, for choosing enrollment option j in year t. Specifically,


















ist. The variable τ
j
ist is the total cost of student
i’s higher education associated with starting with option j. For example,
if student i chooses to start at a community college and then transfer to a
four-year institution, τ 2yrist will include tuition paid at the community college
as well as at the four-year institution. Finally, ωjist is students i’s opportunity
cost of choosing option j, and Ijist is the idiosyncratic cost that the student
incurs.14
Consider student i, a transfer-oriented prospective community college stu-
dent. Prior to the SAA, this student is indifferent between starting their
higher education at a two-year or a four-year institution.15 With an SAA,
this student can in principle enroll in more courses at the community college
(earning up to 60 credits) and transfer more credits to the four-year institu-
tion. This will increase the total tuition paid at the community college, but
decrease the tuition paid at the four-year institution. In other words, this
will reduce τ 2yrist . Alternatively, a streamlined SAA can also reduce ε
2yr
ist , which
encompasses the added cost of having to navigate the transfer system. In
both cases, the SAA will improve the option value of community college, and
tip the scales in favor of choosing to start her education at a two-year rather
than a four-year institution. This will create what I call the “substitution”
effect, where an increase in community college enrollment is accompanied by
a decrease in enrollment at four-year public institutions.
Now consider a student i, who is indifferent between attending a com-
14Idiosyncratic costs can include things such as distaste for higher education bureau-
cracy, credit constraints, having to care for family and/or children, having a disability,
etc.
15A student can be indifferent because, for instance, even though she may know for
certain that she will pursue a bachelor’s degree, she is weighing the cost of transferring
against the high four-year price. The community college may be cheaper, but transferring
to a four-year school is complex and requires, among other things, navigating at least two
separate education systems: the academic system of the two-year school and the transfer
requirements of the four-year university (Baker, 2016; Schudde et al., 2020). For this
reason, students might consider taking out student loans to start at a four-year school
instead.
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munity college and entering the labor force.16 Since many SAAs specify
that the affiliated programs are to be advertised to high school students,
the implementation of an SAA will introduce to this student a new path
to higher education that was previously unavailable. The introduction of
an SAA will allow this student to update her expected lifetime earnings,∑T
t=0 β
t−1Ln(Y 2yrist ) and induce her to enroll at a community college rather
than forgo higher education. I call this the “pull” effect.
Finally, consider another transfer-oriented student i who is already en-
rolled at a community college. Prior to the SAA, she is indifferent between
obtaining an associate’s degree and transferring with a credential. SAAs will
often mandate that students obtain degrees from a community college to
guarantee transfer. With an SAA, having an associate’s degree will allow a
student to transfer more credits with greater certainty. For a student on the
margin of obtaining an associate’s degree 17, the SAA will push student i to
obtain a credential prior to transferring.
This framework produces three testable predictions that serve as a ba-
sis for my empirical analysis of first-time freshman enrollment and degree
attainment. First, enacting an SAA will lead to an increase in first-time
freshman enrollment at community colleges (as a result of the “substitution”
or “pull” effect), which can be driven by either traditional or non-traditional
students, i.e. full-time or part-time students. Second, this increase in first-
time freshman enrollment is a result of students’ substituting away from
four-year institutions into community college. Finally, SAAs will result in an
increase in the number of associate’s degrees awarded.
1.5 Estimation Methodology
In this section I present details regarding my identification strategy and how
I address possible identification threats. I also describe the sample of institu-
tions I include in the analyses and, finally, I present the econometric models
16These students could be indifferent because they are misinformed about the costs and
benefits of higher education, or are unaware of all the options that could ultimately lead
to a degree.
17If student i had initially planned to enroll in the community college only for one year,
SAA will not have an effect on the decision to obtain an associate’s degree. The SAA will
affect only students who are on the margin of obtaining a degree, i.e. plan to take close
to 60 credits at the community college.
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used to estimate the effects of statewide articulation.
1.5.1 Identification
In the first stage of this study I examine the effects of statewide articula-
tion on transfer-in enrollment at four-year public institutions. As a result
of data limitations, the estimation of this outcome is restricted to a case
study of California. In particular, I estimate the effects of legislation that
created a structured pathway from CCCs to CSU campuses, but not to UC
campuses (the STAR act). This means that, in principal, the UC system is
not affected by the policy. I use this variation to estimate a difference-in-
differences strategy where I compare transfer-in enrollment at CSU campuses
with enrollment in the UC system, before and after the legislation. However,
before conducting this analysis, it is important that I establish that transfer-
in enrollment in both systems evolved similarly before the policy was enacted;
this is the standard “parallel trends” assumption that must be satisfied in
any difference-in-differences setting to estimate a causal relationship. Paral-
lel trends can be observed in the raw data, as seen in figure 1.4, and I also
evaluate the assumption empirically using an “event study” specification, in
which I interact treatment status with an indicator for each year before and
after the legislation was enacted. This provides an empirical test to confirm
that the treatment and control groups are not exhibiting statistically signifi-
cant differences in the dynamics of the outcome of interest in the years prior
to treatment. Figure 1.5 shows evidence for flat pre-trends, i.e. no statis-
tically significant differences between the CSU and UC systems. Finally, for
a more robust analysis I also conduct a difference-in-difference-in-differences
(triple difference) analysis, as described in Wooldridge (2007). I compare
transfer-in with first-time freshmen enrollment within an institution, across
the CSU and UC campuses. This will control for two possible confounding
trends: changes in transfer-in enrollment across the whole state and changes
in overall enrollment trends at the CSU campuses (that may have nothing
to do with the transfer legislation).
The second goal of this study is to estimate the causal impact of statewide
articulation on enrollment and degree attainment. Ideally, statewide artic-
ulation would be randomly assigned to observably similar states, but such
14
an experiment is not feasible. To obtain causal estimates, I therefore use a
difference-in-differences strategy, where I compare outcomes in treated states
with outcomes in untreated states before and after the policy was enacted.
There is one main threat to identification in this portion of the study, namely
the potential for endogenous trends. The first-order objective of SAAs is to
encourage students to transfer to four-year institutions, with or without as-
sociate’s degrees. A second-order objective is to increase the efficiency of
the transfer process and educational attainment. It may then be that states
enact SAAs knowing that they might have spillover effects, perhaps to boost
enrollment and improve their community college systems’ completion met-
rics. If this is true, then passing statewide articulation laws could coincide
with other efforts that aim to increase enrollment and completions, which
would inflate any difference-in-differences results. In addition, it would make
it difficult to discern between the effects of statewide articulation and other
policies that are in place to increase community college enrollment. Fortu-
nately, I can also evaluate the likelihood that this threat would occur by
estimating an event study specification. This will empirically confirm that
the treatment and control groups are not exhibiting statistically significant
differences in trends prior to treatment.
1.5.2 Sample Restrictions
For the case study analysis, I restrict my sample to CSU and UC campuses
in the 2007-2018 period, the years for which IPEDS transfer-in data are also
available. The geographic unit of analysis for the second empirical strategy
is the entire state. In this analysis I use only the IPEDS and HEGIS data,
which are generated by surveying all institutions of higher education in the
United States every year. I restrict my main sample to publicly controlled
institutions because they are the institutions primarily targeted by state pol-
icy. Over the entire sample period, I often observe that institutions merge
and switch from two-year to four-year status or vice-versa. To maintain
consistency in my sample I exclude institutions that ever report awarding
certificates only, are not consistently classified as two-year or a four-year
colleges, merge with other institutions, are ever not publicly controlled, are
ever categorized as mixed baccalaureate/associate’s colleges or associate’s-
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dominant four-year colleges, are not accredited, or are institutions with a
special focus.18 I balance the sample by including only institutions that re-
port outcomes from T −3 through T + 3, while also keeping institutions that
have data for only either the pre or post-period time frame. Additionally,
I restrict my main analysis sample to institutions that report outcomes for
at least 40 years, which avoids issues caused by changing sample compo-
sition.19 I also expand the balance thresholds to include institutions that
report outcomes from T − 5 to T + 5 as a robustness exercise, presented in
section 1.6.4.
1.5.3 California Case Study Econometric Models
I begin my formal analysis by estimating an event study design to show that
the CSU and UC systems exhibit parallel trends prior to treatment and to
illustrate the evolution of the effects over time. The estimating equation is:
(1.1)














= 2011 + k) + γstXst + εit





CSUit is an indicator that equals one for CSU and zero for UC institutions.
Included in equation 1.1 are institution and year fixed effects, indicated by
αi and αt, respectively. The institution fixed effects adjust for time-invariant
18I define accredited and special use institutions based on their Carnegie classification.
Special focus two-year colleges include institutions with health professions, technical pro-
fessions, arts & design, or other field focuses. Special-focus four-year institutions include:
faith-related institutions, medical schools and centers, other health professions schools, en-
gineering schools, other technology-related schools, business and management schools, art,
music and design schools, law schools, tribal colleges, and other special focus institutions.
19For example, if new schools enter the sample (or exit following closures) dispropor-
tionately in certain years, that would bias my estimates.
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characteristics within institutions, while the year effects capture time-varying
changes at the state level, such as in aggregate business cycles or public-policy
initiatives, that may be correlated with the outcomes. “Event time” defines
the first treated cohort and is the year 2011. Xst controls for state-by-year
unemployment rates. The coefficients of interest are expressed in the vector
βk3.
20
I next conduct the triple differences analysis by estimating the following
fully interacted model:




























βk7CSUit × Transferit × 1(t = 2011 + k) + γstXst + εit (1.2)









for first-time freshman at institution i in year
t, and Transferit is an indicator that equals one for transfer student ob-
servations.21 The coefficients of interested are stored in vector βk7, showing
the effects of the 2010 policy on transfer-in relative to first-time freshman
enrollment at the CSU campuses compared with enrollment at the UC cam-
puses. The triple difference design allows me to include multiple interacted
fixed effects, namely, αi, αt,csu, αt,type, and αcsu,type which represent institu-
tion, CSU-by-year, student type-(transfer, first-time freshman)-by-year, and
CSU-by-student type effects, respectively. The CSU-by-year-fixed effects ac-
count for time varying trends at the CSU campuses, student type-(transfer,
20I set β−1 = 2010 and assign all UC institution observations an event time equal to −1
21In my data, I have two observations per institution per year. One observation is for
transfer-in enrollment, and the other is for first-time freshmen.
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first-time freshman)-by-year controls for changes in trends for transfers and
first-time freshman, and finally, CSU-by-student type effects control for time-
invariant changes at CSU campuses for both transfer-in and first-time enroll-
ment.
Finally, I estimate a difference-in-differences model that shows the average
effects of the policy in the post-treatment years, a weighted-average of the
results produced by equation 1.1:
Yit = αi + αt + β1CSUit + β2Postit + β3CSUit × Postit + γstXst + εit (1.3)
where Postit is an indicator that equals zero in the years prior to 2011 and
one thereafter. All other variables are the same as in equation 1.1. The main
coefficient of interest in this analysis is β3, which reflects a weighted-average
causal effect of the STAR reform on the transfer-in enrollment outcome in
the eight years following its enactment.
The analogous triple differences model for equation 1.2 is:
Yit = αi + αt,csu + αt,type + αcsu,type + β1CSUit + β2Postit + β3Transferit
+ β4CSUit × Postit + β5CSUit × Transferit + β6Postit × Transferit
+ β7CSUit × Transferit × Postit + γstXst + εit (1.4)
where all variables are the same as in equation 1.3, with the addition of
Transferit, an indicator for transfer student observations within an institu-
tion. The main coefficient of interest in this analysis is β7.
1.5.4 Enrollment and Degree-Attainment Econometric Model
I begin this analysis similarly by estimating an event-study model to em-
pirically test the parallel-trends assumption and show the evolution of the
effects of statewide articulation over time. The estimating equation is:




βk Artist 1(t = t
∗
i + k) + γstXst + εit (1.5)
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where Yist is the outcome in institution i in state s and year t. To assess the
effects of the SAA on students’ decisions to enroll at community college and
their subsequent decisions to obtain associate’s degrees, the main outcomes
of interest are the natural logarithm of first-time freshmen enrolled and the
natural logarithm of associate’s degrees awarded.
Artist is an indicator that equals one if institution i is in a state s that passes
a statewide articulation law and zero otherwise. Included in equation 1.5
are institution and region-by-year fixed effects, indicated by αi, αr(i)t, re-
spectively. The region-by-year fixed effects account nonparametrically for
differential trends across regions of the United States, and Xst controls for
state-by-year unemployment levels, which is intended to reduce standard
errors and control for time-varying trends in college enrollment related to
employment opportunities. The coefficients of interest are expressed in the
vector βk. The construction of the event time defines the first treated cohort-
i.e. students at time k = 0-and varies across outcomes. For example, when
examining the effects of SAA on first-time freshman enrollment, the first
cohort affected comprises students enrolling in college for the first time in
the first year in which SAA laws are operational. For this reason, if a state
passes a law in, for instance, the year 2000, then the first treated cohort
would be the 2000 cohort. On the other hand, when the outcome of interest
is associate’s degrees awarded, then the first treated cohort would still be the
same (the 2000 cohort), but their outcomes would be reported in the IPEDS
in 2002. For this reason, event time is defined as the year of articulation
plus two for the associate’s degrees-awarded outcome. It is also important
to recall that, on average, time elapsed between policy enactment and when
it becomes operational is 2.3 years, and I thus expect that the effects would
be delayed by at least that long.
I next estimate a pooled difference-in-differences model-two-way fixed effects-
that shows the average effects of statewide articulation in the post-treatment
years:
Yist = αi + αr(i)t + βArtist + γstXst + εit (1.6)
where the variable Artist is an indicator that takes the value of one if a state
passes statewide articulation laws in year t thereafter. All other variables are
the same as in equation 1.5. The main coefficient of interest in this analysis
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is β.
1.6 The Effects of Statewide Articulation on Transfers,
Enrollment, and Degree Attainment
In this section I present the main results. I start by assessing the validity
of the difference-in-differences research design. Using an event-study analy-
sis, I show that the treated and control groups exhibit parallel trends in the
years prior to the enactment of the SAA. I proceed to discuss average and
heterogeneous effects of the SAA on transfers into four-year public univer-
sities, first-time freshman enrollment, and associate’s degree attainment at
community colleges.
1.6.1 Transfer-in Enrollment at the California State
Universities
To examine whether there is an increase in transfers into CSU campuses,
regardless of changes in first-time freshman enrollment, I compare the CSU
campuses with UC campuses using a difference-in-differences analysis. Fig-
ure 1.5(b) shows the results, in which there is a statistically significant aver-
age one-percentage-point increase in transfer-in enrollment as a proportion
of total undergraduates after the policy was enacted. The effect, however, is
not sustained over time. In the second and third year after the STAR act
passed, transfer-in rates are higher than in the years prior to the act, but
the effect is decreasing over time and reaches zero after four years. The one-
percentage-point increase translates to 191 additional students transferring
into CSU campuses. This may appear large at first glance, but considering
that there are 112 community colleges in the state of California, this would
yield approximately two students per college per year.
I then estimate whether transfer-in enrollment increases relative to first-
time freshman enrollment within both CSU and UC institutions. This would
show whether there is an increase in transfer-in enrollment and, if so, whether
it results in crowding out first-time freshmen. To do so, I conduct a triple dif-
ferences analysis. The results of this estimation are presented in figure 1.5(a).
The event study figures show flat pre-trends indicating that the control group
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used in this analysis is a valid one. I find no effects on transfer-in enrollment
in comparison with first-time freshman enrollment, indicating that any in-
crease in transfers is not crowding out first-time freshmen.
It is possible that the ADT does not increase transfers to the CSU schools
because it did not significantly (or meaningfully) lower the barriers to trans-
fer. For instance, although the obtaining an ADT guarantees admission into
a CSU school, not all ADTs are accepted at all CSU campuses. In particu-
lar, an ADT does not guarantee admission into a local CSU campus. This
may pose difficulties for students who are accepted at a campus that would
require them to move. Additionally, it does not guarantee acceptance into a
specific major. If a student wishes to study engineering but is not accepted
into a CSU school of engineering, that student may choose to enroll else-
where even if it is not guaranteed that all their credits will transfer. Finally,
Baker (2016) speculates that the ADT program could be unintentionally di-
verting students from four-year degrees; if the introduction of ADTs creates
an atmosphere that communicates the message that the transfer process is
complicated and difficult, the policy might be unintentionally cooling out
marginal students (Clark, 1963). Additional data are needed to investigate
why transfers from CCCs to CSU schools do not increase as a result of the
ADT program.
1.6.2 First-time Freshman Enrollment and Degrees Awarded
In this analysis, I begin by showing the dynamic effects of SAA policies in
the ten years following their enactment, in particular on first-time freshman
enrollment at community colleges. Figure 1.6 shows the main results, but
most importantly it provides evidence of flat pre-trends, which validates the
choice of research design. Figure 1.6(a) plots the effects of the SAA on
total first-time freshman enrollment at community colleges and shows an
increasing trend that is not transitory but in fact grows over time, although
the rise is not statistically significant. It is, however, important to consider
that community colleges disproportionately serve non-traditional students,
so any effects would operate on this margin. Therefore, I examine the effects
of the SAA on part-time and full-time students as proxies for traditional
and non-traditional enrollment. The results of this analysis are illustrated in
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figure 1.6(b), which shows larger effects for part-time students. The average
effect is estimated at 21.4 percent, which equates to 113 additional part-time
students enrolling per college per year. This increases part-time enrollment
at community colleges from 48 percent to 59 percent of total enrollment.
The result is only statistically significant in the long run, which is defined
as five or more years after SAA policies are enacted. This is to be expected
given that again, on average, it takes around 2.3 years for the policies to be
put into practice following enactment. These results are also summarized in
table 1.4 and table 1.7.
I next investigate whether the increase in first-time community college
enrollment can be attributed to students’ substituting away from four-year
institutions (the “substitution” channel). To that end, I estimate the ef-
fects of the SAA on first-time freshman enrollment at four-year institutions.
Figure 1.7 shows evidence of flat pre-trends, and no statistically significant
effects of SAA on first-time enrollment. Four years after the policy is im-
plemented, I do observe a decreasing trend, although it is not statistically
significant. This analysis pools together all public four-year institutions. To
be sure, community colleges will not be attracting students who are consid-
ering attending very selective institutions, but rather students who are more
likely to attend less selective institutions. Therefore, I explore how the SAAs
affect four-year institutions by institutional selectivity. The results are pre-
sented in table 1.5, showing evidence that students are in fact substituting
away from less selective institutions. In particular, enrollment at less selec-
tive four-year institutions decreases by 7.6 percent, which is approximately
122 students per institution per year. This is almost exactly equal to the
increase at community colleges. 22
The final outcome of interest is associate’s degrees awarded. I expect to
find, as a result of the SAA, an increase in enrollment that would eventu-
ally lead to an increase in degrees awarded. Figure 1.9, shows no effects on
overall associate’s degrees awarded. However, given that any students who
will obtain an associate’s degree as a result of the SAA policy likely have an
intention to transfer, the effect on degrees awarded is particularly relevant
for non-vocational associate’s degrees. Therefore, I dig deeper into the data
and repeat the analysis separately for vocational and non-vocational degree
22Table B.1 presents descriptive statistics for the characteristics of some more and less
competitive institutions.
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attainment. The results are presented in figure 1.9b and show that SAA poli-
cies increase non-vocational degrees awarded, and decrease vocational degrees
awarded at community colleges in states that enact articulation policies. 23
On average, in the 10 years after SAA policies are enacted, community col-
leges will experience an increase of around 30 additional students obtaining
non-vocational degrees per campus per year. In this analysis, vocational ma-
jors include engineering technologies and services, education administration,
family and consumer sciences, law enforcement and public services, busi-
ness operations and secretarial majors, agriculture and architecture related
services. Non-vocational majors include languages, literature, philosophy,
liberal arts and sciences, STEM, psychology, the social sciences and history.
1.6.3 Heterogeneity
There is evidence that students make enrollment decisions based on distance
to institutions of higher education (Hillman and Weichman, 2016; Turley,
2009). In particular, students, on average, enroll more frequently at institu-
tions located within 50 miles of their permanent homes. To examine how this
affects the student response to the SAA, I estimate the effects on community
colleges by the number of four-year institutions in their commuting zones.24
Specifically, I examine the effects on community colleges in commuting zones
with at least one four-year institution and compare them with the effects
on community college in commuting zones that have none. The results are
presented in table 1.9 and show no heterogeneous effects on either first-time
freshman enrollment or on associate’s degrees awarded, based on proximity
(or access) to four-year institutions. Ex-ante, one would expect to see no
change in commuting zones with no four-year institutions and a positive ef-
fect in commuting zones with at least one. The signs of the estimates are as
expected, but they are not statistically significant.
I next explore how the effects differ across states with their own sub-
policies in place, namely CCN, TC, and GAA. Figure 1.3 shows that some
23The IPEDS does not separate degrees awarded by full-time and part-time status so I
am not able to explicitly examine the effects on degrees awarded by enrollment status.
24Commuting zones cluster counties according to journey-to-work data from the U.S.
Census Bureau. They are increasingly popular measures of local areas, as seen in recent
studies of upward mobility and labor-market inequality (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996; Turley,
2009; Chetty et al., 2014).
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states have adopted only one of the aforementioned sub-policies, other states
combine two, while the majority of states combine all three in their SAAs.
The differences in policy combinations implemented by each state raises the
question of comparability. The flat pre-trends presented in figure 1.6 and
figure 1.9 provide evidence that the treatment and control groups are com-
parable, but it still leaves one question unanswered: how do the effects of
SAAs differ across states with different sub-policy combinations? To an-
swer this question, following Buchmueller and Carey (2018), I estimate the
following modified version of equation 1.6:
Yist = αi + αr(i)t + β1Artist × Threeist
+ β2Artist × Twoist + β3Artist ×Oneist + γstXst + εit (1.7)
where Threeist, Twoist, and Oneist are indicators that equal one if institu-
tion i is in a state s that combines three, two, or one of the sub-policies,
respectively, in year t.25 In this analysis, the coefficients of interest are β1,
β2, and β3. The results are shown in table 1.9. The policies have the largest
effects on part-time enrollment in states that combine two sub-policies in
their SAAs. I am not able to disentangle these factors further to examine
the effects of each policy combination. The most commonly adopted policy
combination, which bundles two sub-policies and is likely driving this result,
is the combination of the GAA and the TC. Surprisingly, however, I do not
find statistically significant effects for states that implement all three policies
in their SAAs, and in particular that adding a third policy to the mix ap-
pears to negate the effects on part-time enrollment. Additionally, it appears
that states implementing only one policy in their SAAs actually experience
negative effects. This is, in fact, consistent with qualitative evidence from
Texas, which implements only the TC (Schudde et al., 2020). My findings
from this exercise provide evidence that the a GAA along with a TC is the
most effective combination of sub-policies, and that if a state is to implement
an SAA, it should consider including more than one of the aforementioned
sub-policies. Without additional student level data, though, it is impossible
25Threeist includes states that combine a TC, CCN, and a GAA. Twoist includes states
that combine any two of these policies, e.g. a TC and CCN, a TC and a GGA, or CCN
and a GAA. Finally, Oneist includes states that only have one of those policies in place.
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to divide my sample into sub-samples based on the exact policy combination
implemented without losing predictive power. 26
1.6.4 Robustness Checks
In subsection 1.3.1 I discuss the method used to collect dates when state
policies were passed or implemented. Importantly, in the data-collection
process I categorize states into five distinct groups. Group one consists of
states for which I am able to obtain original policy documents and distinguish
between policy enactment and operational date while group two includes
states for which I am able to obtain the original policy documents but cannot
distinguish between policy enactment and the operational date.27 Group
three includes states for which I am not able to track down original policy
documentation but can find secondary sources that mention the date of policy
enactment. Group 4 is small and consists only of four states for which I am
not able to verify the same dates as Townsend and Ignash (2000) but find
a different SAA date within a five-year window of of the date reported in
Townsend and Ignash (2000). Finally, group five includes states for which
I am not able to either find original policy details, verify the date listed in
Townsend and Ignash (2000) through secondary sources, or find evidence
that an SAA existed within five years of the date reported in their study.
States in the second and third groups create a minor problem wherein the
effects of treatment might be lagged. For policies that do not specify when
the corresponding SAAs are to be implemented, it is hard to discern when to
expect to see an effect. Based on the states for which I do have operational
dates, I am able, as I have noted in section 1.3, to calculate an average of 2.3
years between enactment and operation. The fourth and fifth groups are more
problematic and pose more serious threats to identification; in group four,
there are two possible dates of SAA enactment, so it is unclear what type of
treatment is captured by each date, which makes it harder to interpret the
results as causal. Group-five dates, on the other hand, are not only unverified
but there are also lacking in available policy details, which raises the same
26I cannot assess the impact in states that implement a GAA and a TC in comparison
with states that implement a GAA and CCN or a TC and CCN.
27Some policies will specify a timeline for institutions of higher education and specifically
mention a date by which the SAA should be implemented. Other policies are more general
and do not specify the timeline for institutions.
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issues as those associated with group four.
To alleviate concerns regarding clean identification, I estimate the main
specification, equation 1.6 and iterate through excluding each group, start-
ing with the most problematic. The results of this robustness exercise are
shown in table B.2. The effects become larger and statistically significant
once we remove more problematic states. Specifically, as can be seen in col-
umn (5), even though the magnitudes of the effects on part-time enrollment
are smaller, they become more precise, and the effects on total enrollment
become marginally significant. Degrees awarded exhibit some statistical sig-
nificance when I omit states for which I have no details related to the date of
articulation (other than just the date itself), and again when I include only
the states that have verified policy enactment and operational dates. For
more details on the states included in each category, please see table A.1 and
table A.2
The main results presented in figure 1.6 and figure 1.9 include all institu-
tions that report data from T − 3 through T + 3. Since enrollment data are
first reported in 1968, and the first treated states are treated in 1971, the
longest pre-period for which I can balance the sample is three years. There
are, however, only two states with a treatment date of 1971, Florida and Mon-
tana. To check the robustness of my estimates to a more balanced panel, I
run the analysis on institutions that report data from T − 5 through T + 5.
Table B.3 shows the results of this analysis. Panel A shows the original main
estimates, and panel B shows results for a sample that is balanced for the
longer period of time. For total first-time freshman enrollment, restricting
my sample to achieve a longer balanced panel results in smaller estimated
effects.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effects of statewide articulation laws on transfers
into four-year institutions, first-time freshman enrollment, and degree at-
tainment at community colleges. The first-order objective of SAA policies
is to increase transfers from community colleges to four-year institutions.
Because detailed student transfer data are notoriously hard to come by, I
collect data from the CSU and the UC systems. I conduct a case-study anal-
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ysis of the effects of the STAR act, which implemented the ADT program.
My results show a statistically significant one-percentage-point increase in
transfer-in enrollment at CSU campuses relative to UC campuses in the first
year after the policy was enacted. This effect, however, is not sustained
over time. The one-percentage-point increase translates to 191 additional
students transferring into CSU institutions. Dividing this increase by the
112 community colleges in the state of California yields approximately two
student per college per year. This effect is small, especially considering that
increasing transfer-in enrollment is one of the primary goals of the policy.
Understanding why the reform is an important avenue for future research.
I next show that SAA policies have spillover effects in the form of increasing
enrollment at community colleges. Specifically, I observe a long-run increase
in part-time student enrollment, which equated to an additional 113 enrolling
in each community college per year. I also show that the higher enrollment
is a result of students substituting away from less competitive four-year in-
stitutions. This effect on enrollment leads to an increase in non-vocational
associate’s degrees awarded of approximately 17 percent, which translates to
an additional 30 students obtaining degrees from each community college per
year. To determine whether this substitution from four-year to two-year is
a positive or negative spillover, it is necessary to consider students’ possible
eventual labor-market outcomes.
The average cost, net of financial aid, of attending community college is
-$306 per year, whereas the average cost of attending a four-year institution
is $12,285 (Ma et al., 2019).28 Average lifetime earnings following the ob-
tainment of a bachelor’s degree, an associate’s degree, and some college are
estimated at $2,254,243, $1,612,050, and $1,485,955, respectively. Attending
a community college and then transferring to a four-year institution and ob-
taining a bachelor’s degree, rather than starting at the four-year institution,
will add between $25,182 and $49,752 in lifetime earnings per student.29 If
28almost 70 percent of community college receive either federal or state aid in amounts
that exceed tuition and fees.
29This is a “best-case scenario” calculation where a student enrolls part-time at the
community college (for four-year), paying an average cost (net of financial aid) of -$306
per year. The student then enrolls at the four-year institution (full-time) and graduates
after two years. I then compare this to what happens when the student starts at the four-
year institution and graduates in four years, in which case the added lifetime earnings
(from starting at the community college) are $25,182. If it takes six years for the student
to graduate, the additional lifetime earnings are larger, $49,752.
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an additional 113 students are enrolling and there are 880 treated commu-
nity colleges in my sample, assuming that students eventually graduate with
four-year degrees, that amounts to a total of $22,160,160 - $43,781,760 in
added lifetime earnings per year. This is based on a “best-case scenario”
back-of-the-envelope calculation, and is an upper bound on the gains stu-
dents would experience. Yet attending a community college, not conditional
on graduating, always leaves students better off than if they attend only a
four-year institution and drop out. On the other hand, if a student attends
a community college and does ultimately obtains a bachelor’s degree, she is
worse off than if she had graduated from a four-year institution. Therefore,
whether or not increasing enrollment is a positive or negative spillover de-
pends on the student’s ultimate educational outcome. This is one important
possible avenue for future research.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: California Public Universities in 2007
CSU UC
(1) (2)
Total Undergraduate enrollment 15,677 16,819
(9,203.52) (8,784.97)




Proportion CCC Transfer-ins 0.10 0.07
(0.03) (0.02)
Proportion Non-CCC Transfer-ins 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Selectivity (Barron’s) 4.25 2.56
(0.57) (0.98)
Observations 34 20
Notes: Data on total undergraduate enrollment, first-time freshman enrollment, and total
transfers are obtained from the IPEDS. CCC and non-CCC transfers are obtained from
the respective CSU and UC offices of institutional research and analysis. These data span
the years 2007 - 2018. Means in 2007 are reported. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics at the Baseline




Total Undergraduate Enrollment 3,354.29 1,963.26 7,028.15
(4,702.816) (2,703.149) (6,092.318)
First-time Freshman Enrollment 1,125.52 870.91 1,747.26
(1,254.792) (8,93.187) (1,712.484)
First-time Freshman:
Full-time 0.71 0.73 0.87
(0.230) (0.192) (0.165)
Male 0.52 0.53 0.55
(0.191) (0.171) (0.127)
White 0.80 0.90 0.82
(0.204) (0.176) (0.215)
Completions:
Degrees awarded 315.85 154.88 738.80
(613.051) (291.579) (902.697)
Vocational Degrees∗ 97.62 126.78
(104.719) (224.636)
Non-Vocational Degrees∗ 32.84 180.89
(78.790) (420.260)
Number of 2/4-Year 2.95 3.29 5.46
Institutions in CZ1 (3.335) (5.354) (8.782)
Selectivity (Barron’s)2 4.32
(1.088)
Number of years between 2.30
Enactment and Operational3 (0.897)
Number of years in data 47.24 40.36 49.72
(7.449) (14.736) (5.207)
Observations 880 115 336
Notes: This table shows averages for states that ultimately pass statewide articulation
(SAA) laws in column (1), averages for states that never pass SAA laws in column (2),
and averages for all four-year institutions in column (3). All results were calculated in
each institution’s baseline year, i.e. the first year an institution is observed in the data.
Data are from the IPEDS, the HEGIS, and the author’s own data collection. Standard
deviations are reported in parentheses. ∗ These numbers may not add up to total degrees
awarded because the breakdown of degrees by major is inconsistent throughout the years,
whereas total degrees awarded is consistently reported. 1 Results reported in columns (1)
and (2) reflect the number of four-year institutions, and those reported in column (3) show
the number of two-year institutions. 2 The selectivity measure ranges from 1 through 6,
with 1 being the highest and 6 the lowest. 3 This is calculated based on states that report
an operational dates.
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Panel A: Triple Difference:
Articulation × Transfers 0.010 0.011 0.003
× CSU (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 648 648 648
Year × CSU Fixed Effects X X X
Year × Student Type Fixed Effects X X X
Student Type × CSU Fixed Effects X X X
Student Type Fixed Effects X X X
Institution Fixed Effects X X X
Controls X X X
Panel B: Difference-in-Differences:
Articulation × CSU 0.005 0.007** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 324 324 324
Mean Dependent Variable 0.122 0.107 0.0147
Student Type Fixed Effects X X X
Institution Fixed Effects X X X
Controls X X X
Notes: This table shows the average effects of the STAR act reform in the years after
the policy was implemented. The estimates summarize the effects shown in figure 1.5.
Dependent variable means are the proportion of pre-treatment transfer-in enrollment at
the CSU campuses. All regression control for state-by-year unemployment levels. These
estimates are derived from equation 1.3 and equation 1.4.
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Table 1.4: First-time Freshman Enrollment and Degree-Attainment Effects
of Articulation
Total Associate’s
Enrollment Part-time Full-time Degrees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Articulation 0.028 0.116 0.026 0.025
(0.087) (0.093) (0.084) (0.025)
Mean Dependent Variable 1088 525.8 562.7 399.4
Observations 13,241 13,241 13,241 13,038
Region × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating equation 1.5. Dependent variable means
are reported in levels. All regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed effects,
control for state-by-year unemployment levels, and are weighted by total student popula-
tion at the baseline.
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Table 1.5: First-time Freshmen Enrollment and Degree-Attainment Effects
at 4-year institutions by Selectivity
Total
Enrollment Full-time Part-time Degrees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Articulation × 0.052** 0.024 -0.036 0.005
Competitive (0.024) (0.025) (0.122) (0.022)
Articulation × -0.076*** -0.0544** 0.000 -0.011
Less Competitive (0.025) (0.027) (0.103) (0.021)
Mean Dependent Variable 1607 1488 119 1698
Observations 8,842 8,842 8,842 8,692
Region × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating a variation of equation 1.5 where I inter-
act an indicator for post-treatment years with an indicator that equals one for institutions
that are categorized as less competitive, and in a separate regression I interact the indica-
tor for post-treatment years with an indicator equal to one with for institutions that are
more competitive. Each column represents results derived from a single regression. De-
pendent variable means are reported in levels. All regressions include region-by-year and
institution fixed effects, control for state-by-year unemployment levels, and are weighted
by total student population at the baseline.
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Articulation x 0.025 -0.118*** 0.174*
Major Field (0.0.025) (0.0382) (0.0881)
Mean Dependent Variable 399.4 155.3 166.6
Observations 13,038 10,039 10,455
Region x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating equation 1.6 where the dependent
variable is the logarithm of total associate’s degrees, vocational associate’s degree, and
non-vocational associate’s degree. Dependent variable means are reported in levels. All
regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed effects, control for state-by-year
unemployment levels, and are weighted by total student population at the baseline.
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Table 1.7: Short-run vs. Long-run effects of Statewide Articulation
Total Associate’s
Enrollment Part-time Full-time Degrees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Articulation 0.0283 0.116 0.0258 0.0249
(0.0866) (0.0926) (0.0836) (0.0245)
Within 5 Years of Articulation 0.0127 0.0905 0.0131 0.0229
(0.0814) (0.0869) (0.0783) (0.0220)
> 5 Years After Articulation 0.0885 0.214** 0.0749 0.0337
(0.0984) (0.101) (0.0996) (0.0442)
Mean Dependent Variable 1088 525.8 562.7 399.4
Observations 13,241 13,241 13,241 13,038
Region × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating a variation of equation 1.5 where, instead
of an indicator for all years post-treatment years, I include an indicator for the first
five years, and an indicator for post-treatment years 6 through 10. Dependent variable
means are reported in levels. All regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed
effects, control for state-by-year unemployment levels, and are weighted by total student
population at the baseline.
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Table 1.8: First-time Freshman Enrollment and Degree-Attainment Effects
of Articulation by Number of 4-Year institutions in Commuting Zones
Total
Enrollment Part-time Full-time Degrees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least one 4-year in CZ 0.038 0.139 0.028 0.139
(0.096) (0.104) (0.092) (0.018)
No 4-year in CZ -0.018 0.003 0.014 0.003
(0.079) (0.090) (0.086) (0.029)
Mean Dependent Variable 1088 525.8 562.7 399.4
Observations 13,241 13,241 13,241 13,038
Region × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating a variation of equation 1.5 where, in-
stead of one indicator for post-treatment years for all institutions, I include an indicator
that equals one in post-treatment years for institutions in commuting zones with one or
more four-year institutions and zero for institutions in commuting zones with no four-
year institutions. I also include an analogous variable for institutions with no four-year
institutions. Dependent variable means are reported in levels. All regressions include
region-by-year and institution fixed effects, control for state-by-year unemployment levels,
and are weighted by total student population at the baseline.
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Table 1.9: First-time Freshman Enrollment and Degree-Attainment Effects
at Community Colleges by Policy Combination
Total
Enrollment Full-time Part-time Degrees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Articulation × -0.029 0.034 -0.093 0.063
All 3 Sub-policies (0.064) (0.063) (0.104) (0.055)
Articulation × 0.102 0.065 0.255** 0.023
Combine 2 Sub-policies (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.028)
Articulation × -0.162*** -0.123** -0.154** -0.014
Only 1 Sub-policy (0.045) (0.061) (0.064) (0.063)
Mean Dependent Variable 1088 526 563 399
Observations 13,241 13,241 13,241 13,038
Region × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating a variation of equation 1.5 where I
interact the indicator for post-treatment years with an indicator that equals one for states
that have one, two, or three policies in place. Each column represents results from a single
regression. Dependent variable means are reported in levels. All regressions include region-
by-year fixed effects, control for state-by-year unemployment levels, and are weighted by
total student population at the baseline.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Articulation Years
Notes: This figure shows the number of states implementing statewide articulations in
each year. For details on how dates were collected, see section 1.3.1
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Figure 1.2: Frequency of Transferable Core, Common Course Numbering,
and Guaranteed Associates Transfer across states
Notes: Each bar represents the number of states that implement each type of policy. They
are not mutually exclusive, as states can implement one or more of the policies, and thus
appear in more than one bar.
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Figure 1.3: Map of Statewide Articulation in the United States
Notes: This map shows the distribution of states with each combination of the three
statewide articulation policy components. These data are obtained from the website of
the Education Commission of the States. No SA indicates states that never implemented
an SAA policy, while the “No TC, GAA, or CCN” category refers to states that implement
a general SAA in which they do not specify any particular policies to be implemented.
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Figure 1.4: Trends in Enrollment at CSU and UC Campuses
(a) Transfers into CSU (b) Transfers into UC
(c) CCC Transfers into CSU & UC
Notes: In this figure I show the average proportions of total undergraduates by year for both the
UC and CSU systems. Figure 1.4(c) shows the average of CCC transfers as a proportion of total
enrollment for the UC and CSU systems by year. Data on first-time freshman enrollment are
collected from the IPEDS, while detailed data on CCC and non-CCC transfers are obtained from
the UC and CSU offices of institutional research and analysis.
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Figure 1.5: Transfer-in Enrollment Effects of the ADT in California
(a) Triple Difference - Transfer vs. First-time Freshman, CSU
vs. UC
(b) Difference-in-Differences - Transfers to CSU vs. UC
Notes: Figure 1.5(a) shows the results of a triple differences analysis wherein I compare
transfer-in enrollment with first-time freshmen enrollment, within each institution, at
CSU and UC campuses. In figure 1.5(b) I show the results of a difference-in-differences
analysis where I compare only transfer-in enrollments at CSU and UC campuses. The
outcome in each regression is transfers (of first-time freshman) as a proportion of total
undergraduates. The vertical line represents the year 2010, the year in which the policy
was passed and a year before it became operational. These estimates are produced by
equation 1.1 and equation 1.2 and are are weighted by total student population at the
baseline. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Robust standard errors are
reported.
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Figure 1.6: Effects of Statewide Articulation on First-time Freshman
Enrollment
(a) Community College FTF
(b) Full-time vs. Part-time
Notes: These figures plot the results of estimating a difference-in-differences analysis of
the effects of statewide articulation on first-time freshman enrollment. The top panel
shows the effects on total enrollment, while the bottom panel shows the effects by part-
time and full-time status. The outcome on the y-axis is the logarithm of total, full,
and part-time enrollment. Both regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed
effects. These estimates are produced by equation 1.5 and are are weighted by total
student population at the baseline. The reference year T−1 is the year prior to statewide
articulation. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals and standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.7: Effects of Statewide Articulation on Total First-time Freshman
Enrollment
(a) 4-year Universities
(b) Community Colleges and 4-year
Universities
(c) Community College and Less-selective
4-year Universities
Notes: These figure shows the effects of statewide articulation on total first-time freshman en-
rollment at four-year institutions, and at less-selective four-year institutions institutions. The
outcome on the y-axis is the logarithm of total enrollment. The regression includes region-by-year
and institution fixed effects. The reference year T − 1 is the year prior to statewide articulation.
These estimates are produced by equation 1.5 and are are weighted by total student population at
baseline. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals and standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
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Figure 1.8: Effects of Statewide Articulation on 4-Year Public University
First-time Freshman Enrollment by Selectivity
Notes: This figure plots the difference-in-differences estimates calculated to examine the effects of
statewide articulation on first-time freshman enrollment by the four-year institution’s selectivity.
The selectivity measure used here is the Barron’s ratings, which are updated for each institution
every ten years. I define the rating for each institution as the rating in the most recent decade
prior to articulation. For example, if a state passes its legislation in 2005, I use the 2000 rating for
institutions in that state. More competitive institutions include those with a rating of one, two, or
three. Less competitive institutions are those with a rating of four, five, or six. See table B.1 for
additional information on the Barron’s ratings. These estimates are derived from equation 1.6 and
are are weighted by total student population at the baseline. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence
intervals and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
45
Figure 1.9: Effects of Statewide Articulation on Associate’s Degrees
Awarded
(a) Total Associate’s Degrees
(b) Associate’s Degrees by Major
Notes: These figures show the effects of statewide articulation on total associate’s degrees
awarded, and associate’s degrees awarded by vocational and non-vocational majors. Vo-
cational majors include engineering technologies and services, education administration,
family and consumer sciences, law enforcement and public services, business operations
and secretarial majors, agriculture and architecture related services. Non-vocational
majors include languages, literature, philosophy, liberal arts and sciences, STEM, psy-
chology, the social sciences and history. The outcome on the y-axis is the logarithm of
associate’s degrees awarded. The reference year T −1 is defined as the year after the first
year of articulation. These estimates are derived from equation 1.5 and are weighted by
total student population at baseline. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals and
standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.10: Effects of Statewide Articulation on Community College
First-time Freshman Enrollment by Number of 4-Year institutions in CZ
Notes: This figure plots the difference-in-differences estimates calculated to examine the
effects of statewide articulation on first-time freshman enrollment by the number of four-
year institutions in a community college’s commuting zone. These estimates are derived
from equation 1.6 and are are weighted by total student population at baseline. Bands
indicate 95 percent confidence intervals and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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CHAPTER 2
WHEN SARAH MEETS LAWRENCE: THE
EFFECTS OF COEDUCATION ON
WOMEN’S COLLEGE MAJOR CHOICES
In 2016, women earned 57% of all baccalaureate degrees awarded in the
United States, but only 37% of degrees awarded in STEM fields.1 Gender
gaps in the choice of major and occupation account for much of the remaining
pay gap between college-educated men and women (Brown and Corcoran,
1997; Bertrand, 2017; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Sloane et al., 2019). Beyond
inhibiting gender equality, the lack of gender diversity in high-paying fields
could reduce overall economic productivity and innovation (Hunt, 2016; Hsieh
et al., 2019). Designing policies to address these issues requires a complete
understanding of the causes of the gender gap in choice of field.
Canonical models of college major choice emphasize the importance of
expected earnings (Willis and Rosen, 1979; Altonji et al., 2012), but more
recent work attributes a large share of the gender gap to differences in pref-
erences and subjective beliefs (Zafar, 2013; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015, 2018;
Patnaik et al., 2020b). An important hypothesis is that these differences
are shaped by gendered features of the collegiate environment, such as in-
teractions with male students and faculty that may discourage women from
entering male-dominated fields (Ceci et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2010; Shapiro
and Sax, 2011). Efforts to explore this hypothesis, however, have been lim-
ited by a lack of plausibly exogenous variation in womens exposure to men
within typical collegiate settings.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of gendered collegiate environments
on women’s major choices by leveraging an important real-world setting: the
decline of women’s colleges in the United States. While women’s colleges
numbered in the hundreds in the early 1960s, most have since transitioned
to coeducation. These transitions occurred at varying times and were driven
1These statistics are from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS). Throughout this paper we define STEM to include biological sciences, physi-
cal sciences, science technology, mathematics and statistics, engineering and engineering
technology, and computer science.
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by a number of factors, such as an increasingly competitive environment
in higher education and the gradual liberalization of Catholic institutions
(Goldin and Katz, 2011). They impacted schools at a variety of positions
in the American college market—from elite colleges like Sarah Lawrence, to
regional schools like Elms College of Massachusetts, to larger public insti-
tutions like Radford University of Virginia. We leverage this variation in
a difference-in-differences research design to identify the effects of a quasi-
random increase in the male share of the student body on women’s major
choices.
We first show that transition to coeducation exposed women to substantial
inflows of male peers, but was not correlated with other large changes to the
educational environment. Our event-study models leverage hand-collected
information on the timing of U.S. colleges’ transition to coeducation, which
we merge to data on the near-universe of U.S. baccalaureate institutions. We
find that the male share of the student body increased by about 25 percentage
points in the ten years following the arrival of coeducational classes. We also
estimate a marginally significant but small increase in the male share of
faculty (5 percentage points). We find no evidence that coeducation created
capacity constraints at newly coeducational institutions, or was correlated
with labor market shocks that could alter the return to STEM degrees.
We find that this change in the college environment caused women to
substitute away from traditionally male and highly quantitative fields. The
share of women majoring in any STEM field decreased by 2.0 percentage
points (24%) after ten years of coeducation. This was driven by decreases
in the share of women majoring in biology, physical sciences, and math.
We also estimate substantial decreases in the shares of women majoring in
economics and in business. Correspondingly, we find increases in the share of
women choosing health, home economics, and psychology and social sciences
other than economics.2 These estimates are robust to the use of alternative
comparison groups, including a synthetic control approach. Our findings
are consistent with prior observations that gender gaps are strongest in the
most math-intensive fields (Ceci et al., 2014; Kahn and Ginther, 2017), and
suggest that this pattern may self-reinforce due to causal effects of male peer
exposure.
2Most health majors are in nursing or allied health fields, rather than pre-professional
degree programs.
49
We then explore the mechanisms behind this shift toward less quantitative
majors. The effect of coeducation on women’s field of study could oper-
ate through two channels: coeducation could change both women’s interest
in quantitative majors conditional on attending a particular institution (an
“environmental effect”) and women’s interest in attending the institution in
the first place (a “composition effect”). We find no evidence of a change in
entering freshman women’s intended major choices, nor their SAT scores or
other objective ability measures. We also find no evidence that the transition
to coeducation led to an inflow of women STEM majors at peer institutions
that remained women-only. These results suggest that the composition ef-
fect is small relative to the environmental effect. We conclude that our
estimated effects on female students’ choice of major are driven by gendered
peer effects—e.g., greater salience and enforcement of gender roles, gender
stereotypes, and marriage market considerations that accompany a shift to a
coeducational environment. In the concluding discussion, we present a sim-
ple calculation that suggests that gendered peer effects account for 31% of
the contemporary gender gap in STEM major choice.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. While gender dif-
ferences in student characteristics such as math ability (Turner and Bowen,
1999), STEM grades (Calkins, 2020; Goldin, 2015; Astorne-Figari and Speer,
2019), and high school course-taking (Ceci et al., 2014; Card and Payne, 2017)
all contribute to gender differences in college major choice, they only account
for a small portion of the gap (Patnaik et al., 2020b). Heterogeneous pref-
erences for majors are the primary determinant of the gender gap in STEM
majoring (e.g. Zafar, 2013; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). This paper adds to
literature that seeks the ultimate causes of these heterogeneous preferences
(Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Patnaik et al., 2020a), finding that exposure to
male peers in college may exert an important role.
Our study of real-world exposure to male peers furthers an experimental
literature that explores the role of the social environment on gender gaps in
economic behavior (see Bertrand, 2011 for a review). Women’s willingness to
compete and aptitude in competition have been shown to be lower in mixed-
gender relative to single-sex environments (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007, 2008; Kamas and Preston, 2012). In addition, these dif-
ferences appear to depend on prevailing social norms (Gneezy et al., 2009),
exposure to male peers in elementary school (Booth and Nolen, 2012a,b),
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and whether actions will be observed by male peers (Bursztyn et al., 2017).
Our paper helps link this literature to real-world gender gaps in educational
outcomes.
Our analysis also contributes to a growing literature on gendered peer ef-
fects in post-secondary educational environments. Prior work tends to lever-
age highly specialized settings—such as STEM doctoral programs in Ohio
(Bostwick and Weinberg, 2018), the first coeducational class at West Point
(Huntington-Klein and Rose, 2018), or introductory classes at a Dutch busi-
ness school (Zlitz and Feld, 2018). In addition to analyzing a wide range of
U.S. colleges, one feature of our context is that we study exposure to men
in a mostly female environment, rather than exposure to women in a mostly
male environment. This is closer to representative of the American higher ed-
ucation landscape today, where women outnumber men on most campuses.
Our results may also have broader implications for the labor market—for
instance, they may shed light on the expected effects of inflows of men to
traditionally female-dominated occupations like nursing.
Finally, our paper revitalizes a literature on the educational roles of women’s
colleges. Early studies found that graduates of women’s colleges earned
higher income and had higher occupational prestige than graduates of coed-
ucational colleges (Riordan, 1994; Tidball, 1980, 1989). Women at women’s
colleges also tend to report greater satisfaction with educational aspects of
the college experience and greater support in their educational endeavors
(Smith, 1990; Miller-Bernal, 1993; Kinzie et al., 2007).3 Closely related to
our paper is a case study by Billger (2002) that found a decrease in the
number of women choosing traditionally male majors and occupations after
a single women’s college transitioned to coeducation. We expand on this
literature by exploiting variation in the date of transition to coeducation in a
causal framework, and by considering the near-universe of historical women’s
colleges in the United States.
3In addition, Dasgupta and Asgari (2004) found that students at a women’s college
were less likely to form negative stereotypes about women’s STEM abilities than woman
students at a coeducational college.
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2.1 Women’s Colleges and Transitions to Coeducation
2.1.1 Historical context
Women’s colleges have been a part of higher education in the United States
since 1836. Most early women’s colleges were located in the Northeast and
were progressive institutions designed to expand educational opportunities
for women (Chamberlain, 1988). Their footprint grew as Protestant- and
Catholic-affiliated schools opened, mostly in the South and Midwest (Har-
warth et al., 1997). Non-denominational public universities, such as Texas
Women’s University, and private women’s colleges, such as Sarah Lawrence,
added to the ranks in the 20th century. While the precise number is a subject
of debate, by the 1960s, between 233 and 315 U.S. colleges served a strictly
female student body (Harwarth et al., 1997).
The modern decline of women’s colleges began in earnest in the late 1960s.
While much of this trend was driven by changes in demand for single-sex
education, the timing of and approach to the transition to coeducation was
characterized by substantial heterogeneity (Thomas, 2008). The liberaliza-
tion of Catholic education following the Vatican II council opened the door to
coeducation in traditionally Catholic schools (Goldin and Katz, 2011). Some
institutions also worried about the implications of proposed equal rights leg-
islation (Thomas, 2008). These forces led to a wave of changes, with roughly
one-half of women’s colleges disappearing or converting to coeducation by
the early 1970s. Other schools resisted coeducation but eventually followed
suit, with more colleges ending single-sex education nearly every year since.
Still more chose to embrace their single-sex mission for good: Thirty-four
women’s colleges, and only three men’s colleges, remain today.
An institution’s decision to transition to coeducation involved sustained
input of several groups of stakeholders: enrolled students, alumnae and alum-
nae organizations, faculty, the president and college administration, and the
board of trustees (Miller-Bernal and Poulson, 2004; Goldin and Katz, 2011).
On the one hand, transition was likely to expand enrollment and bring in
more tuition revenue. Moreover, as high-achieving students increasingly
came to prefer coeducation to single-sex learning environments, transition
ensured the continued enrollment of quality students. In some cases, par-
ticularly at more prestigious institutions, transitioning to coeducation risked
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upsetting current students and alumnae (The Economist, 1987).4 Our re-
search design, which we describe in the next section, leverages unpredictable
variation in the existence and timing of coeducation events to estimate the
causal effects of coeducation on women’s major choices.
2.1.2 Expected effects of coeducation
Guided by the literature discussed in the introduction and a formal model of
women’s college and major choices (presented in Appendix A.2), we discuss
a number of mechanisms by which women’s choices of degrees at formerly
women’s colleges may be affected by the transition to coeducation.
First, women’s college j’s transition to coeducation may alter the en-
rollment decisions made by women high school seniors. Women who pre-
fer a single-sex environment may substitute away from j and toward other
women’s colleges, while women who prefer a co-educational environment may
substitute toward j. If women’s propensities to major in STEM are corre-
lated with preferences for single-sex educational environments, we may see
changes in majoring behavior that are driven by changes in the composition
of students.
For women who continue to enroll at college j, the transition to coed-
ucation may impact major choices by changing the (perceived or realized)
payoffs of majoring in STEM relative to non-STEM fields. This effect, which
we refer to as the “environmental effect,” may itself be the product of several
different factors associated with the transition to co-education. For example,
coeducation could introduce psychological costs related to competition with
men for course grades and professors’ attention (Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007). This could steer women toward non-STEM majors, to the extent that
men disproportionately entered STEM classrooms (which we show occurred
in our setting; see also Kahn and Ginther, 2017). The presence of men on
campus could also have increased the salience of gender norms and stereo-
types (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Schmader, 2002; Steele, 1997), leading
women to choose non-STEM fields out of a sense of social conformity. Gen-
der norms could also play a role through the marriage market if majoring in
4For example, students at both Mills College and Wells College, which considered
becoming coeducation in 1990 and 2005 respectively, protested the decision. Only the
protests at Mills College were successful.
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a high-paying, STEM-related field is seen as a negative signal to potential
future spouses (Bertrand et al., 2015; Bursztyn et al., 2017). We refer to
the collection of mechanisms related to changes in the gender composition of
women’s classmates as gendered peer effects.
Other mechanisms, such as changes in the educational inputs provided by
newly coeducational colleges, may also factor into the environmental effect.
For instance, if colleges hire more male faculty to prepare for the arrival
of male students, one byproduct could be a weakening of role model effects
that have been shown to draw women into quantitative fields (Carrell et al.,
2010; Kofoed and McGovney, 2019; Bottia et al., 2015). In addition, even
holding the gender mix of the student body constant, coeducation could
influence women’s major choices through gender-neutral peer effects—i.e. by
changing the average quantitative ability of peers and competitiveness of
STEM courses. Our data do not permit exact quantification of these various
mechanisms. However, we use a variety of indirect approaches to rule out
some mechanisms in favor of others. Our results suggest that mechanisms
other than gendered peer effects are of limited quantitative importance.
2.2 Data and Research Design
We hand-collected a list of women’s colleges and their dates of transition
to coeducation, covering the period of 1966-2016. We view this as one im-
portant contribution of our study. Our collection effort, which we detail in
Appendix D, identified 219 institutions that were women’s colleges in the first
year they were observed (see Appendix table G.4). 155 of these institutions
transitioned to coeducation during our sample period.5
Figure 2.1 documents the distribution of the years of transition to coeduca-
tion at women’s colleges in our sample. The modal transition date is between
1969 and 1971, before the passage of Title IX in 1972.6 Although Title IX
5We thank Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz for sharing a similar dataset that covers
a partially overlapping time period (the late 1800s to roughly 1990; see Goldin and Katz,
2011). The transition dates for most former women’s colleges are consistent across the
datasets; where they disagree, the discrepancies are usually only 1-2 years or can be
attributed to differing definitions of coeducation.
6Our sample has switch dates that are more concentrated in the late 1960s and early
1970s than our full data on former women’s colleges. A number of institutions that changed
to coeducation in the 1980s and 1990s either closed shortly thereafter, did not have STEM
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affected the educational environment and outcomes of women at public in-
stitutions (Rim, 2020), it is unlikely to have caused meaningful change in
the women’s colleges in our sample—the majority of which were private and
received little federal funding.7,8
2.2.1 Data on student outcomes
Our main analyses use data from the Higher Education General Infor-
mation Survey (HEGIS) and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System (IPEDS). HEGIS and IPEDS provide information from 1966–1986
and 1987–2016, respectively, on the number of degrees awarded by year, insti-
tution, major, and gender. HEGIS collects data from all institutions of higher
education subject to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965. IPEDS
collects data from all post-secondary institutions in the United States who
participate in federal financial assistance programs—a larger sample than
HEGIS. Many schools participate in IPEDS voluntarily even if they do not
accept federal financial assistance, so the coverage of U.S. baccalaureate-
degree-granting institutions in IPEDS is nearly universal.9
We use these data to construct a measure of the share of graduates of
programs in 1966, or had large numbers of male graduates before their official date to
coeducation. However, the fact that the modal transition date is in the late 1960s does
not change.
7Title IX prohibited sex discrimination at undergraduate public institutions but did
not initially apply to private colleges. Although Title IX applied to other programs at
private institutions if the institution received federal money, including student aid grants,
Title IX only applied to the particular program receiving federal money until 1987 (see
pg. 8 and footnote 15 of Rim (2020)). Aside from student aid grants, federal money
was probably not a large driver of decisions at the (mostly small and private) colleges in
our sample: direct federal appropriations were unlikely, and the median expenditure on
research per year was $0, according to the IPEDS finance data.
8Appendix Table A2 presents linear probability model estimates of ever transitioning to
coeducation on the full sample, and transitioning before 1972 on our sample of switchers.
We included controls for region, religiosity, size (i.e. log enrollment in the first year of
observation) and college selectivity rating. While most of these variables significantly
predict the existence and timing of a transition to coeducation, they jointly explain less
than 22 percent of the variation in each outcome. The results suggest the availability of
substantial institutional heterogeneity to analyze in a difference-in-difference framework.
(This, of course, does not prove that coeducation was randomly assigned conditional on
these observables. We test this identifying assumption extensively below.)
9The data from the HEGIS 1970 issue on degrees awarded has historically not been
available in digital form. Because this is an important time period for our study—a large
number of institutions in our sample transitioned to coeducation in the late 1960s and
early 1970s—we digitized the 1970 issue of the HEGIS data on degrees awarded.
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DGµ,it is the number of degrees in major µ earned by graduates from institution
i in year t of gender G. The data only provide a measure of degrees awarded:
we do not observe individuals who matriculate but do not finish their degrees,
or the time to completion for those who finish their degrees. We therefore
cannot investigate intermediate channels of degree progress.
Our primary focus is on this measure of sGc,it for quantitative majors such
as math, biology, and the physical sciences, although we also examine the
consequences for the full distribution of majors. We pool these three majors,
as well as engineering, engineering technology, and computer science, into a
comprehensive STEM major. We also examine economics.
To examine how coeducation alters the underlying composition of women,
our analysis also requires indicators of entering women students’ prepared-
ness for STEM coursework. These include SAT scores, high school grades,
parental education and income, self-assessments of ambition to pursue a ca-
reer in STEM, and others. We collect these data from The CIRP Freshman
Survey (TFS), which spans the years 1966 to 2006 and is produced by the
Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) of UCLA. TFS surveys fresh-
men at participating institutions on their college and career plans as well
as their academic preparedness and family background.10 We link TFS to
our IPEDS/HEGIS sample to include institution-level information in our
TFS regressions. Our linked sample includes 723 institutions, 67 of which
switched from women-only to coeducation and nine of which are currently
women-only.
After merging the hand-collected data on schools’ dates of transition to
the HEGIS/IPEDS data, we made a number of sample restrictions, which
we detail in Appendix E.3.3. These restrictions exclude cases in which the
transition to coeducation was a gradual process rather than a single event,
some likely errors in the HEGIS/IPEDS data, institutions that did not reg-
10Institutions decide each year whether to participate in TFS, and often skip years.
Students are surveyed before they begin their college careers; many institutions have
students fill out the survey during freshman orientation.
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ularly offer STEM programs, and institutions that closed shortly after tran-
sitioning. We are left with a clean sample of 87 institutions that switched to
coeducation. Institutions that did not initially offer STEM programs or that
closed shortly after the transition make up the bulk of coeducation events
dropped from the sample. Returning them to the sample, which gives us
a total of 119 coeducation events, does not substantially change our main
results. (see Appendix Figure G.1.)
Our main comparison group consists of women’s colleges that did not tran-
sition to coeducation during our sample frame. However, we also consider
specifications that include always-coeducational institutions. We process the
data in a similar manner as above and obtain a sample of 27 institutions
that were always women’s colleges and 921 institutions that were always
coeducational.
2.2.2 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 describes our sample of switchers as well as each of our four com-
parison groups. The comparison groups are relatively similar in the share of
women choosing STEM in the first year they enter the data. The switch-
ers are similar to the always-women’s colleges in terms of initial enrollment,
the initial share of women majoring in STEM, and the number of graduate
degrees awarded. All public women’s colleges eventually switched to coed-
ucation, but the switchers sample is still 78% private, whereas only 30% of
the always-coed sample is private. Forty-seven percent of our switchers were
at some point affiliated with the Catholic church, compared to 33% of the
always women’s colleges and no more than 10% of the schools in the other
comparison groups. And finally, switchers are less selective on average than
the always women’s colleges, and slightly more selective than always-coed
colleges.11
As men joined the student body at former women’s colleges, their pres-
ence was felt disproportionately in traditionally “male” disciplines. Figure
2.2 reports the distribution of majors chosen by students at our sample of
former women’s colleges and a comparison group of coeducational schools.
Relative to men at schools that were coeducational throughout our sample
11“Selective” refers to a 1972 Barron’s rating of 1-3.
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period (light blue), the first cohorts of men who entered former women’s col-
leges were less likely to choose heavily quantitative majors (medium blue):
They were less than half as likely to major in STEM and more likely to spe-
cialize in health or social sciences other than economics. However, relative to
women at these schools (dark blue), they were more likely to choose relatively
quantitative, high-return fields such as STEM, economics, and business. This
suggests that the gender mix of the classroom in these fields changed quickly,
as did classrooms in other fields such as sociology and psychology.
2.2.3 Empirical strategy
We exploit variation in the timing of women’s colleges’ transitions to
coeducation to estimate effects of coeducation on women’s major choices
and the determinants of those choices. Because we expect these outcomes
to evolve dynamically, our main results rely on the following event-study
specification:
Yit = θi +Wi
10∑
k=−5
βk1 (k = t− t∗i −m) + δr(i)t + ψc(i)t + εit. (2.2)
In this equation, Yit is an outcome of interest (e.g., the share of women
graduating from institution i in academic year t with a STEM degree), and
θi is an institution fixed effect.
The coefficients of interest are βk, which flexibly trace out the effect of
the transition to coeducation on outcome Yit at each year relative to the
transition k. The academic year in which school i switched to coeducation is
given by t∗i , and we shift event time by m to align the timing of our outcome
of interest with the timing of exposure to male classmates.12
12When considering the characteristics of entering freshman in the TFS, we set m = 0,
such that the first treated cohort is the first coeducational cohort. When considering
the field choices of graduating seniors in IPEDS/HEGIS, we set m > 0. One natural
choice might be m = 3, assuming that it takes the first coeducational class 4 years to
graduate and end up in IPEDS/HEGIS. (For example, if a student started college in
academic year t = 2000 − 2001 and graduated in four years, her graduation year would
be t + 3 = 2003 − 2004.) However, if an older student’s choice of major is affected by
the arrival of freshman male students to campus, effects may show up before t∗i + 3. For
this reason, we set m = 2, such that the first treated cohort was the cohort that began
its junior year as the first male freshmen arrived to campus. This is not a restrictive
assumption: effects that manifest in the first two years of coeducation would show up as
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The indicator Wi is equal to 1 for schools that switched from female-only to
co-education during our sample period. Conceptually, this means that we in-
clude a comparison group of institutions that did not convert to co-education
during our sample period. Inclusion of these institutions improves precision.
As shown in Table 2.1, women’s colleges in 1966 were more likely to be pri-
vate and religiously affiliated than colleges that were coeducational in 1966.
Women’s colleges were also more common in certain parts of the country.
This motivates the inclusion of δr(i)t, a set of Census region-by-year fixed
effects, and ψc(i)t, a set of institutional-control-by-year fixed effects. These
fixed effects account nonparametrically for differential trends across regions
of the United States and different types of institutions, respectively. Insti-
tutional control is measured at the first year we observe the institution and
differentiates between public, Catholic private, and other private colleges. In
all analyses, we cluster standard errors at the institution level. When Yit is
a ratio, we weight by the denominator of the ratio, although results do not
substantially change if we do not weight the regressions (Solon et al., 2015).
Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on these control variables,
there is no residual determinant of Yit that is correlated with an institution’s
transition from a female-only student body to co-education. While this as-
sumption is fundamentally unverifiable, we conduct several falsification tests.
First, our event-study specification enables us to estimate βk before the re-
form. A series of coefficients that depart significantly from a flat pre-trend
would suggest the presence of confounding variables. Second, we present our
main results based on four different control groups: schools that were women-
only throughout that period (“always women’s” colleges), all non-switching
schools in the sample, schools that were coeducational-only throughout the
sample period (“always coed”), and schools with less than 5,000 students
enrolled in the first year we observe their enrollment data (fall of 1968 or
first year they enter the HEGIS sample—whichever is later).13
Third, in Appendix F.1, we conduct a synthetic control analysis on the
main sample and verify that the results match those generated by the event
studies.
shifts during our “pre-period” when k < 0.
13The largest switcher in our sample, Texas Women’s University, had slightly more
than 5,000 students enrolled in fall 1968. This specification establishes balance between
treated and control schools on initial enrollment. In this specification, we also restrict the
treatment group to schools with enrollment under 5,000 in the first year we observe them.
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In addition to these indirect tests, we directly test whether the switch to
coeducation was correlated with certain labor market conditions that might
determine women’s STEM major choices. We use the March CPS to con-
struct four measures of labor market conditions at the state-year level (Rug-
gles et al., 2020) and then regress these measures on equation 2.2 (Pei et
al., 2018). The results of this exercise are shown in Figure G.2. We find no
effect on the unemployment rate, a common measure of the overall health
of the labor market. The event-study is quite flat, and if we restrict equa-
tion 2.2 to a single βk indicating post-transition, we obtain a precise 0 es-
timate. We also find no correlation between coeducation and the ratio of
employment in STEM-related occupations to employment in non-STEM oc-
cupations among college-educated workers (difference-in-difference estimate
of 0.00066, s.e. 0.0026). We do estimate a short-run increase in the earnings
of male workers in STEM occupations (relative to male workers in non-STEM
occupations) following coeducation. However, to the extent that this esti-
mate indicates an increase in demand for STEM workers, we would expect
it to increase the share of students majoring in STEM fields. Furthermore,
this effect dissipates by the fourth year post-transition, and the difference-
in-difference estimate is indistinguishable from 0 (0.019, s.e. 0.018). Finally,
the relative earnings among women in STEM occupations exhibits a much
flatter trend around the timing of coeducation (difference-in-difference esti-
mate -0.0044, s.e. 0.017). These results suggest that relevant labor market
conditions were orthogonal to the timing of coeducation.14
14Another potential threat to identification would be the existence of capacity con-
straints that limited women’s opportunity to major in quantitative fields due to the school’s
inability to handle an influx of students rather than via the gender mix of students or fac-
ulty. We note that capacity constraints are unlikely to drive our results because the
transition to coeducation was often a response to a reduction in demand for single-sex
education, suggesting that classroom, lab, and other capacities were slack at the time of
coeducation. In Section F.2 of the Appendix, we provide an indirect test of the capacity
constraint hypothesis, and find that it cannot explain our results.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 The effect of coeducation on women’s exposure to male
students and faculty
We start by examining how the change to coeducation altered the gender mix
of the student body, using the CIRP Freshman Survey. For each institution
and year, we calculate the share of the entering class that is male and regress
this on equation 2.2. Figure 2.3a reports estimated event study coefficients.
Coeducation induced a rapid increase in the male share of freshmen beginning
with the first coeducational cohort. By year 10 after coeducation, the male
share of the freshman class had risen by roughly 30 percentage points relative
to the control group in all samples.
We can also evaluate the effect on the male share of the overall under-
graduate student body using our main HEGIS/IPEDS sample. Figure 2.3b
shows that the male share of all undergraduates rose at a slightly slower pace,
leveling off at an increase of 20-25% a decade after the transition. Combined
with the distribution of men’s major choices shown in Figure 2.2, these results
suggest that women, particularly in STEM-related classrooms, experienced
substantial inflows of male peers.
Because our main results will evaluate the choice of major among graduat-
ing students, we also evaluate the evolution of the share of degrees awarded
to men. This measure of gender composition may suffer from measurement
error due the presence of transfer students, variation in time to degree com-
pletion, and the earning of multiple degrees. However, Figure 2.3c shows
that the pattern in degree receipt was broadly similar to the overall gender
composition of the student body, with a substantial increase in the male
share of the student body that levels off after an initial spike.
In fall 1971, 51% of faculty were female at women’s colleges, compared
to only 23% at coeducational institutions. Information on faculty in the
IPEDS/HEGIS data is spotty, but we do observe the number of faculty mem-
bers by sex beginning in fall 1971, and then in select years until fall 1989,
when it is reported relatively consistently. We construct the female share of
faculty by year and institution and regress it on equation 2.2.
Although Kaplan (1978) notes that the faculty of Vassar College became
substantially more male after the transition to coeducation, we do not find
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that this was true on average. In Figure 2.3d we find a small negative effect
that only becomes statistically significant in years 7-10 after the junior year
of the first coeducational cohort. By year 10, the female share of the faculty
had declined by only 5 percentage points. This is quite small relative to the
30 percentage point exposure to male peers estimated above. We therefore
conclude that there is little evidence to suggest that transition to coeducation
diminished the role-model effects of female faculty on women’s major choices.
2.3.2 The effect of coeducation on women’s quantitative
major choices
Our main results are shown in Figure 2.4, which reports the effect of co-
education on the share of women who graduated with degrees in biological
sciences, physical sciences, math, and economics, based on estimates of equa-
tion 2.2. For each field, the event study is relatively flat before coeducation,
slopes downward immediately after coeducation, and remains significantly
below zero in the long run (which we define as 8-10 years after the junior
year of the first mixed-gender cohort, when the inflow of male students had
begun to stabilize). Looking at the long-run coefficients, we find that coed-
ucation caused roughly a 1.0 percentage-point decline in the share of women
majoring in biological sciences, a 0.5 percentage-point decline for physical
sciences, a 0.5 percentage-point decline for math, and a 0.9 percentage-point
decline for economics.
In Figure 2.5, we present similar estimates for our comprehensive measure
of STEM. In the long run, we find a 2.0 percentage-point decline in the
share of women majoring in STEM, relative to contemporaneous changes
experienced by similar colleges that did not transition to coeducation. The
effect of coeducation on STEM majoring as a whole is around 24% of the
pre-coeducation share of women choosing STEM majors at women’s colleges
about to transition. Columns 1 through 5 of Appendix Table G.3 present
standard difference-in-difference coefficients—which average both short and
long run effects of coeducation—for STEM and each field shown in Figure
2.4 and for all 4 comparison groups considered. In all cases the coefficients
are negative and highly statistically significant.
To provide indirect evidence on the validity of our identifying assumptions,
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we test whether β−5, β−4, β−3, and β−2 are jointly different from zero. We
find no statistically significant evidence of a pre-trend. In the “women’s
colleges” specification, the p-values for biology, physical sciences, math, and
economics, and STEM are 0.30, 0.28, 0.22, 0.27, and 0.17, respectively.
These effects are comparable to the effects of moderate changes in other
recognized determinants of major choices. For example, Turner and Bowen
(1999) report that among students with low verbal SAT scores, an increase
in math SAT scores from the 650-700 to 750-800 bin is associated with a 1
percentage-point increase in biology majors, a 6-7 percentage-point increase
in math or physical sciences, and a 3 percentage-point increase in economics
(see their Figure 3). In a study of male Duke undergraduates, Arcidiacono et
al. (2012) estimate that the share majoring in natural sciences increases by 1
percentage point in response to a 1 standard-deviation increase in expected
earnings in science careers. Similarly, a 1 standard-deviation increase in
business career earnings raises the share choosing economics by 3 percentage
points.
2.3.3 The effect of coeducation on the full distribution of
major choices
To examine the effect of coeducation on the full distribution of fields chosen
by women, we classify all fields into eleven major concentrations: STEM,
art, business, economics, education, health, home economics, humanities,
psychology, social sciences other than economics and psychology, and all
other fields. (For further detail, see Appendix E.1.2.) To provide a summary
measure of the effects of coeducation across different majors, we estimate
a standard difference-in-difference coefficient, βDiDµ , for each major µ. As
discussed above, this coefficient describes the average effect of coeducation
(over our window of observation, which includes both the short and long run)
on the share of women majoring in µ. Similarly, we estimate the effect on
the male share of the graduating class to obtain βDiDmshare.
We then scale this effect as follows. For each major µ, we report esti-
mates of γDiDµ = β
DiD
µ · 0.1/βDiDmshare. That is, γDiDµ describes the effect of a
coeducation-induced 10 percentage point increase in the male share of the
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student body on the share of women majoring in µ.15
Figure 2.6a ranks estimates of γDiD in increasing order across all eleven
major concentrations. STEM experienced the largest outflows of women,
with economics experiencing a smaller outflow. In contrast, we estimate that
health experienced large inflows of women. In addition, home economics,
pscyhology, social sciences other than economics, and the “other” concentra-
tion also experienced moderate inflows,16 although none of these estimates
are statistically significant.
Figure 2.6b presents semi-elasticity responses that account for the base-
line share of women majoring in each concentration. For a given major µ,






µ,−1 is the share
of women majoring in µ in the year before transition to co-education. With
this specification, the observed gendered pattern of substitution strength-
ens: Business, Economics and STEM experience the greatest (proportional)
outflows of women, while Home Economics, Health, and the religion and
social-service majors in Other experience the greatest inflows.17
All of the above estimates are expressed in terms of a 10 percentage-point
increase in the male share of the student body. As coeducation induced
a long-run increase of 25 percentage points (Figure 2.3), these estimates
should be multiplied by a factor of 2.5 if one wishes to measure the long-run
consequences of coeducation. Thus, in the long run, coeducation appeared
to cause substantial reallocation of women away from traditionally male and
math-intensive fields, and toward less math-intensive fields. This is consistent
with the large gender gaps in math-intensive fields in typical coeducational
settings, reported by Ceci et al. (2014); Kahn and Ginther (2017).
15Because the estimate of γDiD is the product of two estimates, we conduct inference
via a block bootstrap routine that accounts for the possibility of intraclass correlation at
the institution level. We compute 1, 000 estimates of γDiDµ and its underlying components
via Monte Carlo resampling; the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of this distribution form the
confidence interval of our estimate.
16“Other” contains a set of small majors, many of which were not likely offered by
small private colleges (e.g. agriculture and forestry). The ones that were offered include
interdisciplinary majors, theology and religion, and social services.
17It is also worth noting that our main comparison sample of women’s colleges contains
many liberal arts colleges, which do not consistently offer vocational fields. Appendix
Figure G.4 reconstructs Figure 2.6a based on the “all-colleges” comparison group and
finds similar, if not stronger results. Business, STEM and Economics remain the top 3
losers of women, while Health, Home Economics, and Other remain in the top 4 gainers
of women. Moreover, the Business and Health estimates reach statistical significance.
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2.4 Composition versus environmental effects
As laid out in Section 2.1, the treatment effect of coeducation on women’s
major choices can be divided into two main channels: a composition effect, in
which the transition alters STEM-inclined women’s matriculation decisions,
and an environmental effect, in which a stable population of women responds
to the arrival of male classmates. Suppose that the composition effect is
large—i.e. the estimated decrease in STEM majoring at the transitioning
college is due to STEM-inclined women choosing to enroll at other colleges.
Then, it is unclear whether the large-scale adoption of a policy that mitigates
gendered features of collegiate environments would produce more woman
STEM majors in aggregate, or would simply induce a reallocation of woman
STEM majors across college campuses. On the other hand, if the composition
effect is small, then the treatment effect we have estimated is informative
about the aggregate effect of large-scale “de-gendering” policies.
This section sheds light on the composition effect in three ways. First, we
test for changes in the intended major of entering freshman women. Sec-
ond, we test for changes in the average preparedness for STEM coursework
among entering female freshman. To do so, we collapse our student-level data
from TFS at the institution-by-year level and merge it to the HEGIS/IPEDS
data.18 Finally, we test whether STEM majoring at a current women’s col-
lege responds positively to the share of its competitors that have transitioned
to coeducation.
2.4.1 Changes in the freshman class
We start by using the linked TFS-IPEDS/HEGIS data to study changes in
entering female students’ intended major. We construct indicator variables
for majoring in each broad category of STEM and use them as our outcome
in equation 2.2. It is important to note that this exercise is not a pure test of
the composition effect: students could rationally anticipate an environmental
effect from the arrival of male peers and change their intended coursework,
even before matriculating. Nonetheless, a zero effect on intended major would
suggest little scope for composition effects.
18We implement a 4-year-lag when merging so that we match the characteristics of an
entering freshman cohort to their major choices as graduating seniors.
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Results are shown in Figure 2.7a-2.7c. We find no evidence that the switch
to transition sparked a change in the share of female freshmen who planned
to major in biology, physical sciences, or math. In all cases, the event study
figures are flat and bear little resemblance to the sharp decreases in actual
choice of major that we observe in Figure 2.4. The Freshman Survey does not
report intention to major in economics separately from other social sciences,
so we do not include it in this analysis.
We next use the TFS-IPEDS/HEGIS data to test for shifts in more “ob-
jective” predictors of STEM majoring. Figure 2.7d reports the estimated
effect of coeducation on women’s average math SAT score, and Figure 2.7e
reports the estimated effect on women’s average verbal SAT score. We fail to
find a significant effect in either case—the event studies are somewhat noisy
but display no discernible trend break after coeducation.19
While SAT scores are important, they are not the only predictors of stu-
dents’ success in STEM courses (e.g., Turner and Bowen, 1999; Arcidiacono,
2004; Card and Payne, 2017). Accordingly, we use a two-step procedure
to evaluate the effect of coeducation on a more comprehensive measure of
STEM preparedness of freshman women. First, we estimate
sWSTEM,i,t+3 = γZit + ξit (2.3)
on our linked dataset. In this equation, sWSTEM,i,t+3 is the share of female
graduates four years in the future who will earn STEM degrees, and Zit is a
vector of characteristics of female students, including average SAT Math and
Verbal scores, proportion reporting high school GPAs in each of the A, B,
and C ranges, average parental income and education levels, average student
age, and the share of female freshmen of each race and religion. We use
our estimate of Equation 2.3 to fit ŝWSTEM,i,t: that is, the predicted share of
freshman women who will graduate from institution i with a STEM degree
based on the characteristics of the average female freshman. (ŝWSTEM,i,t is
highly correlated with sWSTEM,i,t; see Appendix Figure G.6.) In this analysis,
we use all colleges as our comparison group due to the relatively small number
of women’s colleges in TFS; however, the results are similar when using
19We find no statistically significant effect of coeducation on the average SAT Math score
for all students at the institution (Appendix Figure G.10). This suggests a limited scope
for factors such as better study partners or increased competition for grades in STEM
courses.
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women’s colleges as the comparison group.
We then estimate Equation 2.2 with ŝWSTEM,i,t as the outcome. Because our
outcome variable is itself an estimate that is subject to error, we calculate
standard errors of this estimation using a percentile block bootstrap with
1,000 replications. Figure 2.7f reports the results of the two-step procedure.
Though our estimates are imprecise, the event study is extremely flat, dis-
playing no discernible trend break after coeducation. Difference-in-difference
estimation finds that the transition to coeducation raised the predicted share
of women who chose STEM majors by 0.06 percentage points — an estimate
that is neither statistically nor economically significant.20
These exercises strongly suggest that the composition effect is small rela-
tive to the environmental effect. Is this plausible? Previous work suggests
that students do not correctly anticipate their own abilities or the effects of
the collegiate environment on their abilities when forming enrollment and
majoring decisions (Zafar, 2011; Stange, 2012b; Owen, 2020). Even among
students that declare a STEM major, nearly half end up switching to another
field (Altonji et al., 2016; Astorne-Figari and Speer, 2019). These findings
suggest that women may not anticipate the effects of (gendered) social en-
vironments on their major choices at the time of enrollment. On the other
hand, if preferences for coeducational environments matter more than—or
are uncorrelated with—preferences for specific majors, women could ratio-
nally expect large effects of coeducation yet still select into coeducation in
an unbiased manner. We view our results as consistent with either of these
classes of educational choice models.
2.4.2 Substitution of STEM majors to other women’s colleges
Another indicator of a “composition effect” of the transition to coeducation
would be a substitution to the remaining single-sex colleges of women in-
terested in quantitative fields. To test for this possibility, we draw on our
20An augmented specification, that includes all of the fixed controls specified in equation
(2.2), is presented in Appendix Figure G.9. This specification is much more precisely
estimated. It displays a small and insignificant pre-trend followed by a similarly flat event
study: the difference-in-difference estimate is almost 0.
67
IPEDS/HEGIS dataset and estimate the following equation:
sWSTEM,i,t = θi + ρCWit × Exposureit + δr(i)t + ψc(i)t + εit (2.4)
This equation contains the same fixed controls as the main event study spec-
ification. The independent variable of interest is Exposureit, which equals
Number of comparable coeducational colleges
Number of comparable coeducational and women-only colleges
where “comparable colleges” are colleges within the same Census region and
1972 Barron’s selectivity band as college i. The indicator CWit is 1 if the in-
stitution is currently women-only and 0 otherwise. The parameter ρ captures
the extent to which women’s STEM majoring increases at current women’s
colleges as comparable women’s colleges increasingly transition to coeduca-
tion. We consider two samples: women’s colleges only, and women’s colleges
plus always-coeducational colleges.21
Our results are reported in Table 2.2. When considering only colleges that
were women-only in a given year, we find a coefficient of -0.00064. When in-
cluding institutions that were always coeducational, which better controls for
regional- and selectivity-driven trends in women’s STEM majoring, we find
a coefficient of -0.0064. That is, a ten percentage point increase in the share
of comparable colleges which were coeducational led to a 0.06 percentage
point decrease in women’s STEM majoring. This estimate is neither statisti-
cally nor economically significant, especially considering that each women’s
college in our sample had on average 8.5 peer institutions within a region-
by-selectivity band in the first year they appeared in the data. This evidence
further indicates that the composition effect, if it exists, is quite small.
2.5 Conclusion
Our paper takes advantage of a unique natural experiment in the history of
American higher education—the transitions of hundreds of women’s colleges
21When excluding always-coed schools, ρ is identified off of differential rates of transition
across region-by-selectivity cells. Including always-coed schools allows ρ to be identified
from co-variation in transition events and women’s STEM majoring at women’s colleges
within a region-by-selectivity cell, relative to trends in women’s STEM majoring at always-
coed colleges.
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to coeducation at varying times during the 1960s-2000s—to isolate the con-
tributions of gendered collegiate environments to gender disparities in field
choice. This analysis expands a literature that has emphasized the role of
non-pecuniary factors on major choice, such as subjective beliefs and prefer-
ences, but has yet to explore how major choices actually respond to changes
in non-pecuniary features of the environment.
Drawing on a newly assembled historical dataset, we estimate event study
specifications that compare the evolution of women’s major choices at newly
coeducational colleges to those at comparable colleges that transitioned at
different times (or did not transition at all). In the ten years following the
junior year of the first coeducational class, we find that the share of women
majoring in STEM fell by around 2.0 percentage points (24%) relative to
control colleges. We also estimate negative effects of coeducation on women’s
economics and business major choices. Our analysis suggests that these
reductions are primarily driven by greater exposure to male peers, rather than
a decrease in opportunities to interact with female faculty role models. We
also find no evidence of capacity constraints or shifting ability composition
as underlying mechanisms.
What do our estimates imply about the role of gendered peer effects on
the overall gender gap in STEM? We can gauge this with a simple exercise.
According to our 2016 data, 28 percent of baccalaureate degrees awarded to
men were in STEM fields, but only 11.5 percent of degrees awarded to women
were in STEM fields. In addition, 57 percent of total degrees were awarded
to women, so the average woman’s potential peer group was 43 percent male.
What would be the effect of reducing this number to zero? Figure 6a reports
that a 10-percentage-point increase in the male share of the student body
caused a 1.2-percentage-point reduction in the share of women majoring in
STEM. Thus, a 43-percentage-point reduction would be associated with a
4.3 · 1.2 = 5.16-percentage-point increase in the share of women majoring in
STEM. This amounts to 31 percent of the 16.5-percentage-point gap.
Of course, this counterfactual exercise must be qualified in several respects.
Our sample of switchers and women’s colleges primarily contain students who
live on campus, which is less often true of students at 4-year colleges today.
In addition, most coeducation events occurred in the 1960s-80s, when gender
roles may have been more salient than they are today. These considerations
suggest that our exercise overstates the aggregate role of gendered peer ef-
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fects. On the other hand, the men who entered newly coeducational colleges
were less likely than the average man to enter traditionally male fields (Fig-
ure 2.2). This suggests that women at newly coeducational colleges faced
less competition from men in STEM classrooms than would be predicted
based on the male share of the student body—implying that our exercise
understates the aggregate role of gendered peer effects.
In either case, our findings indicate that interaction with male peers in-
creases the salience of traditional gender identities and aspirations, stereotype
threat, aversion to competition, and marriage market considerations—and
that these factors meaningfully contribute to gender disparities in college
major choice. While a large-scale return to single-sex educational environ-
ments is likely undesirable, policies that infuse features of single-sex learning
environments into coeducational settings may be effective in closing the per-
sistent gender gap in major choice.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Switchers Women’s colleges All non-switchers Coed schools Small schools
Share of women’s degrees in STEM 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Total enrollment 1729.37 1609.61 11881.25 12143.32 2231.75
(1305.10) (699.06) (10461.56) (10462.53) (1352.69)
Female share of degrees awarded 0.99 1.00 0.48 0.47 0.54
(0.04) (0.01) (0.15) (0.12) (0.18)
Graduate degrees awarded 17.96 17.26 561.01 574.88 66.96
(32.39) (37.73) (824.41) (830.20) (167.29)
Private school indicator 0.78 1.00 0.32 0.30 0.65
(0.42) (0.00) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48)
Catholic school 0.47 0.33 0.05 0.04 0.10
(0.50) (0.48) (0.21) (0.20) (0.29)
Selective admission 0.25 0.52 0.21 0.21 0.20
(0.43) (0.51) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40)
Observations 87 27 948 921 667
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 2.2 for further
detail. Share of women in STEM, total enrollment, female share of graduate degrees,
graduate degrees awarded, and private school indicator measured in first year observed in
the data. Catholic affiliation is coded as 1 if the school was ever affiliated with the Catholic
Church. Schools are coded as having selective admission if they received a Barron’s rating
of 1, 2, or 3 in 1972. The majors included in the STEM concentration are described in
Section 2.2 and Appendix B. Sample statistics are weighted by the number of degrees
awarded to women.
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Table 2.2: Spillover effects analysis: the effect of coeducation on STEM
majoring at comparable colleges remaining women-only
Current women’s Current women’s +
colleges always coed





Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 2.2 for further
detail. The majors included in the STEM concentration are described in Section 2.2
and Appendix B. The table presents estimates of the effect of exposure to coeducational
colleges within the same region and selectivity band on the share of women graduating
from women’s colleges with STEM degrees. See Section 2.4 for further detail. Standard
errors are clustered at the institution level. A small number of institutions were dropped
due to missing Barron’s selectivity ratings.
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Notes: Hand-collected data on the years that former women-only institutions switched to
coeducation. See Section 2.2 for further background on how this list was compiled, and
Appendix E.3 for a comprehensive list of formerly women’s colleges and sample inclusion
criteria.
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Figure 2.2: Field of major among students at coeducational and former
women’s colleges












Men at always-coed schools
Men at former women's colleges
Women at former women's colleges
Notes: Data drawn from the HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected data on the dates of transition to coeducation by institution. Each bar shows the
fraction of graduates of a given sex and college type earning degrees in the corresponding
field. The distribution of majors among men at former women’s colleges is calculated
among men graduating in the first 10 years after the transition to coeducation. The
distribution of majors among men at “always-coed” schools is calculated among men
at schools that were coeducational throughout our sample period, weighted so that the
distribution of years represented matches the distribution of years represented among men
at former women’s colleges. The distribution of majors among women is calculated among
women graduating in the last 5 years before the transition to coeducation.
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Figure 2.3: The effect of coeducation on the gender composition of the
students and faculty
(a) Freshman class share male (b) Undergraduate share male
(c) Male share of degrees earned (d) Faculty share female
Notes: Panel A: Data drawn from the CIRP Freshman Survey, spanning 1966-2006,
matched to hand-collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. Panels B-D:
Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, matched to hand-collected
dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 2.2 for further detail. Panels
display estimates of βk from equation 2.2. Standard errors are clustered at the institution
level.
75



















-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
(a) Biology (b) Physical sciences
(c) Math (d) Economics
Control: Women's colleges Control: All schools Control: Coed colleges Control: Small schools
Years since junior year of first mixed-gender cohort
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 2.2 and Appendix
table A1 for further detail. Panels display estimate of βk from equation 2.2. Dependent
variable is the share of degrees earned in STEM among all degrees earned by women in the
academic year. STEM fields include math, biology, physical sciences, engineering, engi-
neering technology, and computer science. Standard errors are clustered at the institution
level.
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-5 0 5 10
Years since junior year of first mixed-gender cohort
Control: Women's colleges Control: All schools
Control: Coed colleges Control: Small schools
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 2.2 and Appendix
table A1 for further detail. Figure displays estimate of βs from equation 2.2. Standard
errors are clustered at the institution level.
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Figure 2.6: The effect of coeducation on the full distribution of women’s
major choices
(a) Percentage-point effects by major (b) Semi-elasticity by major
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. The majors included in
each concentration are described in Appendix B. Each panel displays estimates from a
difference-in-difference version of equation 2.2. Estimates are re-scaled to capture the ef-
fect of a 10-percentage-point increase in the male share of the student body induced by
coeducation. Confidence intervals account for error in estimation of the effect of coeduca-
tion on the male share of the student body via a block bootstrap routine. Specifically, the
routine computes 1,000 re-scaled coefficients and reports confidence intervals correspond-
ing to the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of this observed distribution. Semi-elasticities are
constructed by dividing the re-scaled percentage-point estimates by the baseline shares of
women majoring in each given concentration.
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Figure 2.7: Did coeducation induce a composition effect?
(a) Intended major: Biology (b) Intended major: Physical science
(c) Intended major: Math (d) Average math SAT scores
(e) Average verbal SAT scores (f) Estimated STEM preparedness
Notes: All panels present estimates of βk from equation 2.2, using TFS data from 1966 to
2006 linked to hand-collected dates of transition to coeducation by institution. See text
for details. 95% confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the
institution level, except in panel 2.7f, where standard errors are calculated using a block




THE EFFECTS OF OUTSIDE OPTIONS
ON WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM
ORCHESTRAS
Historically, [Rowe’s] only recourse would be to say, “‘Okay, if
you’re not going to pay me, I’m going somewhere else,’” he says,
“That’s what most of us have done.”
– Jeffrey Khaner, The Philadelphia Orchestra (Elizabeth Rowe v. The
Boston Symphony Orchestra) 1
3.1 Introduction
Outside options are a key factor in standard models of the labor market. In
a perfectly competitive market, workers will choose among multiple identical
firms, and will negotiate their wages based on their alternative job option.2
Workers will then accept or a reject a job offer based on the alternative, i.e.
their outside option. Once workers settle into a job, they can also leverage
an outside option to negotiate a higher wage at their current firm (Bagger et
al., 2014).
Although outside options play an essential role in wage determination mod-
els, not many studies have evaluated their role empirically. Examining the
link between outside options and wages is challenging for several reasons.
Ideally, a direct estimate of the effects of outside options would require us
to see a full empirical distribution of wages for identical workers in a nar-
rowly defined labor market. In practice, this has been nearly impossible to
do (Hornstein et al., 2011). Second, most datasets do not define sets of out-
side options for workers, because it is very difficult to determine which jobs
1Edgers, Geoff. “Elizabeth Rowe has sued the BSO. Her case could change
how orchestras pay men and women.” Washington Post . December 11 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/entertainment/music/orchestra-
gender-pay-gap/
2See Acemoglu (2001); Cahuc et al. (2006); Farber (1984); Jovanovic (1979)
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would be considered an outside option for any given worker. Third, it is chal-
lenging to isolate an opening that would be meaningful to a worker, i.e. a
single opportunity that would induce a worker to switch either from employ-
ment to non-employment or to another employer. Finally, factors that shift
a worker’s outside options may also shift their productivity in their current
firm. If productivity is changing, it can also impact wages, which would then
create an endogeneity problem that would plague any empirical analysis.
Some recent researcher has approached this question from various creative
angels (Caldwell and Danieli, 2021; Harmon and Caldwell, 2019; Bidner and
Sand, 2017), but is not able to solve these empirical difficulties. In this paper
we are able to overcome the aforementioned challenges by focusing on one
particular labor market, the classical musician labor market in United States
orchestras.
Classical musicians are specialized workers. Their training is often specific
to one instrument. Once a musician wins a position in an orchestra, they
often remain in that position (either at their current orchestra, or at another
orchestra) for the entirety of their career (Allmendinger et al., 1996). This
feature of the orchestra setting makes it possible to identify a musician’s
set of outside options. A principal viola will only consider other principal
viola positions at other orchestras. She will not consider a position in any
other instrument group. Given how coveted a position at an orchestra is,
musicians remain in their position for decades and mainly depart either due to
retirement or death. Therefore, on average, a principal, associate principal, or
assistant principal, will have only one outside option every 3.6 years, making
any given opening a very meaningful opportunity.
In this paper, we collect data and create musician rosters for 13 top or-
chestras in the United States, following Goldin and Rouse (2000). We utilize
digital orchestra archives, physical orchestra archives, as well as the internet
archives (the Wayback Machine), to collect orchestra concert programs from
each season starting the 1992-1993 season (when Goldin and Rouse (2000)
end their data collection) to the 2017-2018 season, not only for the 10 or-
chestras that Goldin and Rouse (2000) include in their study, but for an
additional three orchestras. Our final dataset comprises information on mu-
sicians, their instruments, and positions in every season from the 1971-1972
season to the 2017-2018 season.
We supplement the musician rosters with data on wages of the five highest
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paid employees at each orchestra, obtained from orchestra 990 tax forms.
Orchestras are non-profit organizations and must make their tax returns
available to the public. To collect this data we relied on ProPublica’s Non-
profit Explorer to download each orchestra’s tax returns for every year. Tax
forms from earlier years were obtained by requesting them directly from the
orchestras. Although the 990 tax forms provide data on these musicians’ ac-
tual wage, the wages reported are the amounts that are paid to the musician,
and since musicians are paid by week, it is not uncommon for musicians to
receive lower wages when they take unpaid time off. In these cases, it would
appear that the musician is getting a pay cut, which is never the case. Given
how high musician salaries can be, one missed week can cause up to a $15,000
dollar drop in reported wages in the 990 tax forms, which would severely af-
fect our results. For this reason, our outcome of interest is defined as the
probability of appearing among the five highest employees in an orchestra
rather than the musician’s wage.
An outside option for an instrument-position at one orchestra is plau-
sibly exogenous to all musicians in the same instrument-position at other
orchestras. We leverage this exogenous outside option occurrence to esti-
mate an event-study model to examine their effect on the probability that
a musician will be among the five highest paid employees at their orches-
tra. Our specifications include musician-by-position-by-orchestra fixed ef-
fects, tenure group-by-orchestra-by-year fixed effects, and principal musician-
by-orchestra-by-year fixed effects. These fixed effects effectively yield a triple
difference estimate. We analyze the within-musician change in the likelihood
of being in the five highest earners in the year after relative to before an
opening in another orchestra. We compare this to the change in likelihood
for other musicians in the same orchestra and tenure grouping that year, as
these orchestras have wage schedules that increase with tenure as stipulated
by their contract. We also compare this to the change in likelihood for other
principal musicians in the same orchestra that year, as the wage schedules
are different for principal musicians as stipulated by contract.
Our findings indicate that in the two years after a musician experiences
an opening they are 1.1 percentage points more likely to be among the five
highest paid employees at the orchestra relative to other musicians with sim-
ilar tenure in the same orchestra, and other principal musicians in the same
orchestra. However, these short terms effects are not statistically significant.
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By the fourth year after an opening, the average musicians will experience a
5.7 percentage point increase in the probability of appearing in the orchestra
tax forms as a high paid employee, relative to the year before the opening.
This suggests musicians leverage outside options to bargain for a higher wage
at their current orchestra, and their bargaining can increases their long-run
wages.
We investigate whether these effects vary by the musician’s tenure at the
time of the opening. Musicians who have been in the orchestra for 20 years
may be less likely to be taking new auditions, and thus less likely to expe-
rience positive wage effects after an opening. On average, musicians in our
sample who switch orchestras do so after 10.48 years. To estimate how the
effect varies based on musician tenure, we estimate our analysis on various
tenure groups. We find that musicians who have been in the orchestra for 10
to 19 years are approximately 3.69 percentage points more likely to be among
the five highest paid employees at the orchestra, statistically significant at
the 10% level. This is also statistically significantly larger than the effect for
those with 0-9 groups of tenure. The effect for those with 20+ years is not
statistically different from those with 0-9 years, but also not statistically dif-
ferent from those with 10-19 years. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence
from interviews with orchestra personnel managers, and studies showing that
once workers settle into high-quality jobs, they will often “job-shop” and use
outside offers to generate gradual wage increases (Bagger et al., 2014).
Recent literature has found that women are less likely than men to negoti-
ate wages Leibbrandt and List (2015); Small et al. (2007), and recent events
indicate that women may not receive higher wages when they do negoti-
ate Edgers (2018). Since gender pay and opportunity gaps are particularly
prominent in orchestras, we examine the potential for differential effects of
outside options by gender. We find suggestive evidence that women expe-
rience small to no increases in wage after experiencing an outside option.
Although we cannot rule out that the effects are the same for both men
and women, the magnitude of the effect on women suggests that the overall
increases in wages we observe are driven by men.
The paper most similar to this study is Harmon and Caldwell (2019). In
their study, Caldwell and Harmon isolate changes in a workers information
about her outside options, relying on the fact that individuals often learn
about jobs through social networks, including former coworkers. They use
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employer-employee data from Denmark, and find that increases in labor de-
mand at former coworkers current firms lead to job-to-job mobility and wage
growth. They also find that earnings gains are highest for workers in the
top half of the skill distribution. In this study, we can directly identify and
observe an individual’s outside option. Unlike Caldwell and Harmon’s study,
in this setting, it is mandated by the union that any audition opportunity be
advertised widely to all musicians, which means, in principal, all musicians
will have the same information about existing outside options. Therefore,
we are able to directly detect any effect of an outside option on all affected
worker in the classical music labor market.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: section 3.2 describes
the orchestra setting and the classical musician labor market. Section 3.3
describes the data collection process and data sources. Section 3.4 presents
the main estimation methodology, section 3.5 presents the results, and section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Orchestra Setting
To learn about this setting we examined orchestra collective bargaining agree-
ments (CBA), visited orchestra archives, interviewed orchestra members, per-
sonnel managers, and archivists at various orchestras in our sample. The
orchestra setting is unique, and lends itself well to answer our research ques-
tion. As opposed to a typical firm, orchestras do not vary in size and are
identical both in numbers and types of jobs. Additionally, classical musi-
cians are highly specialized. Their training is not only specific to one kind of
job, but also to one instrument. This feature of the orchestra setting makes
it possible to identify a musician’s set of outside options. For example, a
principal viola will primarily consider other principal viola positions at other
orchestras. She will not consider a position in any other instrument group.
Auditions for a position in an orchestra are very difficult to win, and when
a musicians does win an audition, they tend to remain in that position for
the majority of their careers. So in addition to being able to identify the
set of outside options, and given how coveted a position at an orchestra is,
openings for an instrument-position are quite rare in this setting. Musicians
remain in their position at an orchestra for decades and mainly depart either
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due to retirement or death. On average, a principal, associate principal, or
assistant principal, will have only one outside option once every 3.6 years,
making it a meaningful opening.
All members of an orchestra are also members of a union, the American
Federation of Musicians (AFM). The orchestra will negotiate a CBA with
the union in order to determine benefits, working conditions, base salaries,
seniority pay, and overscale. These CBAs also specify levels of “overscale”
by position. For example, a CBA might specify that the base salary is $1000
per week, and that principals can make up to 120% of this base salary.
However, individual musicians can also negotiate an overscale contract with
the orchestra individually at any time (either in dollar amounts or percent
terms) above and beyond what is specified in the CBA, and changes are
effective immediately upon reaching an agreement.
Another important aspect of this setting is the timeline of openings, au-
ditions, etc. In the orchestra world, musicians form a small community,
therefore, when one musician announces his/her retirement/departure, it is
widespread news. Shortly after the announcement (within 2-3 months), an
audition for an open position will be listed on the orchestras website and in
the International Musician (the official journal of the AFM). Auditions take
place about two to three months later, and can last for a whole regular (sub-
scription) season - which typically run from September to May/June. The
winner is then announced and can start in their new position at the beginning
of the next subscription season. Of course, there are many exceptions to this
scenario, for example in cases of death or illness an acting musician will be
appointed temporarily until the position is filled, but the process described
above is the standard procedure.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Musician Rosters
We collect the data for this project from multiple sources. First, we ob-
tained orchestra rosters from Goldin and Rouse (2000). We supplemented
their rosters by updating them from the 1992-1993 to the 2017-2018 sea-
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son.3 These rosters are simply lists of orchestra personnel, together with
instrument and position (e.g., concertmaster or principal), found in orches-
tra concert programs. In order to update the Goldin and Rouse rosters we
downloaded concert programs from digital orchestra archives, and in some
cases requested scanned copies of concert programs directly from orchestra
archivists/librarians. In cases where we were unable to obtain concert pro-
grams from the orchestra archives, we utilized the internet archives (the Way-
back Machine) in order to find archived orchestra web pages of the musician
rosters. The Wayback Machine, made available by the non-profit organi-
zation Internet Archive, was started in 1996 as an archive of the internet
constructed by automated systems routinely crawling the web and contains
279 billion web pages. The Wayback Machine contains most symphony or-
chestra web pages that list musician rosters in each season. We saved and
referenced these web pages to update rosters for seasons when we did not
have concert programs available to us.4 We used concert programs from or-
chestra archives to update rosters in 75% of the years for which we collect
data, and the Wayback machine in 25%. The orchestras included in our
study are: the Boston Symphony Orchestra, Chicago Symphony Orchestra,
Cleveland Symphony Orchestra, Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Los Angeles
Philharmonic, New York Philharmonic, Philadelphia Orchestra, Pittsburgh
Symphony Orchestra, San Francisco Symphony, St Louis Symphony Orches-
tra, Dallas Symphony Orchestra, Houston Symphony Orchestra, and the
Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra. We include these particular orchestras be-
cause they are among the top in the United States, and for data availability
reasons. Table H.1 provides a summary of the data sources.
3.3.2 Wages
Data on our outcome of interest, being listed as one of the five highest paid
employees in the orchestra, is collected from orchestra tax forms. A tax-
exempt organization must file annual tax returns with the IRS, but more
importantly, these organization must also make the tax returns available to
3The Goldin and Rouse rosters were downloaded from Claudia Goldin’s web page:
https://scholar.harvard.edu/goldin/pages/data
4not all pages from all years are archived, especially in earlier years. Either the auto-
mated web crawlers were not aware of the sites existence at the time of the crawl, or the
site blocked access to automated web crawlers.
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the public. Since orchestras are non-profit organizations, they all file form
990s and make them public. In these 990 forms, orchestras must list their
five highest paid employees with details on their position in the orchestra
and their salaries. For an individual to be listed they must make at least
$50,000 a year.
To collect this data we first downloaded the tax returns available on Pro
Publica’s Nonprofit Explorer.5 The wage data available for download starts
in 1997-1998 for most orchestras, with the exception of the San Francisco
Symphony and the Los Angeles Philharmonic which start in 2001. For older
tax forms we contacted orchestra archivists. We were able to collect 990s from
the Cleveland Orchestra and the New York Philharmonic from 1982 and 1971,
respectively. Since the top five highest paid employees are almost always
concertmasters, principals, associate or assistant principals, we restrict our
sample to those positions. This is also necessary because those positions are
the only ones for which vacancies are actually rare and outside options are
straightforward to define.
Although the tax forms allow us to collect wage data, we are not using
wages as an outcome for a number of reasons. First, the wage are not con-
sistently reported. In some years the wage will be broken down into base
compensation and bonuses, but in other years it will not. Second, we ob-
serve many cases of wage decreases over the years, but from our interviews
with personnel managers, musician never get pay decreases. The pay de-
crease is usually due to unpaid time off which we cannot observe. Third,
we cannot disentangle pay raises due to outside options and negotiations or
deferred payments. For instance, someone might get a lump sum bonus after
10 years at the orchestra, and by using the wage as an outcome, we would
not be able to attribute any result to only negotiations or bargaining.
3.3.3 Sample Construction
To construct our main analysis sample, we create and merge three separate
datasets. Our first dataset is the musician rosters. These data include mu-
sician’s names, sex, instruments, and positions in each year they are in an
orchestra. We have rosters for 13 orchestras spanning the years 1971-2016.
5https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/
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After compiling the rosters, we use them to create our second dataset, po-
sition openings in each year in each orchestra. We define an opening as the
last year a musician is observed in her position in an orchestra. For example,
Jane Doe’s last year as principal viola in her orchestra A is 2003. We define
2003 as an opening for principal viola at orchestra A). Finally, we used the
tax data to create a dataset of our outcome variable, appearing in the 990
as one of the highest paid employees at the orchestra. This dataset lists
the names of musician who appear in the 990s, along with their orchestra,
instrument, position, and wage in that year. We merge the musician rosters
with their corresponding wages, and then merge the rosters and wages with
the openings dataset. A more detailed guide for constructing our sample is
available upon request.6
3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for our regression sample. Our unit of
analysis is the individual-instrument-position, and in column (2) we observe
354 treated individuals (musicians who experience an opening). The reason
we focus on musician-instrument-position is because musicians can switch
orchestras, and may also change positions, although this is quite rare. How-
ever, these changes are often associated with pay increases, which would bias
our estimation. Column (3) shows that there are 479 unique openings. We
calculate this by counting one opening for each instrument-position-season
if there are any openings in that year. For example, if there is an opening
for a principal flutist in 2000, and there are five musicians who are “treated”
by this opening, we count this opening as one unique opening for a principal
flute in the 2000 season even though five individuals experience the opening
in that year. In column (4) we report the average number of openings a
musician will experience for their instrument-position at another orchestra,
column (5) shows the average number of years a musician will appear in our
regressions, and column (6) shows the average number of outside openings
per year that a musician will have in the years they appear in our sample
6Orchestra subscription seasons typically run from September to May/June. Roster
year is defined as the year a season starts. For example, the 2010 season starts in September
2010, but ends in May 2011. Similarly, taxes are reported for the period starting in October
of one year, to September of the next. Therefore, wages for 2010 are reported in the 990s
tax forms filed for the October 2010 to September 2011 period.
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(column (4) divided by column (5)). On average, a musician will have an
opening for their instrument-position at another orchestra once every three
years, confirming that these events are indeed rare. Principals will experience
openings more often than associate or assistant principals, but otherwise all
musicians will have outside options at the same rate independent of their
gender, or the type of orchestra where type refers to big 5 and non-big 5
status, and the orchestra ranking by their annual expenditure. The Big 5
orchestras led the field in musical excellence when the term gained currency
in the late 1950s. In more recent years, orchestra status is usually inferred
from their annual expenditure.
3.4 Estimation Methodology
3.4.1 Sample Restrictions
We restrict our sample to openings for which we have wage data from the
orchestra, and the treated musician is in the rosters, in t−4, t−3, t−2, t−
1, t, t + 1, and t + 2. This is important in order to ensure that our panel
is balanced around the opening, this way we can interpret changes in the
coefficients as dynamic changes rather than due to composition changes. To
conduct our analysis we restrict our sample periods to start in the earliest
year for which we have 990 tax forms from an orchestra. For instance, we only
have tax forms for the Boston Symphony Orchestra from 2001-2016, there-
fore, our analysis of the Boston Symphony Orchestra musicians is restricted
to openings occurring between 2001-2016. The final dataset consists of 13
orchestras, and spans the years 1971-2016. Our unit of analysis is musician-
orchestra-instrument-position. Musicians can change their orchestra, and
within their orchestra they can also change positions, e.g. going from assis-
tant principal to associate principal, although this is not common. Therefore,
making our unit of analysis musician-orchestra-instrument-positions means
we treat a musician as a new unit if and when they change orchestras, or
if they change position, in which case we would redefine their first open
position based on their current orchestra-position. Finally, we categorize
each musician-orchestra-instrument-position into the following tenure groups
(where tenure refers to years in their current orchestra-instrument-position):
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0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years.), we also estimate
our specifications with the following definition of tenure groups: 0 to 9, 10
to 19, and 20+ years.
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The exogenous nature of open positions in other orchestras motivates the use
of an event-study design where we compare the probability of being listed
as one of the five highest paid employees in an orchestra for individuals who
experience an opening, before and after they experience an opening, to those
who do not. As we will describe, our additional fixed effects effectively yield




βk Openingio 1(t = t
∗+k)+αipo+λuto+γrto+εiot (3.1)
Where Top5iot is an indicator for individual i in orchestra o appearing as
one of the five highest paid employees in season t. Openingio is an indica-
tor for whether individual i in orchestra o experiences an opening for their
instrument position in another orchestra. The coefficients of interest are
in the vector βk. αipo, λuto, and γrto are musician-by-position-by-orchestra
, tenure group-by-season-by-orchestra, and principal-by-season-by-orchestra
fixed effects, respectively.
Principal-by-season-by-orchestra fixed effects will account for variation in
wages due to the fact that principals earn more on average than assistants and
associates, and that this will also vary by orchestra. Tenure group-by-season-
by-orchestra fixed effects account for the fact that tenure also determines a
musicians wage, seniority schedules dictate pay raises based on tenure, and
these seniority schedules vary across years and orchestras. We estimate this
specification on a balanced sample where we conduct the analysis only for
individuals who are in the same orchestra roster and have reported wage data
in at least all years from t− 4 to t+ 2.
We also estimate the corresponding following model grouping together
years relative to the opening to summarize the overall effect of outside op-
tions on the probability of appearing as one of the five highest paid musicians
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in an orchestra:
Top5iot = β1×1 ·Postiot+β2(t ≤ t−5)+β3(t ≥ t+3)+αipo+λuto+γrto+εiot
(3.2)
All components in this estimation equation are the same as in equation (1),
with the only difference being that, rather than having five dummy variables
for each year after the opening, we have Postiot which is an indicator that
equals one 0 ≥ t ≤ 2 post treatment. We include T≤t−5 and T≥t+3 to ensure
that the estimate is only capturing the effects in the two years post opening
relative to the four years prior. The coefficient β1 therefore represents the
average probability of appearing as one of the five highest paid employees in
the two years after an opening.
3.5 Results
Our main results are presented in figure 3.2 where we plot the event study
estimates for each year before and after the opening, and the figure shows
that the probability of appearing in the 990 tax forms increases right after an
opening and more importantly we do not observe any evidence of pre-trends.
We observe some small increases in the first few years after an opening, which
is to be expected since announcements are made before auditions are posted,
making it feasible for musicians to start negotiations before ever auditioning.
In other words, we expect there could be some bargaining in t and even
t − 1. However, the stronger later effect is also as we expect, if a musician
bargains their wage and appears in the 990, they are more likely to appear
in the 990 later, based on the fact that wages never decrease. There can
also be a lag in when a pay increase is reported in the tax forms due to the
timing of when taxes are filed relative to when musicians are paid. Because
the sample is not balanced beyond t-4 through t+2, we cannot interpret the
increasing coefficients after t+2 as a dynamic effect. However, we do see that
on average a musician experiences a statistically significant 5.7 percentage
point increase in likelihood of entering the top five highest earners in the
fourth year following the opening.
We summarize the short-run effects in table 3.4 where we report the coeffi-
cient on Postiot from equation 3.2. This only reports the short-run outcome,
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specifically, it only includes effects in the two years after the opening and does
not include effects in the years more than two years after the opening occurs.
Column (1) shows that on average a musician will experience a 0.69 percent-
age point increase in the probability of appearing among the five highest paid
musicians in their orchestra after an opening. However, in this specification
we only include tenure group-by-season fixed effects, so although we are ac-
counting for differences in pay by tenure group, we are not accounting for
any changes that can occur due to differences in seniority schedules (which
dictate pay increases by tenure) across orchestras. In column (2), which is
our preferred specification, we add tenure group-by-season-by-orchestra fixed
effects, the magnitude of the estimate increases to 1.07 percentage points and
the R-squared increases from 0.72 to 0.80.
3.5.1 Effects by Tenure
Tenure is an important factor in determining wage increase in orchestras.
Therefore, we examine potential heterogeneous effects by tenure. Ex ante, it
is not clear if a musician with longer tenure is more or less likely to success-
fully negotiate their wages. On the one hand, the longer a musician plays
with an orchestra, the harder it could be for them to switch to a different
orchestra because musicians develop specific human capital to play in uni-
son with their orchestra. So, musicians with longer tenure should be less
likely to pursue outside opportunities However, musicians with both longer
and shorter tenure can, and occasionally do, move across orchestras. On the
other hand, the shorter a musician’s tenure is at an orchestra, the less likely
it is for them to have the human capital necessary to obtain a better offer
from a different orchestra.
In our analysis, we estimate the equation 3.1 and interact our event-time
dummy variables separately with three indicators for tenure group, 0 - 9
years, and 10 to 19, and 20 or more years in the orchestra. Table 3.6 shows
that the effects are larger for musicians who have been at the orchestra for 10
to 19 years. In particular, the probability that they appear among the five
highest paid employees at the orchestra increases by 3.83 percentage point.
This is statistically significantly larger than the effect for those with 0-9 years.
Those with 20+ years do not experience differential effects relative to those
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with 0-9 years, though the effects for this group are also not significantly
different from those with 10-19 years.
3.5.2 Effects by Gender
Gender gaps in orchestras are incredibly salient, both in terms of opportunity
and pay. Women have historically been a minority in orchestras, making up
less than 10% of musicians until the 1980s. They are also traditionally more
represented in lower paying instruments, and very few women appear in prin-
cipal positions. This has important implications for pay gaps in orchestras,
since pay is correlated with position and instrument. Table 3.1 shows that
in our sample, among the 354 individuals who experience an opening, only
82 are women and of the 206 individuals who appear in orchestra 990 tax
forms, only 18% are women.
Therefore, we conduct an additional analysis to investigate whether there
are differential effects of outside options on wages by gender. Figure 3.5
shows the results of estimating equation 3.1 and interacting each event-time
dummy variable with an indicator that is equal to one for women, and zero
for men. Figure 3.5(a) shows the overall effect on all musicians’ wages after
experiencing an outside options, and although there is an increasing trends,
3.5(b) shows that women’s wages do not increase in the years following an
outside option. Although we cannot rule out that the effects are the same
for men and women, the magnitudes suggest that the effects are nonexistent
for women. This in turn suggests that the overall effects are driven entirely
by increases in men’s wages. It is important to mention that because women
are a minority, the sample size is very small and we are too under-powered
to detect any effects. Even though the results are, unsurprisingly, noisy, the
patterns we find are indeed consistent with the literature. For instance Leib-
brandt and List (2015) find that women are less likely than men to negotiate
wages when there is no explicit statement that wages are negotiable, and
Small et al. (2007) observed that in a laboratory experiment men were nine
times more likely than women to ask for higher compensation. Additionally,
recent events show that even when women do ask for higher wages, their
requests are not always accepted (Edgers, 2018).
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3.5.3 Placebo Tests
To ensure that the pattern we observe is due to a change in wages follow-
ing change in outside options, we conduct a placebo test. Musicians are
specialized, and therefore, a musician will only be affected by an opening
for their particular instrument. If a musician is instead “treated” with an
outside option for a different instrument, it should have no effect on their
wage. Therefore, we randomly assign each musician to an instrument that is
not their original instrument. Instruments in our data are coded from 1-37.
To randomly assign each musician to an instrument, we randomly draw a
number, that is not equal to their original instrument code, from a uniformly
distributed random variate over the interval 1 to 37. For example, a violinist
will be randomly assigned to any other instrument but the violin, e.g. a
cellist. We then proceed to define their opening as the first opening for a
cellist at another orchestra, rather than the first opening for violin. Using
this new definition of treatment, we re-estimate equation 3.1 and equation
3.2. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for the regression sample using
placebo openings. Column (6) in table 3.2 shows that openings are still few
and far between for the placebo sample, and the distribution of observations
by sex, position, big 5 and non-big 5, rank, and tenure are all similar to the
main regression sample.
Figure 3.6 shows that there is no change at all in a musician’s wage in
the five years after they experience an opening for a instrument that is not
their own. Unlike figure 3.2, the results are largely centered around zero and
do not exhibit an increasing trend. Furthermore, the results of estimating
equation 3.2 in table 3.8 are not only not statistically significant, but they
are also negative.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the effects of an outside job opportunity on an
individual’s wage within their current firm. Outside options play a key role
in seminal models of the labor market. However, until now, researchers have
faced many challenges in empirically estimating their role. It is difficult to
identify the set of outside options for a given worker in broadly defined la-
bor markets. The orchestra setting allows us to overcome these challenges
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because the classical musician labor market is very narrow and specialized.
Musicians playing a specific instrument will only look for positions for their
particular instrument. Therefore, it is possible to identify their set of out-
side options. Furthermore, openings in the orchestra setting are quite rare,
coming only once every 3.5 years on average. These rare opportunities are
therefore very meaningful from a musician’s perspective, and present a cred-
ible threat from the orchestra’s perspective.
We collect data and build a novel dataset of classical musicians in 13
orchestras, along with musician wages from orchestra tax forms, and we
identify whether there is an open position for each instrument-position in
each orchestra and in each season. This dataset allows us to estimate an
event-study model to evaluate the effects of outside options on the probability
that a musician will receive a pay increase in the years after an opening. Our
estimates effectively yield a triple-difference estimate, as we compare changes
within musician to changes for other musicians with similar tenure at the
same orchestra, and to changes for other principal musicians in the same
orchestra. The dynamic event-study model shows that musicians experience
increases in pay following an opening, and that the effects increase over time.
The effects in the two years after an opening show that musicians who have
been in the orchestra between 10 and 19 years will, on average, experience
a 3.69 percentage point increase in the probability of being among the five
highest paid musicians in their orchestra. This is statistically significantly
larger than the effect for 0-9 years. This consistent with the findings in
some theoretical models (Bagger et al., 2014) as well as anecdotal evidence
from orchestra musicians and personnel managers. Additionally, we find
suggestive evidence that women experience small to no increases in wage
after experiencing an outside option. Although we cannot rule out that the
effects are the same for men and women, the magnitude of the effect on
women suggests that they experience no wage increase, and that the overall
increases we observe are driven by men.
This paper is one of the first to find empirical evidence of wage bargain-
ing using outside options. Although this study is restricted to the orchestra
setting, which is highly specialized and narrowly defined, these results are
consistent with predictions of theoretical studies. Furthermore, these find-
ings can be generalized to other high skill occupations where women continue
to lag behind men in terms of wages and promotion opportunities, such as
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academia and executive positions. Finally, hiring practices and wage nego-
tiations in the orchestra setting are very similar to practices in other, more
broad, labor market. Orchestra musicians, like workers in many other occu-
pations, are represented by a union, they also go through several rounds of
“interviews” (auditions) to secure a position. As such, our findings can be
generalizeable to many other occupations.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Regression Sample Summary Statistics
Average Number of
Treated Unique Openings
N Individuals Openings Openings Years per-year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All 6451 354 479 5.43 16.23 0.33
Male 4978 272 5.51 16.17 0.34
Female 1473 82 5.14 16.46 0.31
Principal 3422 196 254 6.32 17.03 0.37
Associate Principal 1353 70 104 4.28 15.42 0.28
Assistant Principal 1676 88 121 4.51 15.26 0.30
Big 5 3498 190 337 5.82 17.42 0.33
Non-Big 5 2953 164 142 4.96 14.83 0.33
Rank 1-5 3016 165 254 5.86 17.38 0.34
Rank 6-13 3435 189 225 5.05 15.23 0.33
Tenure at the time of the opening:
0 to 9 Years 2654 188
10 to 19 Years 1972 105
20+ Years 1076 61
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the main regression sample used to
estimate equation 3.1. Column (1) shows the total number of observations. In columns
(2) - (6) our unit of analysis is musician-instrument-position. Column (2) reports the
number of musician-instrument-position-orchestra who are ever treated (ever experience an
opening for their instrument-position at another orchestra). In column (3) we calculate the
unique number of openings that occur for each instrument-position in our sample period.
For example, if there is an opening for a principal flute in 2000, and there are five musicians
for whom this opening presents an outside option, we count it as one unique opening for
principal flute in 2000. In columns (4), (5), and (6) we report the average number of
openings a musician will experience, the number of years they are in the sample, and the
average number of openings per year for each musician-instrument-position. Tenure refers
to tenure at the time of the opening
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Table 3.2: Placebo Regression Sample Summary Statistics
Average Number of
Treated Unique Openings
N Individuals Openings Openings Years per-year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All 8021 8021 507 5.06 15.45 0.33
Male 6123 443 5.21 15.55 0.33
Female 1898 153 4.57 15.09 0.30
Principal 3995 298 262 6.07 16.30 0.37
Associate Principal 1949 143 112 3.93 14.35 0.27
Assistant Principal 2077 155 133 4.15 14.83 0.28
Big 5 3908 260 351 5.66 17.28 0.33
Non-Big 5 4113 336 156 4.48 13.71 0.33
Rank 1-5 3246 231 255 5.67 16.94 0.33
Rank 6-13 4775 365 252 4.64 14.43 0.32
Tenure at the time of the opening:
10 to 19 Years 1922 103
20+ Years 966 55
0 to 9 Years 2499 176
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the placebo regression sample, where
outside options are defined based on randomly assigned instruments. This samples is
included in the estimation of equation 3.1. Column (1) shows the total number of ob-
servations. In columns (2) - (6) our unit of analysis is musician-instrument-position.
Column (2) reports the number of musician-instrument-position-orchestra who are ever
treated (ever experience an opening for their instrument-position at another orchestra).
In column (3) we calculate the unique number of openings that occur for each instrument-
position in our sample period. For example, if there is an opening for a principal flute
in 2000, and there are five musicians for whom this opening presents an outside option,
we count it as one unique opening for principal flute in 2000. In columns (4), (5), and
(6) we report the average number of openings a musician will experience, the number
of years they are in the sample, and the average number of openings per year for each
musician-instrument-position. Tenure refers to tenure at the time of the opening
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Table 3.3: 990 Tax Forms Sample Summary Statistics






Associate Principal 15 184,999
Assistant Principal 9 166,829
No Position 28 134,430
Average Tenure 8.84
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for data collected from orchestra 990 tax
forms. There are a total of 206 individuals listed in orchestra 990s. The average wage is
presented by position, and sex. We also show, on average, how long a musician had been
at the orchestra by the time they first appear in the 990s tax forms.
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Table 3.4: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Opening, Short-run 0.0069 0.0107 0.0147 0.0200
(0.0121) (0.0152) (0.0110) (0.0131)
Observations 6451 6451 6451 6451
R-squared 0.72 0.80 0.71 0.77
Mean 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Table 3.5: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - First Ever Opening Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Opening, Short-run 0.0148 -0.0253 0.0172 0.0113
(0.0173) (0.0285) (0.0207) (0.0227)
Observations 1878 1878 1878 1878
R-squared 0.76 0.94 0.73 0.88
Mean 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Notes: These tables present the results of estimating equation 3.2. Table 4 shows the
results where outside options are defined as the first outside option for which the musician
has balanced observations. Balance indicates that all musicians in the sample are present
in their orchestra and that we have data from tax forms from the orchestra from at least
t− 4 to t+ 2. Table 5 shows the results where we define outside options as the first one a
musician will experience as they appear in the data, and we only include them if they are
balanced around that outside option, where balanced is defined as above. Columns (1),
(2),(3), and (4) show the results on a sample that is balanced from t − 4 to t + 2. The
short-run is within two years of experiencing the opening. We include an indicator for the
year t ≤ −5, a separate indicator for t ≥ 3+, and the omitted group is t− 4 ≤ t ≤ t− 1.
The fixed effects included in each specification are listed in the table. In columns (1) and
(2), for the tenure group fixed effects, musicians are classified into the following tenure
groups: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years in the orchestra. Whereas
in columns (3) and (4), musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 9,
10 to 19, and 20+ years in the orchestra. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard
errors are clustered at the musician-orchestra level.
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Table 3.6: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians, by Tenure Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Opening, Short-run -0.0200 -0.0166 -0.0003 0.0111
(0.0173) (0.0196) (0.0148) (0.0154)
Post Opening, Short-run 0.0583** 0.0535* 0.0388* 0.0327
x Tenure 10 - 19 (0.0261) (0.0308) (0.0232) (0.0236)
Post Opening, Short-run 0.0343 0.0409 0.0119 -0.0242
x Tenure 20+ (0.0312) (0.0484) (0.0273) (0.0390)
Observations 6451 6451 6451 6451
R-squared 0.72 0.80 0.71 0.77
Mean 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation 3.2. Musicians are classified
into one of three tenure groups based on their tenure at the time of the opening. The first
tenure group is 0 to 9 years, and the second is 10 to 19, and the last is 20+ years. In this
regression, Postios is separately interacted with indicator variables for the 10 to 19 years,
and 20+ tenure group. The short-run is within two years of experiencing the opening. We
include an indicator for the year t ≤ −5, a separate indicator for t ≥ 3+, and the omitted
group is t− 4 ≤ t ≤ t− 1. We include the indicator variables for each tenure group in the
regression, and interact each tenure group dummy variable (for being in the 10 to 19, and
another for being in the 20+ year tenure group) with t ≤ −5, and separately with t ≥ 3+
as well. Results are for a sample that is balanced from t − 4 to t + 2. Balance indicates
that all musicians in the sample are present in their orchestra and that we have data from
tax forms from the orchestra from at least t − 4 to t + 2. The fixed effects included in
each specification are listed in the table. In columns (1) and (2), for the tenure group
fixed effects, musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to
14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years in the orchestra. Whereas in columns (3) and (4),
musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 9, 10 to 19, and 20+ years
in the orchestra The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors are clustered at the
musician-position level.
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Table 3.7: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians, by Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Opening, Short-run 0.0113 0.0109 0.0194 0.0220
(0.0131) (0.0162) (0.0122) (0.0137)
Post Opening, Short-run -0.0213 -0.0014 -0.0221 -0.0086
x Female (0.0183) (0.0219) (0.0179) (0.0208)
Observations 6451 6451 6451 6451
R-squared 0.72 0.80 0.71 0.77
Mean 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation 3.2 and interacting the
dummy variable for post opening years with an indicator that is equal to one for female
musicians. Columns (1) and (2) show the results on a sample that is balanced from t− 4
to t + 2. The short-run is within two years of experiencing the opening. We include an
indicator for the year t ≤ −5, a separate indicator for t ≥ 3+, and the omitted group is
t−4 ≤ t ≤ t−1. We also interact the indicator for female with t ≤ −5 and separately with
t ≥ 3+. Balance indicates that all musicians in the sample are present in their orchestra
and that we have data from tax forms from the orchestra from at least t− 4 to t+ 2. The
fixed effects included in each specification are listed in the table. In columns (1) and (2),
for the tenure group fixed effects, musicians are classified into the following tenure groups:
0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years in the orchestra. Whereas in
columns (3) and (4), musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 9, 10
to 19, and 20+ years in the orchestra. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors
are clustered at the musician-position level.
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Table 3.8: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Opening, Short-run -0.0049 -0.0117 0.0007 -0.0018
(0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0176)
Observations 8021 8021 8021 8021
R-squared 0.69 0.77 0.68 0.73
Mean 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation 3.2, where the outside option
for which we are estimating an effect is a placebo. We randomly assign each musician
to an instrument that is not their original instrument. For example, a violinist will be
randomly assigned to any other instrument but the violin, e.g. a cellist. We then define
their opening as the first opening for a cellist at another orchestra, rather than the first
opening for violin. Using this new definition of treatment, we re-estimate equation 3.2.
Columns (1), (2),(3), and (4) show the results on a sample that is balanced from t − 4
to t + 2. The short-run is within two years of experiencing the opening. We include an
indicator for the year t ≤ −5, a separate indicator for t ≥ 3+, and the omitted group is
t − 4 ≤ t ≤ t − 1. Balance indicates that all musicians in the sample are present in their
orchestra and that we have data from tax forms from the orchestra from at least t− 4 to
t + 2. The fixed effects included in each specification are listed in the table. In columns
(1) and (2), for the tenure group fixed effects, musicians are classified into the following
tenure groups: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years in the orchestra.
Whereas in columns (3) and (4), musicians are classified into the following tenure groups:
0 to 9, 10 to 19, and 20+ years in the orchestra. The sample period is 1971 to 2017.
Standard errors are clustered at the musician-position level.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Opening for Musicians in the Regression Sample
Notes: This figures shows, on average, the number of the opening for which we are esti-
mating the effects. For example, an individual can experience an opening in the first year
we observe them in our data, in their orchestra-instrument-position. We do not define that
opening as the outside option because we would not have sufficient data in the pre and
post period to estimate it’s effect. They can also experience another opening in the next
year, and the same reasoning as above applies. On average, an individual’s 2.75th, ≈ 3rd,
opening is the one we define as our outside option. The data is also missing some years
of data due to tax forms not being available for certain years, this would also contribute
to how a musician’s outside option is defined. For instance, if a musician’s first outside
option is in 2000, but the orchestra is missing tax information fr 1999, then we cannot
use the 2000 opening as the outside option because the individual’s observations are not
balanced around that event. Instead, we find the next opening for which the individual
satisfies our sample balance. Balance indicates that all musicians in the sample are present
in their orchestra and that we have data from tax forms from the orchestra from at least
t− 4 to t+ 2. The sample period is 1971 to 2017.
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Figure 3.2: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians
Notes: This figure plots the results presented in column (2) of table H.2. The estimation
used to produce this figure includes musician-by-position-by-orchestra, Tenure group-by-
season-by-orchestra, and Principal-by-season-by-orchestra fixed effects. The tenure groups
fixed effects in the specification estimated to produce this figure are 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to
14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years. To create this figure we define outside options as the
first outside option for which the musician has balanced observations. Balance indicates
that all musicians in the sample are present in their orchestra and that we have data from
tax forms from the orchestra from at least t − 4 to t + 2. The sample period is 1971 to
2017. Standard errors are clustered at the musician-position level.
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Figure 3.3: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musician - First Ever Opening Only
Notes: This figure plots the results presented in column (2) of table H.3. The estimation
used to produce this figure includes musician-by-position-by-orchestra, Tenure group-by-
season-by-orchestra, and Principal-by-season-by-orchestra fixed effects. The tenure groups
fixed effects in the specification estimated to produce this figure are 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to
14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years. To create this figure we define outside options as the
first one a musician will experience as they appear in the data, and are only included if
they are balanced around that outside option, where balanced indicates that the musician
in the sample are present in their orchestra, and that we have data from tax forms from
the orchestra, from at least t − 4 to t + 2. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard
errors are clustered at the musician-orchestra level.
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Figure 3.4: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - By Tenure
(a) 0 to 9 (b) 10 to 19
(c) 20+
Notes: This figure plots the results presented in table H.5. The estimation used tp pro-
duce this figure includes musician-by-position-by-orchestra, Tenure group-by-season-by-
orchestra, and Principal-by-season-by-orchestra fixed effects. The tenure groups fixed
effects in the specification estimated to produce this figure are 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15
to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors are
clustered at the musician-position level.
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Figure 3.5: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - Women
(a) Overall Effect (b) Women
Notes: This figure plots the results of estimating equation 3.1 and interacting each event-
time dummy variable with an indicator equal to one for female musicians, and zero for
male musicians. The estimation used tp produce this figure includes musician-by-position-
by-orchestra, Tenure group-by-season-by-orchestra, and Principal-by-season-by-orchestra
fixed effects. The tenure groups fixed effects in the specification estimated to produce this
figure are 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years. The sample period
is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors are clustered at the musician-position level.
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Figure 3.6: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - Placebo
Notes: This figure plots the results of estimating equation 3.1, and the estimates shows in
table H.4, but with event defined based on a randomly assigned instrument group rather
than the musician’s instrument. The estimation used tp produce this figure includes
musician-by-position-by-orchestra, Tenure group-by-season-by-orchestra, and Principal-
by-season-by-orchestra fixed effects. The tenure groups fixed effects in the specification
estimated to produce this figure are 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and
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A.1 Additional Details on California Articulation Law
Articulation agreements were first mentioned in the California state legis-
lature in 1988 under Cal. Educ. Code 66720-66721. The law states that
California Community Colleges (CCCs), the University of California (UC)
system, and the California State University (CSU) system must develop a
common core curriculum in general education courses for the purpose of
transfer and that it should be published and distributed to all public high
schools and community colleges in California. Shortly after the law was
enacted, all parties realized the confusing multiplicity of general education
course requirements in the CSU system and the individual campuses, colleges,
and programs of the UC system were still a barrier to students who wished
to transfer. Therefore, the education code was amended in 1991 to create the
California Intersegmental Articulation Committee (CIAC), which worked to
consolidate articulation efforts into one unified statewide agreement and be-
came operational in 1994. The CIAC developed an Intersegmental General
Education Transfer Curriculum (IGETC) that permitted a student to trans-
fer from a community college to a campus in either the CSU system or the
UC system without the need, after transfer, to take additional lower-division
general education courses to satisfy general campus education requirements.
The educational code was amended again in 2000 to include a section
mandating that a copy of the transfer core curriculum be distributed to each
enrolled community college student in some form, whether by electronic or
physical copies. Finally, another change in the legislation occurred in 2010,
whereby the CSU system and the CCCs were required to inform students
of the new program-which was called the “Associates Degree for Transfer”
(ADT), a program created by California Senate Bill 1440 that guarantees
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students who complete an ADT a spot at a CSU campus-prior to its imple-
mentation to give students a chance to enroll. This program was implemented
beginning in the 2011-2012 academic year.
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A.2 Details of Articulation Date Data Collection
Figure A.1: Graphical Depiction of Statewide Articulation Policy Dates
Data Collection Process
Townsend & Ignash, 2000 (TI)



















Notes: This figure is a graphical depiction of the data-collection process described in
section 1.3.1. ECS refers to the Education Commission of the States, NCSL is the National
Conference of State Legislatures, and SAAs are Statewide Articulation Agreements.
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Table A.1: Summary of State Articulation Laws
State Final Adoption Implementation Transferable Common Course Guaranteed
Date Date 1 Date Core Numbering AA Transfer
Alabama 1998 1994 1998 X
Arizona 1998 1996 1998 X X
Arkansas 1989 1989 X X X
California 1994 1991 1994 X
Colorado 1988 X X X
Connecticut 1991 1991
Delaware
Florida 1971 X X X
Georgia 1985 X X
Idaho 1986 X X X
Illinois 1990 1990 X X
Indiana 1992 X X X
Iowa 1981 1981 X
Kansas 1991 1991 X X X
Kentucky 1993 X X
Louisiana 1996 X X X
Maine 2009 2009 X
Maryland 1996 1995 1996 X X
Massachusetts 1984 X X
Michigan
Minnesota X
Mississippi 1989 X X
Missouri 1987 X X X
Montana 1971 X
Nebraska
Nevada 1997 1997 X X X
New Hampshire
New Jersey 2008 2008 X X
New Mexico 1995 1995 X X X
New York
North Carolina 1997 1995 1997 X X
North Dakota 1990 X X
Ohio 1990 1989 1990 X X
Oklahoma 1995 X X
Oregon 1988 X X
Pennsylvania 2008 2006 2008 X X
Rhode Island 1979 X
South Carolina 1996 X X
South Dakota 1998 1998 1999 X X X
Tennessee 2001 2000 2001 X X X
Texas 1997 1997 X X
Utah 1980 X X X
Vermont
Virginia 1990 X X
Washington 1985 1983 1985 X X
West Virginia 1979 X X
Wisconsin 2001 X X
Wyoming 1985 X X
Notes: 1 Year of any articulation and/or in which transfer policies were passed. I do not
yet distinguish the dates for each component of the articulation policy (transferable core
vs. common course numbering vs. guaranteed AA transfer). The dates provided do not
reflect any reverse transfer policies.
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Table A.2: Summary of State Articulation Laws (cont.)
Verified Corrected Verified Date Cannot Verify Enact vs. Statute/Legislation
State Source Date No Primary Source Date Implement /Board Policy Source
Alabama X X FL Statutes Act 1007.23
Arizona X X Arizona State Revised Statute 15-1824;
Report of the Transfer Articulation Task Force (1996)
Arkansas X X Act 98 of the 1989 Regular Session H.B 1133
California X X California Educ. Code [6670-66722.5]
Illinois X X IBHE Policies on Undergraduate Education -
Transfer and Articulation
Maine X X NCSL: ME S 367 Pilot law, Maine Revised Statute 10907-A
Maryland X X ”MHEC Student Transfer Policies & COMAR Title 13B -
Maryland Higher Education Commission Student Transfer Policies
New Jersey X X Lampitt Bill of 2007
New Mexico X X N.M. Stat. 21-1B-3
North Carolina X X 1995 Session Ratified Bill Chapter 625 Senate Bill 1161
Ohio X X Ohio department of higher education transfer
Ohio policy appendices, Appendix A
Pennsylvania X X 20-2004-C.Transfer and Articulation Oversight
Pennsylvania Committee; 24 P.S. 20-2002-C
South Dakota X X 1988 H.B 1146
Tennessee X X Tenn. Code Ann. 49-7-202
Texas X X Texas Educ. Code Sec. 61.822 and Educ. Code Sec. 61.832
Washington X X Washington State Revised Code 28B.77.210
Connecticut X X Policy manual of the board of trustees of
community-technical colleges
Iowa X X Articulation and Transfer between Public Institutions
of Higher Education in Iowa - Progress
Report to the General Assembly 2009
Kansas X X 1991 Kan. SB 34






















Notes: This information is collected by the author. Verified source means I was able to
confirm that the date in Townsend and Ignash (2000) is correct and found the correspond-
ing policy documents. Corrected date means I was not able to confirm that the date in
Townsend and Ignash (2000) was correct but I found policy documents with a date prior to
2000 indicating thata it was the first year the policy was passed. Verified date, no source
indicates states where I was able to verify the date listed in Townsend and Ignash (2000)
through secondary sources but was not able to find the corresponding policy documents
or details. States in the cannot verify date category are the ones for which I was unable
to find any policy documents/laws/or reports reflecting a date around the date reported
in Townsend and Ignash (2000). Enact vs. Implement notes the states for which I can
distinguish between policy enactment date and the date by the which the policy is to be
implemented.
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES
AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1




Land Grant 4.01 67
(0.86)
Non-Land Grant 4.32 438
(0.90)
Under 1,000 3.69 8
(1.92)
1,000 - 4,999 4.64 124
(0.94)
5,000 - 9,999 4.45 130
(0.77)
10,000 - 19,999 4.26 127
(0.77)
20,000 and above 3.77 116
(0.79)
More Competitive - Random Sample
University of California-Berkeley
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Michigan State University
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
University of Colorado at Boulder
The University of Tennessee
University of Kansas
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Less Competitive - Random Sample
University of Houston-Downtown
University of Northern Iowa






Notes: Data are obtained from an IPEDS subsample and Barron’s ratings for 2008, which
is the year of the most recent Barron’s ratings.
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Table B.2: First-time Freshman Enrollment and Degree-Attainment Effects




All No Info Dates Document Enactment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Enrollment 0.0283 0.0645 0.0997 0.1910 0.0909*
(0.0866) (0.0942) (0.1050) (0.1500) (0.0513)
Full-Time Enrollment 0.0258 0.0707 0.0914 0.1830 0.1080
(0.0836) (0.0892) (0.1010) (0.1480) (0.0741)
Part-time Enrollment 0.1160 0.1380 0.2010* 0.3060** 0.1880***
(0.0926) (0.1010) (0.1070) (0.1400) (0.0635)
Degrees Awarded 0.0249 0.0431* 0.0326 0.0679** 0.0687
(0.0245) (0.0240) (0.0258) (0.0305) (0.0417)
Mean Dependent Variable 1,088 1,137 1,165 1,195 1,121
Observations 13,241 11,820 11,062 9,861 7,601
Region × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating equation 1.5, where column (1) replicates
the results in equation 1.4. Starting in column (2), states are excluded from the analysis
in steps. Column (2) shows the effects on all states excluding those for which I do not have
sufficient information on policy dates. Column (3) shows the effects on states reflected
column (2) while further excluding states for which I find conflicting dates. Column (4)
shows the effects on states reflected in column (3), excluding states for which I do not
have policy documentation. Column (5) excludes all of the above, in addition to states
that have only an enactment date. In other words, column (5) displays the effects only for
states that report an operational dates. Dependent variable means are reported in levels.
All regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed effects, control for state-by-year
unemployment levels, and are weighted by total student population at the baseline.
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Table B.3: First-time Freshman Enrollment and Degree-Attainment Effects
of Articulation by Sample Balance
Total Associate’s
Enrollment Part-time Full-time Degrees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Balanced from T − 3 to T + 3
Articulation 0.028 0.116 0.026 0.025
(0.087) (0.093) (0.084) (0.025)
Mean Dependent Variable 1088 526 563 399
Observations 13,241 13,241 13,241 13,038
Panel A: Balanced from T − 5 to T + 5
Articulation 0.0223 0.106 0.0210 0.0202
(0.0843) (0.0905) (0.0819) (0.0245)
Mean Dependent Variable 1091 528 563 400
Observations 13,131 13,131 13,131 12,923
Region × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating equation 1.5. Panel A presents the same
estimates as in equation 1.4, where I include only states that report data from at least T−3
through T + 3. For panel B I restrict the sample to enhance the balance of my sample and
include only states that report data from at least T −5 through T +5. Dependent variable
means are reported in levels. All regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed
effects, control for state-by-year unemployment levels, and are weighted by total student
population at the baseline.
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Figure B.1: Trends in Undergraduate Tuition
Notes: The figure above shows average sticker prices of per-year tuition and fees by level
of institution (2-year vs. 4-year) from 1971 through 2015. All prices are adjusted to 2015
dollars. Calculated using Delta Cost Project variables.
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Figure B.2: Trends in Undergraduate Enrollment
Notes: The figure above shows average enrollment per institution-year by level of institu-
tion (2-year vs. 4-year) from 1989 through 2018. The highlighted area represents NBER
recession. Calculated using data from the IPEDS.
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Figure B.3: Trends in Median Earnings by Education Level and Sex
Notes: The figure above shows median earnings for full-time year round workers age 25
to 34 in 2018 thousands of dollars from 1991 through 2018. Data are obtained from the
College Board Education Pays report of 2019.
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Figure B.4: Effects of Statewide Articulation on First-time Freshman
Community College Enrollment by Sex and Race
(a) By Sex
(b) By Race
Notes: These figures plot the results of estimating a difference-in-differences analysis of the
effects of statewide articulation on first-time freshman enrollment. The top panel shows
the effects on total enrollment by sex, while the bottom panel shows the effects by race.
The outcome on the y-axis is the logarithm of total, full, and part-time enrollment. Both
regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed effects. These estimates are derived
from equation 1.5, and are are weighted by total student population at the baseline. The
reference year T − 1 is the year prior to statewide articulation. Bands indicate 95 percent
confidence intervals, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure B.5: Effects of Statewide Articulation on First-time Freshman
Enrollment at 4-Year Public Universities by Sex and Race
(a) By Sex
(b) By Race
Notes: These figures plot the results of estimating a difference-in-differences analysis of the
effects of statewide articulation on first-time freshman enrollment at four-year institutions.
The top panel shows the effects on total enrollment by sex, while the bottom panel shows
the effects by race. The outcome on the y-axis is the logarithm of total, full, and part-time
enrollment. Both regressions include region-by-year and institution fixed effects. These
estimates are derived from equation 1.5, and are are weighted by total student population
at the baseline. The reference year T −1 is the year prior to statewide articulation. Bands
indicate 95 percent confidence intervals and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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APPENDIX C: CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR CHAPTER 1
High school students will choose to start at option j ∈ {Labor Force, 2year, 4year}.
Student i is a prospective transfer-oriented community college student.
Student i, prior to the SAA, is indifferent between starting at a two-year
or a four-year institution:
U(Y 2yrist , c
2yr





























if student i chooses to start at the community college and then transfer,
her total tuition will be τ 2yr = XτCC + Zτ 4yr, where τCC is tuition paid at
the community college, X is the number of years spent at the community
college, and Z is the number of years at the four-year. institution With a
SAA, more credits will transfer from the two-year institution, and student i
will in turn take more credits at the two-year institution. This will increase
X and decrease Z, and in total it will decrease τ 2yr. Similarly, the SAA can
instead reduce ε2yrist by streamlining the process of transferring credits. In
both cases
U(Y 2yrist , c
2yr





If instead we consider a student who is indifferent between enrolling at
community college or entering the labor force, then
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Upon learning of the SAA and the options it provides, students will update
their expected lifetime earnings associated with enrolling at a community
college, which would increase
∑T
t=0 β
t−1Ln(Y 2yrist ) and in turn
U(Y LFist , c
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Finally, for a transfer-oriented student who is already enrolled at commu-
nity college and is indifferent between obtaining a degree or not obtaining
one:
U(Y 2yrist , c
2yr





An SAA will increase the probability that more credits will transfer, which
will require students to take fewer credits at four-year institutions. This will
decrease the total tuition associated with obtaining an associate’s degree,
since it will reduce tuition paid at the four-year institution. This will result
in
U(Y 2yrist , c
2yr






APPENDIX D: A FORMAL MODEL OF
THE EFFECT OF COEDUCATION ON
WOMEN’S STEM MAJORING
We use a very simple Roy model of college and major choice to illustrate
the possible effects of transition to co-education on subsequent women’s out-
comes. We assume there are 3 collegiate institutions in the market: h, j and
k. There are two time periods: 0 and 1, which are separated by a substantial
number of years. At t = 0, institutions h and j are women-only while k is
co-educational. Between t = 0 and t = 1, institution j transitions to co-
education. All institutions in each time period offer two majors: STEM (S)
and non-STEM (NS). We assume away capacity constraints. (In Section
F.2 we show that evidence consistent with this assumption.)
Each time period consists of two stages. In the first stage, women make
enrollment decisions η under uncertainty about the values of attending each
college. In the second stage, women who have chosen to enroll in a college
choose a major µ in which to graduate, with full information about major-
specific payoffs. We assume that every woman enrolls in college, and that
every woman who starts college completes a degree at her starting institution.
Consider a hypothetical high school senior w making decisions in period
t. A given enrollment choice ηwt returns the expected payoff Vwt(ηwt). She
chooses the enrollment choice η∗wt that maximizes this function:
Vwt(η
∗
wt) = max {Vwt(h), Vwt(j), Vwt(k)} . (3)
After making her enrollment choice, woman w realizes her major-specific
payoffs and chooses her major µwt. We represent her payoff from choosing





wt; η) = max {vwt(S; η), vwt(NS; η)} , η ∈ {h, j, k}. (4)
Woman w’s expected payoff from enrolling at institution η is simply equal to
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the expected payoff from choosing her most-preferred major at η:
Vwt(η) = E [vwt(µ
∗
wt; η)] (5)
Assume there are many women w in the market with varying preferences
for colleges and majors. Consider the students who chose to enroll at women’s
institution j in period t. Denote each enrolled woman as belonging to the set
Ajt. The share of this student body graduating from h with a STEM degree
is given by sSTEM,jt:
sSTEM,jt =
∑
w∈Ajt 1 {S = argmax {vwt(S; j), vwt(NS; j)}}∑
w 1 {j = argmax {Vwt(h), Vwt(j), Vwt(k)}}
(6)
Suppose that, aside from institution j transitioning to co-education, nothing
else changes between periods 0 and 1. Then, the object
∆ = sSTEM,j1 − sSTEM,j0
describes the treatment effect of co-education on the production of women
STEM majors at institution j.
Two channels determine ∆. First, suppose that the set of women enrolling
at institution j, Aj, does not change between time periods 0 and 1. Then, ∆
simply depends on how the transition to co-education alters the payoffs to
majoring in STEM (vw(S; j)), relative to majoring in non-STEM (vw(N ; j)),
for this population of women. We call this the “environmental effect.” See
Section 2.1.2 for a discussion of the various channels determining this effect.
Second, the transition to co-education might induce a change in the en-
rolled set of students Aj. To see why this might be the case, plug (5) into
(3) and re-express the optimal enrollment decision:
ηwt = argmax {E [vwt(µ∗wt;h)] , E [vwt(µ∗wt; j)] , E [vwt(µ∗wt; k)]} (7)
That is, women forecast their (major-specific) payoffs from attending each
institution, and use those expectations to guide their enrollment decisions.
When institution h transitions to co-education, the women that strongly de-
sire a single-sex environment may experience a reduction in E [vwt(µ
∗
wt; j)]
and may substitute from j to women’s college h. Additionally, the women
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that strongly desire a co-educational environment may experience an im-
provement in E [vwt(µ
∗
wt;h)], and may substitute from co-educational college
k to j. If the women who most desire a single-gender environment also have
the highest expected payoffs from majoring in STEM (say, because they are
the most prepared for STEM coursework), then j’s transition to co-education
causes its subsequent population of women to become more negatively se-
lected on expected STEM payoffs: plausibly leading to a reduction in STEM
majoring. We call this channel the “composition effect.”
In Section 2.3, we estimate the overall treatment effect ∆. Because the as-
sumption that nothing else about the collegiate environment changes between
periods 0 and 1 is likely false, we apply difference-in-difference methodolo-
gies to estimate ∆. That is, we compare the evolution of women’s major
choices at colleges that transitioned to coeducation to the evolution of major
choices at comparable colleges that did not transition. Section 2.4 attempts
to decompose ∆ into composition versus environmental effects.
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APPENDIX E: DATA COLLECTION AND
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION DETAILS FOR
CHAPTER 2
E.1 Major codes
E.1.1 Coding scheme and crosswalks
This paper uses consistent 4-digit, 2-digit, and grouped 2-digit versions of
major codes. The consistent coding scheme is based on the 1990 version of
the Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) from the National Center
from Education Statistics (NCES).
Codes to describe college majors have been revised several times over our
sample period. There were two sets of major codes in the HEGIS data,
with a revision in 1970, and coding switched to the CIP in the early 1980s.7
Revisions of the CIP occurred in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010.8 Crosswalks
between the 1970s HEGIS codes and the CIP, and between different versions
of the CIP, are available from NCES, but they are not complete.
Similar to occupation codes, the CIP has 2-, 4-, and 6-digit versions of
codes, while the HEGIS codes have only 2- and 4-digit versions. Revisions
of the CIP only rarely move major categories across 2-digit codes,9 though
the 1990, 2000, 2010 revisions did move, split, and combine some two-digit
codes.10
7The first version of the CIP was constructed in 1980, but HEGIS seems not to have
adopted it until 1983.
8There seems to have been late adoption of the new coding schemes in the IPEDS data
– the switches seem to have occurred in 1987, 1992, 2002, and 2012, and may not have
occurred uniformly across schools. Revisions of the CIP vary in how many changes were
made, with the 1985 revision being much smaller than subsequent revisions.
9Exceptions include clinical versions of the life sciences, materials science, and educa-
tional psychology, all of which could be considered to be part of multiple two-digit codes.
10For instance, the 1990 revision of the CIP combined category 17, Allied Health, with
category 18, Health Sciences, into category 51, Health Professions and Related Sciences.
Most of the 4-digit categories were preserved but re-numbered in the revision.
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For this paper, all 6-digit codes were crosswalked to the 4-digit 1990 CIP.
Where crosswalks provided by the NCES were incomplete, they were supple-
mented by lists and descriptions of CIP codes created by the NCES. When
majors were not included in the NCES crosswalks, they were matched to
the major of the most similar title and description in the 1990 CIP. If two
4-digit codes were combined in any version of major codings after 1970, they
were combined in the consistent coding scheme. The same is true for the
2-digit codes. Six-digit majors that were created or deleted at any point
were assigned to the same 4-digit code in the “other” category, and 4-digit
codes that were ever created or deleted were assigned the the 4-digit code
for “other” within the same 2-digit code.11 Four-digit majors with fewer
than 950 school-by-year observations were combined with majors that cover
similar material12 or with the “other” category within their two-digit code.
Smaller 2-digit codes, such as Law, Library Science, and Military Science,
were treated as a single 4-digit code.
For the main result, majors were combined into groups of 2-digit codes,
with the most important of those groups being STEM. STEM in this case
includes the 2-digit codes for Life Sciences, Physical Sciences, Engineering,
Computer Science, and Mathematics. Alternative specifications also included
Health Professions.
E.1.2 Categories of majors
The following list is the two-digit categories of majors in each group of 2-digit
codes. Groups are in bold and the two-digit categories are listed afterward.
Where the two-digit sets of codes are not informative, four-digit codes are
included in parentheses. Some groups contain only one two-digit code. The
“other” group includes majors that generally cannot be found at small liberal
arts colleges or that are generally very small.
Art Visual and performing arts, architecture and related services
Business Business, marketing
11For instance, African Languages were not included in the 1990 CIP and were therefore
assigned to the 4-digit code for Other Foreign Languages.
12For instance, Architectural Engineering and Civil Engineering, Business Administra-
tion and Enterprise Management, and the health categories such as medicine, dentistry,
and others which require a professional degree.
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Education All education fields (including math education)
Economics Economics (4-digit code)
Health Health professions and clinical services
Home Economics Home economics/family and consumer sciences
Humanities Area and group studies (e.g. gender studies, Hispanic Stud-
ies), English, foreign languages and linguistics, philosophy and religious
studies
Psychology Psychology
Other Social Sciences Social sciences except economics (general social sci-
ence, anthropology, criminology, demography, geography, history, in-
ternational relations, political science, social science, urban studies),
communications
STEM Life sciences, physical sciences, mathematics and statistics, com-
puter and information science, engineering, engineering technology, sci-
ence technology
Other Agriculture, forestry, law, trades/vocational, military science, library
science, multi- and inter-disciplinary, theology and religious vocations,
protective services, public administration and social services
E.2 School Codes
NCES uses two different coding schemes for individual schools at different
points in the data. HEGIS identifies schools using FICE codes, which is
a six-digit identification code assigned to schools doing business with the
Office of Education in the 1960s. IPEDS uses the UnitID, which is also a
six-digit code. Our data uses the FICE as a consistent identifier throughout
the survey, with some modifications as detailed below.
Not every institution has a FICE code. Institutions that do not have
a FICE code are those that entered the IPEDS data after the Institutional
Characteristics file stopped listing FICE codes (which was during the 1990s).
We drop those institutions from our sample, as according to the ICPSR files
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for IPEDS financial characteristics between 1988 and 1990, institutions that
entered the sample after the beginning of the IPEDS have a much lower
response rate than institutions in the HEGIS sample. However, the data set
itself has the UnitID entered in place of the FICE code for those institutions.
Some institutions have multiple FICE codes. In most of these cases, a
public institution originally reported all branches under one observation, and
then switched to reporting each branch separately. The vast majority of cases
where all degrees awarded are reported under the main campus occur in 1966,
with a few additional cases between 1967 and 1969. We do not link such cases
together. In other cases, an institution switched FICE codes in the middle
of the sample. We are generally not sure why this occurs. We do link these
cases together so that we have a single FICE code for all years the institution
was in the data. Finally, there are a few institutions (notably Cornell and
Columbia) with several different administrative units that separately report
degrees awarded to IPEDS and HEGIS. We treat these institutions as a single
observation and collapse them to a single FICE code.
Some FICE codes apply to multiple institutions. In these cases, all insti-
tutions are part of the same system, and the majority of these cases occur
among institutions who enter the data in 1987 and later, especially among
for-profit institutions with multiple campuses nationwide (e.g. the Univer-
sity of Phoenix). There are some cases where a public college with several
branches (e.g. the University of Pittsburgh) reported degrees separately from
each branch but reported the same FICE from each school. Where we could,
we assigned these institutions to separate codes for each branch, but the rest
of them are collapsed to the FICE level. We have also dropped schools that
are ever classified as for-profit schools from our sample, which removes many
of these cases from our analysis.
E.3 Data construction and processing
We construct our full dataset via the following procedure. First, we identify
all institutions that awarded over 90% of their degrees to women in the first
year they they are observed in the HEGIS/IPEDS data. Because of concerns
about response rates from institutions that entered the data after the tran-
sition to IPEDS, we restrict our sample to HEGIS-participating institutions
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that began offering four-year degrees before 1987.13 For each of these insti-
tutions, we gathered information on whether it was once a women’s college.
If it was, we recorded the date of transition to coeducation based on the in-
stitution’s website, the “Everywoman’s Guide to Colleges and Universities”
(Howe et al., 1982), or other online sources. Where possible, we relied on
institutions’ own websites for this information. Over 90% of our transition
dates were found on .edu websites. This procedure identified 219 institutions
that were women-only in the first year they were observed, 155 of which
eventually transitioned to coeducation.
E.3.1 Data collection on years of the switch to coeducation
We define the first year of coeducation as the first year that men were ad-
mitted to traditional four-year undergraduate programs with coeducational
courses. Schools where men were admitted to these programs only as com-
muter students are counted as coeducational, but schools where men could
only participate in evening or adult education classes or graduate programs
are not. We exclude all coordinate institutions, that is, institutions such as
Columbia and Barnard where a men’s college and a women’s college share a
campus and allow cross-registration in classes. We also exclude cases where
a women’s college merged with a men’s college.
We sourced the years that single-sex institutions switched to coeducation
in three different ways. The first source of information was a comprehensive
check of the top 120 liberal arts colleges and the top 80 universities in the 2018
U.S. News and World Report for the gender of the student body in 1966 and
a date of switch to coeducation. The second source of information was a list
of current and former women’s colleges from the Women’s College Coalition,
including a date of switch to coeducation. Finally, we generated a list of
institutions that awarded more than 90% of their degrees to women in the first
year they appeared in the data and used a research assistant to track down
which of those institutions are current or former women’s colleges. The RA
also found the date of the switch to coeducation for former women’s colleges.
The three lists were then compared. Institutions that appeared on multiple
13The ICPSR documentation for the IPEDS financial data for fall 1987 (study 2220)
discusses concerns about response rates and imputation for institutions which enter the
data after the transition to IPEDS.
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lists with matching switch dates were considered confirmed. Institutions
with conflicts between the switch dates or that appeared on only one list
were independently verified.
Our classification of the “gender” of an institution is based on the gender
of the student body in 1966. Institutions that did not appear on any of the
lists noted above were assigned a gender based on the HEGIS or IPEDS “sex
code” variable in the first year they appeared in the data.
In total, we found 136 former women’s colleges that switched to coedu-
cation (“switchers”). Of these, 118 were never coordinate, entered the data
before 1987, did not merge with a men’s college, and were never for-profit.
E.3.2 Problems in the data
Sixty-four of our “switchers” had at least one man graduate before the official
date of the full switch to coeducation. In the vast majority of cases, this seems
to have been either occasional one-off male students or the introduction of a
small coeducational adult education program. In other cases, schools either
opened a men-only college on campus or had male commuter students before
completely switching to coeducation. We denote problematic cases with the
following flags:
1. A small number of men (≤ 10 per year) graduate from the institu-
tion before the switch to coeducation, or > 10 men graduate from the
institution before the switch and we can verify the existence of a co-
educational adult education program. In these cases, we believe that
there are unlikely to be errors with our coding of the dates of transition
to coeducation and that these male students probably did not interact
with traditional undergraduates. (n = 46)
2. A large number of men (> 10 per year) graduate from the institution
before the switch to coeducation, and we cannot verify the existence
of a coeducational adult education program that did not interact with
traditional undergraduates. In these cases, we became concerned that
there was an error in the date of transition to coeducation that we had
found, which might mean that the institution was not truly single-sex
for traditional undergraduates during the time we had coded it as such.
(n = 10)
144
3. Men were allowed as commuter students long before the official date of
coeducation. In these cases we were usually able to identify the true
date that men were allowed to register in traditional undergraduate
coursework and continued to include them in the sample. (n = 8)
4. Rather than becoming fully coeducational, the school opened a men’s
college (or men-only program) on campus – basically becoming coor-
dinate rather than coeducational. We reclassified these institutions as
coordinate. (n = 2)
We exclude group 2 from the main specification. We also exclude institu-
tions that awarded zero bachelor’s degrees in STEM fields to women in 1966
and institutions that closed shortly after a switch to coeducation. We be-
lieve these restrictions help us comply with our identifying assumption, that
there is no residual determinant of women’s STEM majoring that occurred
at the same time as the transition to coeducation, especially in the case of
removing institutions that did not regularly offer STEM programs before
transitioning to coeducation, as all but two of the institutions dropped for
this reason began offering STEM programs only when men began attending
the institution.
E.3.3 Defining our sample
Our sample includes institutions that:
1. Were woman-only or coeducational in 1966 (N = 3, 707; Nswitch =
155)14
2. Entered the data in 1987 or earlier. This cut was made to deal concerns
noted by ICPSR about the accuracy of imputation for nonrespondents
after the switch to the IPEDS data in 1987. The IPEDS data dramat-
ically expanded the sample to include schools that had not been classi-
fied as “institutions of higher learning” under Title IX and the response
rate of those new institutions was much lower than the response rate of
institutions included in HEGIS. See the ICPSR documentation of the
14Note that the sample sizes here are meant to note how each subsequent restriction
decreases the size of the sample, and different restrictions can overlap.
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1986-1987 academic year finance data for further details. (N = 1, 850;
Nswitch = 150)
3. If switched to coeducation, did not close 9 years after the switch to
coeducation (but not omitting schools that switched to coeducation in
2007 or later); if untreated, was in data for at least 15 years. This cut
was made for balance. (N = 1, 508; Nswitch = 126)
4. Had at least one woman complete a STEM (life or physical science,
math, engineering, computer science) degree in 1966. This cut was
made because of concerns that the establishment of STEM degree pro-
grams may have been a move that went hand-in-hand with the transi-
tion to coeducation. (N = 971; Nswitch = 102)
5. Were never classified as a coordinate institution (a women’s college
sharing a campus with a men’s college) and were not part of a merger
with a men’s college after 1966. We made this cut because we sus-
pect that classes on campus were coeducational long before merg-
ers occurred, as is common with coordinate institutions. (N = 971;
Nswitch = 94)
6. Were never a for-profit institution. This cut was made because our data
provides information only on degrees awarded, and for-profit institu-
tions tend to have very low graduation rates. However, many for-profit
institutions were already removed by the requirement that institutions
enter the data prior to 1987. (N = 963; Nswitch = 91)
7. Had fewer than 10 male students per year graduate before coeducation
started or had coeducational adult education program that we could
verify dates of existence for – that is, was not part of group 2 in the
previous section. We made this cut because were concerned about the
accuracy of the date of transition we had found. (N = 957; Nswitch =
87)
Returning post-1987 entrants (item 2), institutions that closed shortly af-
ter the transition to coeducation (item 3), and institutions that may not
have offered STEM degrees (item 4) do not substantially change our main
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results. The results of returning early closures and schools that did not offer
STEM, compared to our main analysis, are reported in Appendix Figure G.1.
Returning these institutions to the analysis leaves us with 124 switchers, 44
always women’s colleges, and 3,478 always coeducational institutions. We
believe that all of the restrictions we have made are key to either maintain-
ing our identifying assumption or to avoid spurious effects created by poor
imputation procedures in the post-1987 entrants. We believe that the ex-
clusion of coordinate colleges and mergers are particularly important, as it
is not clear that there was truly a transition from women-only courses to
coeducational courses at either time. Especially at institutions where there
was a merger between a women’s college and either a men’s college or an
institution which was already coeducational, we think it is likely that a num-
ber of other changes came about at the same time, and coordinate colleges
likely had coeducational courses before the transition to coeducation.
We also make a number of cuts that only apply to our comparison groups.
To promote sample balance, we omit institutions that were in the data for
less than 15 years from these comparison groups. We also omit military
academies, institutions that were men’s colleges in 1966, coordinate (or part-
ner) colleges, institutions where no women were awarded STEM degrees in
the first year we observe them,15 and for-profit institutions.
15Many men’s colleges transitioned to coeducation program-by-program, often estab-
lishing a nursing or teaching program before allowing women into academic programs.
STEM programs were often the last to open to women. We therefore believe the inclusion
of these institutions might contaminate our control group.
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APPENDIX F: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
FOR CHAPTER 2
F.1 Robustness check: the synthetic control method
As a robustness check on our main result, we use the synthetic control method
to estimate the effects of transitioning to coeducation on women’s STEM
major choices. The synthetic control method offers a data-driven proce-
dure to construct a control group that matches our treatment group based
on pre-treatment characteristics. Thus, it may provide a valid comparison
group even if our identification assumption fails in the standard difference-
in-differences methodology used above.
One complication of our setting is that we have multiple “treated” schools
rather than the single treated unit that is standard in synthetic control set-
tings (e.g. (Abadie et al., 2010)). We adjust the standard procedure in two
ways to incorporate this complication. First, we group schools that switched
to coeducation in the same year, so that the “treated” groups are effectively
school-cohort combinations. Second, we construct a synthetic control group
separately for each cohort of treated schools and then average the effects by
year relative to the switch (Cavallo et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2016).
Our baseline specification constructs a synthetic control group for each
treated school-cohort observation by matching on the entire set of pre-transition
outcome variables (Ferman et al., 2020). Appendix Figure G.7 reports the
results of this estimation procedure. For consistency with our event-study
results, time 0 corresponds to the effect on the female STEM share in the
junior year the first coeducational cohort. Note that because years -2 and
-1 are not used in the matching procedure, the fact that they remain near
0 provides an informal cross-validation test and some reassurance of the va-
lidity of our design. In fact, we see little evidence of a departure from 0
effect until the graduating year of the first coeducational senior class. The
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synthetic control event study traces a similar path as did our standard event
study (Appendix Figure A2): it shows a 2 percentage point decrease in the
share of women majoring in STEM by five years after the transition to coed-
ucation and a 3 percentage point decrease by nine years after the transition
to coeducation. We calculate a “difference-in-differences” estimate by aver-
aging the post-treatment coefficients and subtracting them from the average
pre-treatment coefficients. The estimate of -0.025 is an outlier in the distri-
bution of placebo effects, with a p-value of 0.01.16 This estimate is slightly
larger in magnitude than the one we obtain in our main event study model.
By matching on the entire set of pre-transition outcome variables, this
baseline approach reduces concerns about specification searching (Ferman
et al., 2020). In addition, in cases with sufficiently long pre-periods, it re-
duces the bias of the synthetic control estimator (Abadie et al., 2010; Kaul
et al., 2018). However, its disadvantage is that it runs the risk of overfitting,
particularly for our early-switching schools with few observed pre-treatment
periods. To assuage these concerns, Appendix Figure G.8 reports estimates
from three other specifications (Ferman et al., 2020). The first specification
replicates the baseline. The second specification matches on only the second
half of pre-treatment outcomes as matching variables, rather than the full
pre-period. The third specification, labeled “college characteristics,” matches
on a five-year average of the pre-treatment period plus some features of the
school: A five-year average of the ratio of total PhD and professional degrees
to bachelor’s degrees, and the share of all students at a school that ma-
jored in humanities, social science, physical science, and business in the year
before the reform. Finally, the fourth specification, labeled “School major
distribution,” replaces the bachelor’s-degree shares from event-year −1 with
those same shares for the last half of the pre-period. While these robust-
ness checks are generally noisier than our baseline estimates, the results are
relatively consistent across specifications.
16We conduct inference by randomly reassigning treatment status and estimating the
effect of the transition to coeducation on the placebo institutions, using 500 replications
(Abadie et al., 2015). If our estimated effect is either below the 2.5th percentile or above
the 97.5th percentile of placebo effects, the effect is statistically significant.
149
F.2 Testing for capacity constraints
One possible explanation for our finding of a reduction in the share of women
majoring in STEM at newly coeducational colleges is that such colleges hit
capacity constraints to a larger extent in STEM than in non-STEM fields.
For example, if STEM is both more costly for colleges to provide and more
popular among men, students might be more crowded out of STEM ma-
jors than non-STEM majors after the transition to coeducation. To test
this hypothesis, we examine how the total number of degrees awarded in
each STEM-related field changed, and whether these changes were correlated
with the cost of each STEM field. If capacity constraints were important,
we should expect an inverse correlation between the expense to colleges of
offering different fields and the growth in those fields after the transition to
coeducation.
For each of several candidate majors, we estimate a difference-in-difference
version of Equation 2.2:
log(Degrees)itµ = θiµ +WiPostitγµ + δr(i)tµ + ψc(i)tµ + εitµ. (8)
log(Degrees)itµ is the log total number of degrees awarded in major µ to
(male and female) students graduating from school i in year t. Our coefficient
of interest is γµ: the effect of the switch to coeducation on the log number
of degrees awarded in field µ. As before, Wi is an indicator of being a
women’s college that switched to coeducation. Postit is an indicator that
school i has already switched to coeducation. θiµ, δr(i)tµ, and ψc(i)tµ are year,
region-by-year, and control-by-year fixed effects, similar to our event study
specification. We then rank the size of γµ in order of the cost of providing
each field as described in (Hemelt et al., 2018).17
The most expensive field commonly offered at the institutions in our sam-
ple is nursing, followed by education. The most expensive STEM field is
physics, followed by chemistry, biology, economics, and math.18 Figure G.5
17(Hemelt et al., 2018) rank fields of study by cost relative to the English major. They
establish that costs vary widely by field, and interestingly, both math and economics are
cheaper to offer than English (and many other non-STEM majors). The variance in costs
of offering different fields is largely explained by differences in class size and faculty pay
— economics and math are cheaper because they often have very large classes.
18Nursing is the second most expensive field ranked by (Hemelt et al., 2018), and edu-
cation is the fourth most expensive. The two most expensive STEM fields are electrical
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reports the estimates of γµ for each of these fields, in order from most ex-
pensive to least expensive. If capacity constraints were the only factor re-
sponsible for changes in the share of women choosing each field, we would
expect that the most expensive fields would grow the least and the least ex-
pensive fields would grow the most. In that case, the difference-in-difference
coefficients would get larger (less negative or more positive) as the cost of
offering the field decreased. This is not the case: there does not appear to be
any relationship between cost and the change in the log number of degrees
awarded by field. We therefore conclude that capacity constraints were not
the only driver of women’s substitution away from STEM after the transition
to coeducation at former women’s colleges.
engineering (which is the most expensive field) and mechanical engineering (which is the
third most expensive field). The vast majority of colleges in our sample do not offer en-
gineering, so we omit electrical and mechanical engineering from our analysis. Computer
science is also more expensive than physics. However, most of our sample switched to
coeducation in the early 1970s, when computer science was just beginning to be offered as
a degree (and before most small liberal arts colleges would have had a computer science
program). Given the huge changes to the field of computer science, we are not confident
that its place in the rank order of costs has been stable since 1966.
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APPENDIX G: ADDITIONAL TABLES
AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2
Table G.1: Determinants of the transition to coeducation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switched Switched Switched Switched
before 1972 before 1972
Region = Midwest -0.0246 0.0565 -0.572 -0.484
(0.130) (0.127) (0.163) (0.177)
Region = South 0.156 0.195 -0.377 -0.283
(0.0937) (0.0909) (0.128) (0.131)
Region = West -0.143 -0.172 -0.376 -0.471
(0.136) (0.135) (0.177) (0.167)
Ever Catholic 0.191 0.108 -0.174 -0.333
(0.101) (0.117) (0.128) (0.111)
Log enrollment 0.00456 0.00734 -0.0702 -0.0723
(0.0901) (0.0859) (0.104) (0.0973)
Selective -0.219 -0.317
(0.116) (0.155)
Observations 112 110 85 83
R-squared 0.122 0.153 0.169 0.218
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. Linear probability model
estimates based on transitioning to coeducation (for all initial women’s colleges) or tran-
sitioning to coeducation before 1972 (for all switchers) as the dependent variable. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Region refers to U.S. Census regions. Omitted region
category is Northeast. “Selective” refers to a Barron’s rating of 1, 2, or 3 in 1972.
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Table G.2: Average share of women choosing each major from time -3 to -1
(1)
mean/sd










Math and Computer Science 0.030
(0.025)





















Table G.3: Difference-in-difference coefficients for the effect of coeducation
on the share of women choosing STEM and economics majors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STEM Bio. Phys. Sci. Math Econ.
Panel A: Control = Women’s Colleges
DiD -0.0180 -0.00945 -0.00322 -0.00497 -0.00705
(0.00479) (0.00271) (0.00103) (0.00185) (0.00244)
Observations 5,675 5,675 5,675 5,675 5,675
R-squared 0.690 0.631 0.660 0.563 0.781
Time −1 mean 0.0804 0.0431 0.0108 0.0168 0.00913
Panel B: Control = All Schools
DiD -0.0228 -0.00832 -0.00357 -0.00614 -0.00471
(0.00412) (0.00234) (0.000892) (0.00190) (0.00203)
Observations 50,558 50,558 50,558 50,558 50,558
R-squared 0.714 0.662 0.546 0.525 0.688
Time −1 mean 0.0804 0.0431 0.0108 0.0168 0.00913
Panel C: Control = Coeducational Colleges
DiD -0.0233 -0.00837 -0.00361 -0.00623 -0.00442
(0.00415) (0.00235) (0.000897) (0.00191) (0.00205)
Observations 49,245 49,245 49,245 49,245 49,245
R-squared 0.712 0.659 0.521 0.523 0.649
Time −1 mean 0.0804 0.0431 0.0108 0.0168 0.00913
Panel D: Control = Small Schools
DiD -0.0211 -0.00833 -0.00352 -0.00650 -0.00475
(0.00423) (0.00245) (0.000935) (0.00179) (0.00217)
Observations 36,548 36,548 36,548 36,548 36,548
R-squared 0.667 0.603 0.542 0.472 0.702
Time −1 mean 0.0816 0.0436 0.0111 0.0172 0.00940
Notes: Table reports difference-in-difference coefficients corresponding to event study es-
timates from equation 2.2 and Figure 2.4. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at the institution level. Time −1 mean refers to the mean share of women choos-
ing each major at event time −1 in switcher institutions. Small schools refers to total
enrollment under 5,000 students in the first year information on enrollment is available
from HEGIS/IPEDS; the sample cut affects switcher schools as well as control schools.
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Table G.4: List of switchers and mergers
Institution Name Year of Switch Merger Flag
College of Saint Benedict 1961
Webster University 1962
Framingham State College 1964
Ohio Dominican University 1964
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 1964 3
Newman University 1965
Oklahoma College for Women 1965
Briar Cliff University 1966
Madison College (James Madison) 1966
Dominican College 1967
Georgia College & State University 1967
Mount Saint Mary College 1967





Sarah Lawrence College 1968
Villa Maria College 1968
Avila University 1969
Bennington College 1969 1
Coker College 1969 1
College of St. Rose 1969
College of St. Scholastica 1969
Columbia College2 1969
Connecticut College 1969
Elmira College 1969 1
Lindenwood University 1969 4
MacMurray College 1969
Marycrest College 1969 1
Mercy College 1969
Mercyhurst University 1969
Mount Marty College 1969 1
Mount Mercy University 1969
Notre Dame de Namur University 1969 3
Our Lady of the Lake University 1969 1
Saint Xavier University 1969
San Francisco College for Women (Lone Mountain) 1969
Siena Heights University 1969
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Table G.4: Switchers and mergers (continued)
Silver Lake College 1969
St Joseph’s College for Women 1969
Vassar College 1969
Cabrini University 1970
Cardinal Stritch University 1970
Dominican University 1970
Edgewood College 1970
La Roche College 1970
Loretto Heights 1970 2
Marian University 1970 1
Pitzer College 1970
Saint Joseph’s College of Maine 1970
University of Mary 1970 1
University of Mary Washington 1970
University of the Incarnate Word 1970 1
Viterbo University 1970
Alvernia College 1971
College of St. Joseph 1971
D’Youville College 1971
Daemen College 1971 1
Dominican University of California 1971
Fontbonne College 1971
Holy Family University 1971
Holy Names University 1971 1
Lynn University 1971
Manhattanville College 1971 1
Mary Manse College 1971 1
Marygrove College 1971
Marymount Manhattan College 1971
Nazareth College 1971
Skidmore College 1971
University of Mary HardinBaylor 1971 3
University of St. Francis 1971
Webber College 1971
Annhurst College 1972
Barat College of the Sacred Heart 1972
Brenau College 1972 1
Madonna University 1972
Radford University 1972 1
Sacred Heart University 1972 3
Texas Woman’s University 1972
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Table G.4: Switchers and mergers (continued)
University of San Diego College for Women 1972 1
Virginia Intermont College 1972
Anna Maria College 1973
Beaver College 1973
Gwynedd Mercy University 1973
Nazareth College of Kentucky 1973 5
Notre Dame College 1973 1
Salve Regina University 1973 1
Spalding College 1973 1
Westbrook College 1973
College of Mount Saint Vincent 1974
Marylhurst University 1974
Nazareth College of Rochester 1974 1
Newton College of the Sacred Heart 1974
Thomas More College 1974
Winthrop University 1974 1
Barry University 1975
Lourdes University 1975
Misericordia University 1975 1
Longwood University 1976 3
Ladycliff College 1978 1
Clarke College 1979
Neumann University 1980 1
Mississippi University for Women 1982
Molloy Catholic College for Women 1982
Molloy College 1982 1
Albertus Magnus College 1985 1
Caldwell University 1985 1
Keuka College 1985 1
Notre Dame College 1985 3
Felician University 1986 1
Goucher College 1986
Lake Erie College 1986 1 2
Marymount University 1986 3
Mount St. Joseph University 1986 1
Tift College (Mercer) 1986 1 2
Queens University of Charlotte 1987
Centenary University 1988 1
University of Saint Mary 1988 3
Wheaton College 1988
Marywood University 1989 4
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Table G.4: Switchers and mergers (continued)
ColbySawyer College 1990 1
Rivier University 1991 2
Endicott College 1994 1
William Woods University 1996 1
Lasell University 1997
Elms College 1998 1
Emmanuel College 2001 1
Notre Dame College 2001
Seton Hill University 2002 1
Chestnut Hill College 2003 1
Hood College 2003 3
Wells College 2004
Blue Mountain College 2005 1
Immaculata University 2005 1
Lesley College 2005 2
Randolph-Macon Woman’s College 2007 1
Regis College 2007 1
Rosemont College 2009 2
William Peace University 2012 1
Georgian Court University 2013 1
Wilson College 2013 1
Pine Manor College 2014
Chatham University 2015 1
College of Saint Elizabeth 2015 1
St Mary of the Woods College 2015 1
College of New Rochelle 2016 1
Midway University 2016 1
Mary Baldwin College 2017 3
University of Saint Joseph 2018 2
Notes: List of former women’s colleges and mergers, with the year of switch,
collected in the manner described in Appendix E.3.1. FICE codes and other
information, as well as a list of colleges that remained women-only, are avail-
able upon request. Flag values are as described in Appendix E.3.2.
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Figure G.1: The effect of coeducation on the STEM share of degrees
awarded to women, including schools dropped from the main sample
(a) Including schools that did not offer
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Years since junior year of first mixed-gender cohort
Main sample
Including non-STEM schools
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 1.3 for further
detail. The majors included in the STEM concentration are described in Section 1.3 and
Appendix B. Comparison group is institutions that remained women’s colleges. Panels
display estimate of βs from equation 2.2. Standard errors are clustered at the institution
level.
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Control: Coed colleges Control: Small schools
Notes: Data drawn from 1966-2016 CPS data accessed via IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2020),
linked to hand-collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution’s state. See
Section 1.3 for further detail. Unemployment rate is measured among individuauls age 18-
64. Relative STEM employment is constructed as the ratio of college-educated workers in
STEM occupations to workers in non-STEM occupations. Relative income among men is
constructed as the ratio of average annual income among college-educated men currently
working in a STEM occupation to average annual income among college-educated men
currently working in a non-STEM occupation. Relative income for women in STEM is
constructed in the same manner, except that we include individuals with 0 earnings in the
previous year. Panels display estimates of βs from equation 2.2. Unemployment rate is
calculated among all Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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(a) Art (b) Business (c) Education
(d) Health (e) Home economics (f) Humanities
(g) Other (h) Psychology (i) Social science
Control: Women's colleges Control: All schools
Control: Coed colleges Control: Small schools
Years since junior year of first mixed-gender cohort
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 1.3 and Appendix
table A1 for further detail. Panels display estimate of βs from equation 2.2, where the
share of graduating women who choose each major is the dependent variable. Standard
errors are clustered at the institution level.
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Figure G.4: The effect of coeducation on the full distribution of women’s
major choices, all-college specification





























































































Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. The majors included in
each concentration are described in Appendix B. Each panel displays estimates from a
difference-in-difference version of Equation 2.2, using all colleges (other than men’s col-
leges) as the comparison group. Estimates are re-scaled so that they capture the majoring
effect of a 10 percentage-point increase in the male share of the student body induced by
coeducation. Confidence intervals account for error in estimation of the effect of coedu-
cation on the male share of the student body via a block bootstrap routine. Specifically,
the routine computes 1,000 re-scaled coefficients and reports confidence intervals corre-
sponding to the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of this observed distribution. The top panel
uses a percentage-point scale. The bottom panel reports semi-elasticities, which are con-
structed by dividing the re-scaled percentage-point estimates by the baseline shares of
women majoring in each given concentration.
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Figure G.5: The effects of coeducation on log total number of degrees
awarded by field, ordered by cost of field
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 1.3 and Appendix
table A1 for further detail. The graph displays estimates of γµ from Equation 8, which
describes the difference-in-difference effect of coeducation on log total degrees awarded in
major µ. Estimates are ordered by cost of field as estimated in (Hemelt et al., 2018).
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Figure G.6: The correlation between women’s actual STEM majoring and
predicted majoring based on freshman characteristics
Notes: Data on freshman characteristics drawn from the CIRP Freshman Survey (TFS),
spanning 1966 to 2006, matched at the institution-by-year level to data drawn from
HEGIS/IPEDS surveys on STEM degrees awarded. (We implement a 4-year-lag between
the two sources to map entering freshmen in TFS to graduating seniors in HEGIS/IPEDS.)
Appendix B.2 describes the majors included in the STEM concentration. The graph plots
the true share of women from each institution and year who graduated with STEM degrees
against the predicted STEM share—ŝWSTEM,i,t=4. We predict this share based on equation
2.3.
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Figure G.7: The effect of coeducation on the STEM share of degrees
awarded to women: synthetic control specification
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 1.3 for further
detail. The majors included in the STEM concentration are described in Section 1.3 and
Appendix B. See Appendix F.1 for description of the synthetic controls procedure. Dark
line reports the main estimate, while grey lines report the results of a randomization
inference procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure G.8: Synthetic control estimates using alternate specifications and
majors
Notes: Data drawn from HEGIS/IPEDS surveys, spanning 1966-2016, linked to hand-
collected dates of transitions to coeducation by institution. See Section 1.3 and Appendix
table A1 for further detail. See Appendix B.2 for information on the specific majors in-
cluded within each concentration. Appendix F.1 provides further detail on the synthetic
control estimation procedure. Main specification matches on outcome variable for all pre-
treatment years, i.e. all years before the freshman year of the first coeducational cohort.
Specification in red (circle markers) matches on second half of pre-period. Green line (di-
amond markers) matches on average of outcome over 5 years period to the transition to
coeducation, plus five-year average of ratio of professors and PhD students to undergrad-
uates, share of all students majoring in humanities, social science, physical science, and
business. Orange line (square markers) matches on 5-year average of pre-treatment out-
comes, ratios of professors and PhD students to undergraduates, and share of the following
majors in the last half of the pre-period: Humanities, social sciences, business, physical
science.
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Figure G.9: The effect of becoming coeducational on women’s STEM
preparedness, with fixed effects and additional controls
Notes: STEM degrees are defined as degrees in engineering, computer sci-
ence, life and physical sciences, and mathematics. Data is drawn from records
of the number of degrees awarded by year, institution, and gender from 1966-
1969 and 1971-2016 in the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) and its predecessor, the Higher Education General Information Sur-
vey (HEGIS), linked to the CIRP Freshman Survey (TFS). Figure shows es-
timate of βs from equation 2.1 with ŝ
W
STEM,i,t=4 calculated using equation 2.3,
adding controls for the number of years of math, science, and computer sci-
ence instruction in high school as well as missingness indicators for the high
school course variables and school, region-by-year, and institutional-control-
by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are calculated using a percentile block
bootstrap with 1000 replications.
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Figure G.10: Average SAT Math score for all students at newly
coeducational colleges
Notes: Data is drawn from the CIRP Freshman Survey. Figure shows the
effect of coeducation on the average SAT score at an institutions. Standard
errors are clustered on the institution level. Mathematics includes statistics.
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APPENDIX H: ADDITIONAL TABLES
AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 3
Table H.1: Summary of Roster & 990 Data
Rosters Wage (990) Data
Source(s) Years Available Years Missing Years Available
Philadelphia GR + WM 1938-2017 No 1997-2016
Pittburgh GR + WM 1931-2017 No 1998-2016
San Francisco GR + WM 1938-2017 No 2001-2016
Boston GR + Archives 1944-2017 Yes 1997-2016
Chicago GR + Archives 1944-2017 No 1998-2016
Cleveland GR + Programs 1949-2017 No 1982-2016
NY Phil GR + Archives 1938-2017 No 1971-2016
Detroit GR + WM + Programs 1931-2017 Yes 1998-2016
LA Phil GR + WM + Programs 1938-2017 No 2001-2016
Cincinnati WM 1998-2017 Yes 1998-2016
Dallas WM 1996-2017 Yes 1998-2016
Houston WM 1996-2017 Yes 1998-2016
St. Louis GR + WM 1937-2016 Yes 1998-2016
Notes: GR - obtained from Goldin and Rouse Rosters, WM (Wayback Machine) - obtained
from archived orchestra webpages, Archives - obtained from online orchestra archives,
Programs - obtained from concert programs sent to the authors directly from orchestra
personnel managers/librarians/archivists. Years Missing refers to missing rosters (e.g., for
St Louis we are missing 1995 to 1998, 2002 to 2004, and 2017-2018 seasons).
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Table H.2: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - Event-study coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t-10 49 -0.0207 -0.0351 -0.0174 -0.0263
(0.0291) (0.0431) (0.0279) (0.0361)
t-9 75 -0.0102 -0.0390 -0.0112 -0.0353
(0.0311) (0.0410) (0.0297) (0.0391)
t-8 107 -0.0424* -0.0763** -0.0454** -0.0758**
(0.0241) (0.0332) (0.0220) (0.0300)
t-7 130 -0.0153 -0.0289 -0.0178 -0.0411
(0.0255) (0.0273) (0.0251) (0.0282)
t-6 177 -0.0216 -0.0514** -0.0256 -0.0558**
(0.0211) (0.0254) (0.0210) (0.0239)
t-5 206 -0.0288 -0.0650*** -0.0298* -0.0597***
(0.0189) (0.0217) (0.0180) (0.0211)
t-4 354 -0.0034 -0.0359** -0.0063 -0.0343**
(0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0163) (0.0175)
t-3 354 0.0043 -0.0183 0.0013 -0.0108
(0.0142) (0.0151) (0.0134) (0.0145)
t-2 354 0.0186 -0.0011 0.0145 -0.0001
(0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0111) (0.0118)
t-1 354 - - - -
t+0 354 0.0122 -0.0033 0.0152 0.0061
(0.0122) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0135)
t+1 354 0.0163 0.0008 0.0175 0.0141
(0.0160) (0.0205) (0.0152) (0.0181)
t+2 354 0.0104 0.0133 0.0140 0.0195
(0.0164) (0.0222) (0.0159) (0.0213)
t+3 310 0.0188 0.0204 0.0204 0.0226
(0.0180) (0.0227) (0.0179) (0.0221)
t+4 295 0.0411** 0.0567** 0.0414** 0.0593**
(0.0188) (0.0261) (0.0184) (0.0237)
t+5 274 0.0365* 0.0534* 0.0358* 0.0472*
(0.0213) (0.0283) (0.0212) (0.0264)
t+6 252 0.0105 0.0260 0.0092 0.0309
(0.0191) (0.0276) (0.0186) (0.0252)
t+7 224 -0.0128 0.0051 -0.0145 0.0152
(0.0236) (0.0328) (0.0235) (0.0317)
t+8 194 0.0020 0.0426 -0.0027 0.0391
(0.0253) (0.0375) (0.0251) (0.0343)
t+9 168 0.0514* 0.0786* 0.0429 0.0730*
(0.0288) (0.0439) (0.0285) (0.0392)
t+10 144 0.0301 0.0602 0.0224 0.0515
(0.0342) (0.0485) (0.0329) (0.0420)
Observations 6451 6451 6451 6451
R-squared 0.7190 0.8010 0.7120 0.7670
Mean 0.1470 0.1470 0.1470 0.1470
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation 3.1, where outside options
are defined as the first outside option for which the musician has balanced observations.
Balance indicates that all musicians in the sample are present in their orchestra and that
we have data from tax forms from the orchestra from at least t− 4 to t+ 2. Columns (1)
and (2) show the results on a sample that is balanced from t− 4 to t+ 2. The fixed effects
included in each specification are listed in the table. In columns (1) and (2), for the tenure
group fixed effects, musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 4, 5 to 9,
10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years in the orchestra. Whereas in columns (3) and
(4), musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 9, 10 to 19, and 20+
years in the orchestra. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors are clustered
at the musician-orchestra level.
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Table H.3: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - Event-study coefficients - First Ever
Opening Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t-10 11 0.0107 0.0062 0.0180 0.0121
(0.0445) (0.0549) (0.0422) (0.0386)
t-9 13 -0.0014 0.0067 0.0168 0.0157
(0.0384) (0.0492) (0.0346) (0.0328)
t-8 21 -0.0628 -0.0079 -0.0459 -0.0502
(0.0473) (0.0368) (0.0453) (0.0473)
t-7 24 -0.0305 -0.0233 -0.0337 -0.0182
(0.0441) (0.0413) (0.0384) (0.0372)
t-6 32 -0.0445 -0.0200 -0.0407 -0.0070
(0.0372) (0.0307) (0.0325) (0.0312)
t-5 44 -0.0363 -0.0231 -0.0344 -0.0362
(0.0292) (0.0215) (0.0270) (0.0265)
t-4 65 -0.0807** -0.0311 -0.0629* -0.0688
(0.0335) (0.0308) (0.0357) (0.0437)
t-3 65 -0.0347 -0.0026 -0.0288 -0.0136
(0.0254) (0.0172) (0.0241) (0.0364)
t-2 65 -0.0351 -0.0145 -0.0317 -0.0329
(0.0246) (0.0185) (0.0220) (0.0218)
t-1 65 - - - -
t+0 65 -0.0151 -0.0241 -0.0050 -0.0005
(0.0280) (0.0205) (0.0296) (0.0227)
t+1 65 -0.0287 -0.0194 -0.0203 -0.0122
(0.0309) (0.0266) (0.0302) (0.0262)
t+2 65 -0.0217 -0.0582 -0.0197 -0.0338
(0.0320) (0.0490) (0.0318) (0.0327)
t+3 58 -0.0197 -0.0409 -0.0143 -0.0791*
(0.0335) (0.0537) (0.0329) (0.0443)
t+4 57 -0.0078 -0.0621 0.0053 -0.0814**
(0.0277) (0.0575) (0.0285) (0.0408)
t+5 57 -0.0249 -0.0526 -0.0050 -0.0293
(0.0465) (0.1070) (0.0435) (0.0548)
t+6 51 -0.0215 -0.0333 -0.0202 -0.0748**
(0.0411) (0.0587) (0.0381) (0.0377)
t+7 47 -0.0407 0.0093 -0.0258 -0.0030
(0.0378) (0.0603) (0.0420) (0.0602)
t+8 35 -0.0268 0.0073 -0.0028 -0.0188
(0.0386) (0.0952) (0.0400) (0.0526)
t+9 32 0.0455 0.0555 0.0465 0.0071
(0.0389) (0.1140) (0.0419) (0.0693)
t+10 27 -0.0324 -0.0364 -0.0274 -0.1040*
(0.0334) (0.0958) (0.0313) (0.0587)
Observations 1878 1878 1878 1878
R-squared 0.7690 0.9460 0.7350 0.8800
Mean 0.0923 0.0923 0.0923 0.0923
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Notes: These tables presents the results of estimating erquation 3.1, where we define
outside options as the first one a musician will experience as they appear in the data,
and are only included if they are balanced around that outside option, where balanced
indicates that the musician in the sample are present in their orchestra, and that we have
data from tax forms from the orchestra, from at least t− 4 to t+ 2. Columns (1) and (2)
show the results on a sample that is balanced from t−4 to t+2. The fixed effects included
in each specification are listed in the table. In columns (1) and (2), for the tenure group
fixed effects, musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to
14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years in the orchestra. Whereas in columns (3) and (4),
musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 9, 10 to 19, and 20+ years
in the orchestra. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors are clustered at the
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Table H.4: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - Event-study coefficients, Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t-10 46 0.0163 0.0076 0.0037 -0.0135
(0.0316) (0.0410) (0.0337) (0.0413)
t-9 66 0.0316 -0.0174 0.0309 0.0058
(0.0294) (0.0332) (0.0284) (0.0321)
t-8 94 0.0502 0.013 0.0489 0.0173
(0.0357) (0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0369)
t-7 117 0.0135 -0.008 0.0103 -0.0193
(0.0307) (0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0314)
t-6 160 0.0188 -0.0009 0.0162 0.0101
(0.0299) (0.0333) (0.0293) (0.0301)
t-5 186 0.0144 0.0053 0.0152 0.0061
(0.0262) (0.0287) (0.0261) (0.0271)
t-4 322 0.0387 0.018 0.0354 0.0202
(0.0243) (0.0239) (0.0241) (0.0228)
t-3 322 0.0455** 0.0519** 0.0434** 0.0484**
(0.0216) (0.0211) (0.0216) (0.0207)
t-2 322 0.0145 -0.0081 0.0131 0.006
(0.0181) (0.0185) (0.0177) (0.0180)
t-1 322 - - - -
t+0 322 0.0226 0.0159 0.0268 0.0269
(0.0186) (0.0200) (0.0183) (0.0194)
t+1 322 0.0111 -0.0123 0.0143 0.005
(0.0258) (0.0283) (0.0253) (0.0267)
t+2 322 0.0233 0.0055 0.0272 0.0158
(0.0267) (0.0274) (0.0262) (0.0279)
t+3 285 0.0216 0.0161 0.0257 0.0312
(0.0276) (0.0331) (0.0275) (0.0315)
t+4 271 0.0272 0.038 0.0309 0.0418
(0.0256) (0.0296) (0.0262) (0.0295)
t+5 251 0.0341 0.0274 0.0366 0.0388
(0.0275) (0.0309) (0.0276) (0.0294)
t+6 233 0.0253 0.0275 0.029 0.0382
(0.0268) (0.0329) (0.0269) (0.0310)
t+7 207 -0.0162 -0.035 -0.0132 -0.003
(0.0375) (0.0437) (0.0374) (0.0415)
t+8 176 -0.0117 -0.0292 -0.0105 -0.0004
(0.0367) (0.0448) (0.0363) (0.0406)
t+9 150 0.005 0.0139 0.0073 0.015
(0.0361) (0.0413) (0.0363) (0.0402)
t+10 130 -0.0252 -0.0369 -0.0224 -0.0308
(0.0413) (0.0474) (0.0417) (0.0440)
Observations 8021 8021 8021 8021
R-squared 0.685 0.766 0.678 0.728
Mean 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.138
Fixed Effects:
Musician x Position x Orchestra Y Y Y Y
Tenure group x Season Y Y
Principal x Season Y Y
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals 10 year intervals
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation 3.1 but with event defined
based on a randomly assigned instrument group rather than the musician’s instrument.
Columns (1) and (2) show the results on a sample that is balanced from t − 4 to t + 2.
Balance indicates that all musicians in the sample are present in their orchestra and that
we have data from tax forms from the orchestra from at least t − 4 to t + 2. The fixed
effects included in each specification are listed in the table. In columns (1) and (2), for
the tenure group fixed effects, musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0
to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25+ years in the orchestra. Whereas in
columns (3) and (4), musicians are classified into the following tenure groups: 0 to 9, 10
to 19, and 20+ years in the orchestra. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors
are clustered at the musician-position level.
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Table H.5: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
the 5 Highest Paid Musicians - Event-study coefficients, by Tenure
Tenure Group
0 to 9 (t∗) t∗× 10 to 19 t∗× 20+
(1) (2) (3)
t-10 -0.0441 0.0572 0.0346
(0.0802) (0.0867) (0.1170)
t-9 -0.0209 0.0379 -0.0109
(0.0635) (0.0624) (0.1030)
t-8 0.0039 -0.0468 -0.1090
(0.0522) (0.0594) (0.0979)
t-7 -0.1320** 0.1760** 0.1660**
(0.0589) (0.0717) (0.0812)
t-6 -0.0958** 0.1070** 0.0805
(0.0445) (0.0542) (0.0790)
t-5 -0.0854*** 0.0825** 0.0051
(0.0318) (0.0408) (0.0702)
t-4 -0.0479** 0.0739** -0.0441
(0.0241) (0.0369) (0.0640)
t-3 -0.0145 0.0328 -0.0806
(0.0207) (0.0328) (0.0520)
t-2 -0.0153 0.0442 0.0261
(0.0199) (0.0285) (0.0381)
t-1 - - -
t+0 -0.0275 0.0699** -0.0030
(0.0199) (0.0337) (0.0518)
t+1 -0.0410 0.1180*** 0.0188
(0.0278) (0.0431) (0.0598)
t+2 -0.0178 0.0689 0.0372
(0.0294) (0.0456) (0.0657)
t+3 -0.0136 0.0997** -0.0167
(0.0280) (0.0495) (0.0743)
t+4 -0.0029 0.1320** 0.0833
(0.0331) (0.0627) (0.0806)
t+5 0.0029 0.1130** 0.0514
(0.0370) (0.0567) (0.0892)
t+6 -0.0173 0.0908* 0.0462
(0.0326) (0.0535) (0.0912)
t+7 -0.0461 0.1220* 0.0346
(0.0410) (0.0645) (0.0836)
t+8 -0.0037 0.0789 0.1060
(0.0412) (0.0610) (0.1220)
t+9 0.0608 0.0664 -0.0247
(0.0527) (0.0890) (0.1200)






Musician x Position x Orchestra Y
Tenure group x Season
Principal x Season
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y
Tenure Groups 5 year intervals
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation 3.1 where each event time
dummy variable is interacted separately with 10 to 19 tenure group, and 20+ tenure group.
Column (1) shows the coefficient on the base term (event study dummy variables), column
(2) shows the coefficients on the interaction of the base term and tenure group 10 to 19,
and column (3) shows the coefficients on the interaction of the base term and tenure group
20+. All columns show results on a sample that is balanced from t− 4 to t+ 2. Balance
indicates that all musicians in the sample are present in their orchestra and that we have
data from tax forms from the orchestra from at least t − 4 to t + 2. The fixed effects
included in each specification are listed in the table. The sample period is 1971 to 2017.
Standard errors are clustered at the musician-position level. Tenure groups are: 0 to 4, 5
to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20+
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Table H.6: The Effects of Outside Options on Probability of Appearing in
















































Musician x Position x Orchestra Y
Tenure group x Season
Principal x Season
Tenure group x Season x Orchestra Y
Principal x Season x Orchestra Y
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation 3.1 where each event time
dummy variable is interacted an indicator for the musician being female. Column (1)
shows the coefficient on the base term (event study dummy variables), column (2) shows
the coefficients on the interaction of the base term and the indicator for female. All
columns show results on a sample that is balanced from t− 4 to t+ 2. Balance indicates
that all musicians in the sample are present in their orchestra and that we have data from
tax forms from the orchestra from at least t−4 to t+ 2. The fixed effects included in each
specification are listed in the table. The sample period is 1971 to 2017. Standard errors
are clustered at the musician-position level. Tenure groups are: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14,
15 to 19, 20+
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Table H.7: 990 Tax Forms Sample Summary Statistics
Number in
Main Regression Placebo Regression
(1) (2)
First Violins 788 320
















Fretted Instruments 16 16
only Piccolo 20 20
English Horns & other Oboes 11 11
only English Horn 34 34
only Bass Clarinet 18 18
E-Flat Clarinet & Clarinets 118 40
Clarinet & Saxophone 13 13
only Contra Bassoon 20 20
only Bass Trombone 21 21
Tympani & Percussion 107 85
only Tympani 186 167
Percussion, Piano & Celeste 1 1
Piano & Celeste or other keyboard Instruments 55 4
Notes: This table shows the number of observations for each instrument in our main
regression sample in column (1) and for the placebo sample in column(2).
175
